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Abstract 
 
UK historians’ work in the interwar era demonstrates their particular significance in 
shaping the UK’s relationship with Germany. UK interwar historians served in roles 
that touched upon high politics, and in occupations that gave them unique access to 
the public space. The thesis explores why UK historians studied Germany, and with 
what impact on public perceptions. It also assesses how their engagement with 
Germany contributed to their reputations as public intellectuals. The thesis argues 
that UK interwar historians were an influential collection of individuals, whose 
writings on Germany helped consolidate a shifting public space. It examines UK 
historians’ capacity to analyse, prescribe and advocate.  
 
UK historians emerged in the interwar period as an identifiable body of 
public intellectuals. Several factors fostered the development of this collective. These 
factors were strongly influenced by analyses that reflected UK historians’ 
understandings of interwar Germany, and included perceptions of Germanness, 
Germany’s democracy, Germany’s power and the Nazi Party. Ultimately, the thesis 
examines UK interwar historians’ commitment to analysing Germany, albeit with 
diverse opinions. Historians’ evolution as public intellectuals was key in this 
phenomenon.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION AND APPROACHES 
On 15 April 1937, British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin’s private secretary took 
receipt of a memorial addressed to the Prime Minister, and which was authored by 
several prominent British historians of Germany.1 One of the historians who co-
authored the document, William Harbutt Dawson, also appended a personal note to 
the memorial, meant for Baldwin. In it, he outlined what he hoped his 
correspondence would achieve, and in so doing, outlined what he believed to be the 
position and role of British historians in interwar Britain:  
 
 …It falls to me to send this memorial to you. It is due to a deep 
conviction that these questions hold the key not only to friendship 
with Germany but to the peace of Europe. I have known Germany 
intimately for over fifty years – from my student days in Berlin, 
when A. Chamberlain simultaneously matriculated there...have 
closely followed the colonial movement, and written in The Times 
without number. I know, therefore, how intensely, even 
passionately, the Germans feel on this subject, but I know, too, how 
strongly they trust English generosity. I believe they would respond 
wonderfully to a decision in the service of this memorial. I believe, 
too, that the more steps all the world over would be informed for 
such a gesture…I have tried to serve my country and the course of 
international peace for over half a century, and my quest is to help 
avoid our drift into another catastrophe like that of 1914-19.2  
 
  Dawson’s memorial to Baldwin gave insight into the lack of consideration 
for the complexity of Germany’s position in Europe. Dawson felt that misinformed 
views about Germany were rising in the United Kingdom, views which he had hoped 
to help dissuade by appealing to the Prime Minister. The extent of UK historians’ 
                                                          
1 A statement of facts as the basis of a petition. 
2 William Harbutt Dawson’s Note to the Memorial to Baldwin, 15 April 1937, Cambridge University 
Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, Stanley Baldwin’s Private Papers, 
Baldwin 89, ff., F2. 
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public roles involving Germany was belied by Dawson’s personal note and co-
authorship of the memorial, which emphasised to Baldwin that their correspondence 
was not meant for publication.3 However, Dawson’s communication to Baldwin at a 
crucial period in Anglo-German relations shows that an appeal to a leading politician 
could be decisive and revealed historians’ capacity to navigate between the public 
and private spaces that affected foreign policy. The wider interwar period 
demonstrates an ambitious assertion of public intellectuals’ roles by UK historians in 
the interwar era. The note and accompanying memorial’s inspiration was the 
conviction, adopted by Dawson and his colleagues, that a punitive peace had been 
imposed on Germany after World War I. They used this belief to give urgency and 
credence to their analyses and commentary about Germany, and thereby to enhance 
their roles as public intellectuals.  
 
World War I provided the immediate context for British historians’ 
perspectives on Germany, and offers a prism through which to comprehend their 
analyses. An analysis of British historians in the interwar era shows the influence 
that they, as a collection of individuals, wielded in the UK’s relationship with 
Germany, and indicates their collective importance in bringing foreign affairs to the 
attention of the British public. In the period I analyse, some historians often self-
identified as ‘English’ as opposed to ‘British’. Hereafter, I use United Kingdom 
(UK) when referring to the state, and defer to the historians’ own terminology within 
quotations. I argue that UK historians acted as an effective collection of individuals, 
whose interest in interwar Germany created the context for their work across 
different fields of knowledge, thereby accentuating their public role. They fulfilled 
this function while maintaining a variety of beliefs. In the process, UK historians 
sought to raise Britons’ awareness of a collective sense of grievance held by 
Germans. In the interwar period, historians occupied roles that affected decisions of 
high politics, and served in capacities that gave them access to the public. The thesis 
considers UK historians and their ability to marshal analytical, prescriptive and 
advocacy skills. It investigates the role of UK historians in influencing public 
opinion and foreign policy on interwar Germany. 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 
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The focus of the thesis is on UK historians and public intellectuals of interwar 
Germany in order to ascertain the extent to which their public commentary and 
histories contributed to the shaping of UK public opinion and to British foreign 
policy towards Germany. The thesis proposes that, although there was a diversity of 
opinion in their views, there was a synergy between their ability to influence public 
opinion and foreign policy directions. It argues that the study of UK historians of 
interwar Germany constitute a unique case study of public intellectuals who 
influenced private, public and political attitudes. Accordingly, the aim of my thesis is 
to outline and analyse the ways interwar UK historians addressed the geopolitical 
importance of interwar Germany. Though sometimes the historians examined other 
periods and countries aside from Germany’s, it was the singularity of that country’s 
assertiveness and power before World War I which contrasted with the vulnerability 
and weakness after it. Following World War I, Germany remained the object of UK 
historians’ analyses because the outcome of that country’s fate seemed uncertain to 
them and the state remained of geostrategic importance.  
 
These historians’ careers arose at a time when the study of history at tertiary 
level was fluid. The criteria for university history teachers’ employment at this time 
were, according to Matti Klinge, ‘…traditional, undefined and flexible’.4 Such 
historians did not have to be assessed and undertake research in order to facilitate a 
career in academia, though they often did. The intellectuals I selected for this thesis 
all published their work in a wide array of publications. The historians that have been 
selected include those scholars who published revisionist works that questioned 
Germany’s responsibility in starting World War I and who emphasised the severity 
of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and who were variously engaged in 
government and university employment. They worked across different fields of 
knowledge, and the areas of their employment overlapped in a number of ways. 
Historians in the interwar UK were aided in their role by the benefits that flowed 
                                                          
4 Matti Klinge, ‘Teachers’, in Walter Ruegg (ed.), A History of the University in Europe: Universities 
in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Centuries, Vol. 3, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2004, p. 139. 
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from their contributions to their country’s political and social establishment. Chief 
among these were the concepts of capital and the notion of value.  
 
The structure of the thesis examines how UK interwar historians worked 
across contexts as public intellectuals, and how this enabled their particular 
examinations of Germany. Chapter 1 begins with an outline of how UK historians 
gained the wherewithal to engage Germany publicly as intellectuals in the interwar 
era. It explains social and cultural capital as theoretical concepts that underpinned 
UK historians’ capacity to work across different spaces. The chapter explores the 
nature of the interwar public space, and how its development influenced UK 
historians’ analyses of Germany.  
 
Chapter 2 seeks to determine the origins of UK historians’ authoritative 
commentary and analyses on interwar Germany. UK historians’ activities in various 
circles gave them the gravitas to work across different fields of knowledge, and to 
broaden notions about what their role in society really was. Working within these 
fields enhanced their authoritativeness as public intellectuals. UK interwar historians 
formed a collection of individuals, but their collective influence was given 
expression by public involvement in political parties, international movements, 
foreign-policy formation, the press and associations. Chapter 3 looks at how UK 
historians’ capacity to depict themselves as authoritative analysts of Germany was 
aided by the socio-cultural context of interwar UK. The literature review shows how 
historians analysed the interwar period. It is situated as an examination of historians’ 
roles in the public space, and places the period’s various aspects in the context of 
what has been written about this subject. UK historians were strongly influenced by 
ideas about class, ethnicity and gender. As public intellectuals, these were formative 
parts of their identity, and how historians analysed Germany and German identity. 
 
UK interwar historians investigated matters of high importance to Germans. 
Within Britain, they examined contested interpretations of Germannness, as outlined 
in Chapter 4. These included interpretations that revolved around how Britons could 
comprehend Germany. Historians invoked ideas about Anglo-Saxon identity, 
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militarism, and intellectualism as reference points through which to understand 
Germans. UK historians raised the significance of these aspects to create a context 
about Germans’ collective sense of injustice, grievance and failure following World 
War I. Historians sought to bring awareness of these to Britons, and to elicit empathy 
for Germans’ vulnerability and humiliation. Chapter 5 investigates UK historians’ 
views about Germany’s chances of achieving a viable democratic system, which had 
been complicated by the 1919 Versailles Treaty and its associated War Guilt Clause. 
Chapter 6 profiles how UK historians saw interwar Germany’s ability to project its 
power beyond its borders as indicative of Germans’ sense of renewed dynamism 
after World War I.  
Historians were sensitive to Germans’ sense of insecurity and were conscious 
of their German colleagues’ aspirations for national achievement. These events set 
the context for the way historians scrutinised the Nazi Party, and are examined in 
Chapter 7. Historians contextualised the party’s development through two parallel 
tracks, with one approach analysing the Nazi Party as just another German 
government that could be influenced, while the other examined the party and 
movement to represent a force that required balancing and opposition. The thesis 
differs from other studies in that I argue that UK interwar historians’ acted as an 
uniquely influential collection of individuals, whose knowledge of Germany raised 
their profile as public intellectuals who could.  
 
For UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany, the social rank they enjoyed 
afforded them an appreciation of the merits in which holding Germany high as an 
important subject of discussion be continued. The thesis uses elements of a 
prosopographical approach that presents biographical data of individuals who meet 
the thesis’ definition of UK historians and public intellectuals. This is in order to 
outline their backgrounds, motives and to discern the degree of commonalities that 
existed among them.5 Prosopography has been defined as ‘collective life histories’, 
‘collective biography’, and quantitative Personenforschung.6 Moreover, 
                                                          
5 Anna Beerens, Friends, Acquaintances, Pupils and Patrons: Japanese Intellectual Life in the Late 
Eighteenth Century: A Prosopographical Approach, Amsterdam, Leiden University Press, 2006, p. 
18. 
6 Ibid. 
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prosopography has often been determined to be ‘the description of persons with 
regard to their functions and their relations to other persons’.7 Indeed, the historian 
Lawrence Stone articulated an interpretation of prosopography in a magisterial 
article.8 He wrote,  
 
Prosopography is the investigation of the common background 
characteristics of a group of actors in history by means of a 
collective study of their lives. The method employed is to establish 
a universe to be studied, and then to ask a set of uniform 
questions…The various types of information about the individuals 
in the universe are then juxtaposed and combined, and are 
examined for significant variables.9  
 
 
Advances in the methodology of prosopography continued to increase in the 
interwar period, and crystallised with the publication of Lewis B. Namier’s The 
Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (1928).10 One of the impetuses 
for the interest in prosopography was historians’ desire to know ‘about who rather 
than what’.11 While the focus of prosopography appears to highlight the significance 
of ‘the group’, the goal of retaining ‘the individuality of every person within the 
chosen collective’ is aimed for.12 Despite this, however, prosopography is exercised 
in order to analyse collectives, because the whole of the collective should be looked 
at and not just the individual parts who comprise it.13 As it was infeasible to analyse 
all of the UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany outside the scope of the 
thesis’ parameters, there is a concentration on historians and public intellectuals 
whose involvement as part of an effective collective of individuals is apparent. The 
prosopographical methodology applied in the study is not strictly comparative, as the 
employment of ‘identical categories’ would be unviable, given the differing 
                                                          
7 Peter Becker, ‘Making Individuals: Some Remarks on the Creation of a Prosopographical Catalogue 
with KLEIO’, in Jean-Philippe Genet and Günther Lottes (eds), L’État moderne et les élites, XIIIe-
XVIIIe siècles, apports et limites de la méthod prosopographique, Paris, 1995, p. 51, pp. 51-61. 
8 Lawrence  Stone, ‘Prosopography’, Daedalus 110, 1971, pp. 46-79. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, 2nd edn, London, 
Macmillan, [1928] 1957. 
11 Stone, p. 53. 
12 Beerens, Friends, Acquaintances, Pupils and Patrons: Japanese Intellectual Life in the Late 
Eighteenth Century: A Prosopographical Approach, p. 19.  
13 Ibid., p. 36. 
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contributions from a wide range of historians and public intellectuals.14 Individuals 
whose work and biographies gave evidence of their contributions are included. In 
terms of the development of the historical discipline, there were few limitations put 
on the inclusion of individuals, as there was growth in the extent to which history 
bordered on, and sometimes merged into the neighbouring research areas of 
international relations and political science. The research and writing of history was 
considered foundational to the analysis of international relations in this era.  
 
Anna Beerens has acknowledged that gatherings of people that are 
identifiable by several or more characteristics ‘often evoke a sense of organisation, 
structure and conscious belonging’.15 However, the sense of group awareness or 
consciousness ‘may not have been intended by the individuals associated with the 
group’ and a sense of association may be absent.16 Some of the differences between 
historians and social scientists include historians’ use of prosopographies for 
biographical information, while social scientists practice ‘social network analysis’.17 
Prosopography and social network analysis are similar in some respects but are 
different methodologies.18 Beerens contended that the methodology of 
prosopography is context-dependent and is contingent upon the specific nature of the 
task. She wrote, 
 
The term ‘method’ is used here in a fairly loose sense: one might 
say that there is no single prosopographical method, but that 
prosopography is a varying combination of methods borrowed from 
several disciplines. The structure of prosopographical studies can 
vary endlessly.19  
 
  
Social and Cultural Capital: Bourdieu 
UK historians’ possession of social and cultural capital enabled a capacity to project 
authority into political space throughout the interwar period. Their ability to do this 
                                                          
14 Ibid., p. 21. 
15 Ibid., p. 29. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 31. 
18 Ibid., p. 30. 
19 Ibid., p. 38. 
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was aided by the measure of authoritativeness that their work held, and derived from 
a public perception that their opinions were reputable. The noted sociologist, Pierre 
Bourdieu, identified social groups as being attached to an agglomeration of social 
fields where different power centres converge. Bourdieu contended that these aspects 
were ‘capital’.20 Gaining access to these fields required UK historians to possess 
intellectual, social and cultural ‘assets’, which determined their inclusion into fields 
where their opinions about Germany would matter.21 Among Bourdieu’s 
contributions towards understanding capital was his categorisation of the term into 
four generic divisions, involving symbolic, economic, social and cultural capital. 
This was thereafter broadened into the classes of capital that included political 
capital, educational capital, as well as other field-specific definitions.22 As a 
collection of individuals, historians’ use of these types of capital would add credence 
to their analyses and commentary about interwar Germany. 
 
UK historians’ possession of various aspects of capital allowed them to 
augment their authority in the interwar era.23 Social capital, and its close counterpart 
cultural capital, both largely derive from Bourdieu’s works.24 James Coleman and 
Robert D. Putnam have deepened the discussion provided by Bourdieu’s research 
into social and cultural capital, by investigating whether the phenomenon finds 
                                                          
20 Rajani Naidoo, ‘Fields and Institutional Strategy: Bourdieu on the Relationship between Higher 
Education, Inequality and Society’, British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol. 25, No. 4, 
September 2004, p. 458.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Mike Savage, Alan Warde and Fiona Devine, ‘Capitals, Assets, and Resources: Some Critical 
Issues’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2005, p. 40. See also: James Farr, ‘Social 
Capital: A Conceptual History’, Political Theory, Vol. 32, No. 1, February 2004, p. 25. Farr pointed 
out that nineteenth-century political scientists, such as Marx, Marshall and Bellamy, emphasised the 
‘social’ of social capital, rather than twenty-first-century focuses on the ‘capital’ aspect of the term. 
23 The most notable of his books in this field are: Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, Peter Collier 
(trans.), Stanford, Stanford University Press, [1984] 1988; Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social 
Critique of the Judgement of Taste, Richard Nice (trans.), London, Routledge, [1979] 1984; Pierre 
Bourdieu et al, Academic Discourse: Linguistic Misunderstanding and Professorial Power, Richard 
Teese (trans.), Cambridge, Polity Press, [1965] 1994; Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, in J. 
Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research in the Sociology of Education, New York, 1985; 
and, Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, J. D. Wacqaunt (trans.), 
Cambridge, Polity Press, [1989] 1996. 
24 Ben Fine, ‘Social Capital versus Social History’, Social History, Vol. 33, No. 4, November 2008, p. 
451; Derek Robbins, ‘The Origins, Early Development and Status of Bourdieu’s Concept of Cultural 
Capital’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2005, p. 15: Robbins contends that 
Bourdieu came from an intellectual culture which evolved differently to the German legacy of 
Kulturgeschichte or Geisteswissenschaft.  
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greater expression in individuals or groups.25 The UK historians gave expression to 
social and cultural capital as a collection of individuals who had interests in interwar 
Germany.  
 
UK historians acquired social and cultural capital by their closeness to 
education and institutions of learning, such as public schools and universities. 
Networks forged during study and work facilitated historians’ later employment. 
Their involvement also facilitated their ability to collaborate and network with 
colleagues from other professions. The public’s recognition of historians as credible 
commentators was facilitated by the latter’s proximity to higher education and ability 
to access zones where they could be influential. Bourdieu interpreted social capital to 
be the ‘aggregate of the actual or potential resources that are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition…which provide each of its members with the backing 
of collectively owned capital’.26 The acquisition of social capital enabled historians’ 
professional advancement through their proximity with intellectuals and their entry 
into institutions that awarded credentials, such as degrees deemed worthy by 
society.27  
 
Historians knowingly used aspects of a particularly relevant type of capital, 
cultural capital, to advance their credibility.28 Historians’ connections to schools and 
universities, and the increasing prominence of education’s value aided this 
perception. Cultural capital, wrote Susan Dumais, was ‘a power source’ which 
                                                          
25 Ibid.  
26 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, in J. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research 
in the Sociology of Education, New York, 1985, p. 249; For seeing the distinction between North 
American and European interpretations of social capital, see: Ellen Wall, Gabriele Ferrazzi and Frans 
Schryer, ‘Getting the Goods on Social Capital’, Rural Sociology, Vol. 63, No. 2, June 1998, p. 304: 
‘In mainstream American sociology, the current, widely accepted definition of social capital is the 
mutual relations, interactions, and networks that emerge among human groups, as well as the level of 
trust (seen as the outcome of obligations and norms which adhere to the social structure) found within 
a particular group or community. In contrast, European sociologists tend to use the same term when 
examining how the mobilisation of connections associated with social networks reinforces the social 
hierarchy and differential power’  
27 Alejandro Portes, ‘Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology’, Annual 
Review of Sociology, Vol. 24, 1998, p. 4.  
28 Susan A. Dumais, ‘Cultural Capital, Gender, and School Success: The Role of Habitus’, Sociology 
of Education, Vol. 75, 2002, p. 46.  
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facilitated status, a feature it shared with symbolic, economic and social capital.29 
Historians would draw upon these currents of legitimacy, both real and perceived, in 
order to amplify the scope of their authority. Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital 
has particular resonance in the education system of interwar Britain, where it 
intersected with the class system.30 This intersection helps to understand the broader 
social authority of public intellectuals whose success originated from time spent at 
educative locales, such as school or university.  
  
UK interwar historians were endowed with cultural capital, and had the 
opportunity to be acknowledged publicly by virtue of their acquired expertise.31 This 
is especially so if their knowledge of a field was vast and was regarded by the 
community as having social and cultural importance.32 Dumais recounted how 
Bourdieu differentiated cultural capital along several criteria, with institutional 
cultural capital, involving ‘educational credentials and the credentialing system’ that 
can clearly be associated with UK interwar intellectuals.33 UK interwar intellectuals’ 
educational attainment transformed a generic cultural capital into its institutionalised 
variant with an educational and class-based dimension.34 Embodied cultural capital, a 
form of cultural capital distinct from its institutionalised variant, enabled historians 
to exploit their ‘dominance’ in information about Germany by gaining direct access 
to ‘prestigious groups’ as well as by facilitating their involvement in ‘exclusively 
bounded networks’.35 This aided the development of ‘social connections’ with 
likeminded people who held comparable views.36 Bourdieu’s investigations of social 
capital’s relatedness to cultural capital emphasised the importance of social 
connections, and these would have had particular relevance for UK interwar 
historians.37 He explored the method by which intellectuals’ capital incorporated 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Rob Moore, ‘Cultural Capital: Objective Probability and the Cultural Arbitrary’, British Journal of 
Sociology of Education, Vol. 25, No. 4, September 2004, p. 445. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Dumais, ‘Cultural Capital, Gender, and School Success: The Role of Habitus’, p. 46. 
35 Omar Lizardo, ‘How Cultural Tastes Shape Personal Networks’, American Sociological Review, 
Vol. 71, October, 2006, p. 780.  
36 Wendy Bottero, ‘Relationality and Social Interaction’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 60, 
No. 2, 2009, p. 407. 
37 Ibid.  
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‘strategies of reproduction’, based on the underpinning ‘field of power’.38 As van der 
Werfhorst contended: 
 
[i]n Bourdieu’s work on cultural reproduction, cultural capital 
functions to reproduce social advantage…Once direct forms of 
transmission of (economic) capital became less easy, elites had to 
find other ways to transmit their advantage, which is achieved by 
means of cultural resources reproduced through the education 
system…the increasing relevance of education was not only driven 
by normative pressures against direct transmissions of advantage, 
but also by increasing demand for the kinds of skills closely related 
to cultural resources, such as social and language skills.39 
 
  UK historians were particularly adept at attaining and deploying 
institutionalised cultural capital.40 UK interwar historians’ networks emanated from 
their association with schools, colleges, universities and work, which maximised 
their connectivity with social and cultural capital. Historians were able to improve 
their standing by involving themselves in firm social circles that accentuate their 
visibility, obligation and fellowship, increasing their cultural capital in the process. 
Furthermore, this entry into ‘prestigious groups’ increases a participant’s rewards in 
the system.41 Sullivan theorised Bourdieu’s idea of cultural capital to be intertwined 
with the norms and values of a society’s elite, and particularly intellectuals’ capacity 
to discern and employ the language of the ‘educated’.42 Cultural capital is 
constructed via embodied, internalised social structures, shown in the concept of 
habitus.43  
 
UK historians in interwar Britain possessed a variety of forms of capital, 
drawing attention to the convertibility of one type of capital into another.44 Bourdieu 
developed this idea in his work, Distinction (1984), in which he wrote that 
                                                          
38 Ibid.  
39 Herman G. van der Werfhorst, ‘Cultural Capital: Strengths, Weaknesses and Two Advancements’, 
British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol. 31, No. 2, March 2010, p. 160. 
40 Portes, ‘Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology’, p. 4.  
41 Lizardo, ‘How Cultural Tastes Shape Personal Networks’, p. 780.  
42 Alice Sullivan, ‘Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment’, Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2001, p. 
893. 
43 Mary Kosut, ‘Professional Capital: Blue-Collar Reflections on Class, Culture and the Academy’, 
Cultural Studies-Critical Methodologies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2006, pp. 247-248.  
44 Kosut, ‘Professional Capital: Blue-Collar Reflections on Class, Culture and the Academy’, pp. 247-
249; See also: Lizardo, ‘How Cultural Tastes Shape Personal Networks’, p. 780.  
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someone’s social standing was related to four entwined classes of capital, namely, 
cultural, social, economic and symbolic.45 Bourdieu’s insights revealed how he 
situated social capital within the framework of rituals and institutions, including, 
among other things, work, education, status and institutional networks. He noted that, 
while these associations are interconnected and served as a vehicle for the 
propagation of selected aspects of cultural and economic capital, they are often not 
noticeable by actors at the time.46 UK historians, however, used Britons’ interest in 
interwar Germany to defy this observation, though it remained accurate in how they 
primarily acquired social and cultural capital in the first place. 
  
Bourdieu’s research on capital focused on the nexus that existed between 
cultural capital and the educational system and which attracted historians who were 
‘academically talented’.47 Accordingly, a symmetry existed between advanced 
education and social class, with historians who possessed cultural capital often pre-
exposed to it as a consequence of their social background and influence.48 Bourdieu’s 
work on Parisian institutions of higher education, Homo Academicus (1984), and his 
opus on elite schools, The State Nobility (1989), laid out the flexible nature of 
defining some types of capital. In his books, he laid out a distinction between 
intellectual capital and academic capital, though this acknowledged that historians’ 
success in various roles required them to master the conventions of their 
institutions..49 Moreover, the transferability of different types of capital that 
historians enjoyed gave an insight into how education was deemed valuable. 
Historians’ cultural capital was transmitted by the means of the transformative power 
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of education. The cultural signifiers of those historians who internalised cultural 
capital existed in their mien, language and self-confident projection.50  
 
It is undoubtedly the case that the attainment and use of social and cultural 
capital provided a form of influence to historians. UK interwar historians’ personal 
and career success depended on the role and gradual expansion of universities, as 
well as a rising level of education to cater to an interwar mass society’s demands of a 
reading public.51 The British tradition of universities was often held to accentuate 
universities’ role in developing ‘character’ rather than focusing on ‘scholastic 
credentials’.52 In this context, historians’ academic capital refers to cultural capital 
that has been institutionalised via the transmission of a university education.53 In 
Homo Academicus, academic capital was associated with the machinery of the 
university establishment, while intellectual capital was connected to scholarly 
achievement and reflection.54 In The State Nobility, however, academic capital takes 
on an institutional dimension of cultural capital and was founded on such factors as 
‘prior educational achievement’ and a propensity to exhibit academic attributes in 
verbal and written communication.55 In The State Nobility, Bourdieu outlined the 
significance of accruing accredited, educative credentials for the acquisition of 
cultural capital.56 In this respect in the UK, the weight that social capital had 
acquired as a desirable commodity for social networking, when viewed in the context 
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of historians’ attendance at a school or university, transcended the importance of the 
institution’s credentials.57  
 
The promulgation of civic values by UK historians allowed them to 
contribute to political debates, entangling them in the public space. These 
phenomena were part of the larger framework of the UK’s political culture, a feature 
which indicated how the state’s constituent nations dealt with debate. It is evident 
that cultural and social capital was revealed by UK historians to engage in topics of 
significance within a multinational and multiethnic UK, and to ensure that a political 
environment rich in capital was also ‘open, pluralistic, deliberative, tolerant and 
democratic’.58  
 
UK interwar historians moved across contexts through their employment in 
both academia and government, enabling their access to various positions that were 
both traditional and innovative. Historians formed a group to the extent that they can 
be collectively characterised by a proximity to multiple fields of knowledge. While a 
group’s traits, argued Michael Grenfell, often determine their educational success, 
the same was true for a collection of individuals.59 Individuals’ social capital 
translated into how influence was used at all levels of the education system. This was 
where teachers’ influence, ‘collegiality’, ‘bonding’ and ‘mutual trust’ formed social 
capital that endured beyond the duration of their studies.60 The social mores and 
norms were reflected in society’s education system.61 High educational achievement 
provided historians a pathway to the public space. UK historians’ education from 
schools and universities provided them with formative skills that benefited them in 
the interwar era. It is not surprising that historians of Germany would command 
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respect when commenting on Germany, given Bourdieu regarded disciplines as 
having their own distinct intellectual capital that were each woven together within 
‘fields of power’.62  
 
For the historians, who form the basis of this thesis, a fluid interdependence 
that drew on diverse social and political networks would prove central. The political 
culture of the interwar UK ensured that historians would not have to temporise in the 
face of government fiat and could undertake research that amplified their projection 
of political influence. The interrelationship between students and teachers in 
universities was vital in serving as a seedbed for the socialising process in the 
interwar era.63 Coleman, in 1990, sought to explain how intellectuals benefited from 
trust that was embodied in relationships formed by social capital.64 He argued that a 
precondition for maximising the efficiency and knowledge of human capital was that 
social capital provide an organic basis for social networks to flourish.65 Historians’ 
networks embodied social capital, and highlight the role that networks play in 
accentuating the civic virtues that underpin stable democracies.66 Historians 
demonstrated that a polity could draw on social networks that operate outside a 
government’s aegis, as well as highlight the significance of democracy’s social 
resources.67 
 
Crucially, UK historians worked across multiple contexts in the public space. 
UK historians sought to raise awareness of interwar Germany, and in the process 
excite public interest about the complexity of Germany’s circumstances. The case of 
interwar Germany emphasises the centrality of the public space and its connectivity 
with the interests of UK historians. Historians’ involvement increased the public 
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visibility of intellectuals in the public space. UK historians operated within the 
tradition of not maintaining connections with, and being subsidised by, the state. 
While there are many formulations of ‘the public space’ depending on the era, place 
and society, most emphasise it in contradistinction with the private space and argue 
that it emanates from the particular power arrangement in a society.68  
 
UK historians’ involvement in the public space transcended their influence as 
a part of civil society. Paul Ginsborg supported theorist Jürgen Habermas’ 
interpretation of the public space as representing, ‘first of all a realm of our social 
life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed […] A portion of 
the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals 
assemble to form a public body’.69 The public space, Ginsburg explained, is separate 
from civil society, even though they are associated and serve as a locale for citizens 
to engage in dialogue.70 The distinction is emphasised when it is recalled that civil 
society is founded on activities and networks, while the public space operates as a 
vehicle for disseminating public opinion.71 The concept is extrapolated further on the 
predication that ‘liberal’ societies’ self-identify by declaring a private dimension to 
their activities. Indeed, Alan McKee acknowledges that the public space is connected 
with civil society and is not attached to government.72  
 
A developing public space was crucial in determining the expression of 
interwar UK historians, though historians’ public voice was not new. As UK interwar 
historians were public intellectuals who sought to propagate civic virtues within the 
public space, their actions were helped by pre-existing connections with social 
capital.73 Historians formed collectives that were composed of individuals, which 
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nurtured political tolerance and political orientation.74 The performance of these 
‘…little democracies’, influenced the ‘political context’ of the broader society.75 
Their success extended to the political and social institutions, including parliament 
and the rule of law, which constituted the foundations of the political order.76 Jeffrey 
Cormier and Phillip Coutin, suggested that the promotion of democracy is a theme 
that is redolent throughout the literature on the public space, and pointed out that the 
growth of new types of civic associations in the nineteenth-century aided the 
transmission of democracy and imbued its ethics across the public space in many 
countries.77  
 
Using Bourdieu as a Framework 
The thesis’ use of Bourdieu incorporates his scholarship within the parameters of the 
work of UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany. As such, while the 
empirical and theoretical aspects of the thesis tend to be combined, it nonetheless 
seeks to emphasise the applicability of Bourdieu’s work in a narrow, specific and 
historical context. Bourdieu’s work was vital for accentuating the merits of UK 
historians and public intellectuals, and in explicating how the notions of social and 
cultural capital were related to their career development both within and outside of 
the UK’s education system. When Roger Brubaker reviewed Bourdieu’s book, 
Choses dites (1987), itself composed of Bourdieu’s intellectual’s discussions, 
lectures and interviews, he commented that Bourdieu’s work has a uniqueness when 
it is positioned around subjects that are situationally and contextually applicable.78 
Brubaker wrote, 
 
[s]ince Bourdieu’s texts are products – and instruments – of 
particular intellectual strategies and struggles, their emphases vary 
considerably from text to text, depending on the particular 
intellectual field in which a text is situated and the structure of that 
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field at the time the text was written.79  
 
 
The historical and specific context of the influence shown by UK historians 
and public intellectuals of Germany is discernible from a careful employment of 
Bourdieu’s ideas. Bourdieu’s work covered the complexities involved with 
determining how someone’s social standing influences the decisions they take 
throughout life.80 He took political positions that were publicly contentious. He 
examined, sociology, history, education, philosophy and anthropology, among many 
others. Bourdieu founded his own journal, before gradually starting a publishing 
company.81 Bourdieu came from France, a polity where ‘the ideal of the detached 
and critical intellectual who intervenes actively in the political life of the nation is 
particularly strong’.82 Bourdieu was an untypical intellectual, in that he was deemed 
by some to be not as energetic as his colleagues. There was a difference between 
Bourdieu’s ‘public political activism’ in the later part of his working life, and 
between the scholarship that typified the early work of his career.83  
 
The personal trajectories of UK historians and public intellectuals of 
Germany through the UK’s class system was of vital importance to identifying their 
level of influence. However, historians’ proximity to fellow intellectuals and 
scholarly institutions also assisted their choice in available pathways. Bourdieu’s 
work is useful when setting his contributions inside the specific social meaning of the 
interwar period’s parameters.84 Education was a vital aspect to understanding 
Bourdieu’s research, and it has been identified that greater scope for future research 
lies in the areas of ‘personal narrative’ and ‘emotion’.85 Bourdieu regarded the 
schooling system to be the primary vehicle for the reproduction of a functioning 
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hierarchy in sophisticated countries.86 Although Bourdieu’s concepts were associated 
with the latter half of the twentieth century, they have currency within the interwar 
era as he held education to be important in the travails of democracy.87 Bourdieu 
studied philosophy as a requirement for higher learning, and it was noted that 
intellectuals were often tutored in philosophy as their first subject. Anthropology was 
not yet regularised as an authentic subject, and the teaching of philosophy dominated 
the curricula.88 The combination of history, geography and anthropology attained 
greater significance for intellectuals’ education.89  
 
Bourdieu derived much of his concepts from sociological readings of 
peoples’ interactions, and the extent to which public intellectuals’ functions and 
obligations reinforced one another were evident with the choices made by interwar 
UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany. Bourdieu explained habitus as a 
way to discern his own career chronology. He determined that comprehending 
habitus depends upon knowing social backgrounds.90 Bourdieu was chided by some 
within France because his political activism was perceived to be too intense. It was 
noted that he felt deeply about ‘the role and the responsibilities of the intellectual’.91 
Bourdieu later wrote that, ‘[n]othing is more false… than the maxim almost 
universally accepted in the social sciences according to which the researcher must 
put nothing of himself into his research’.92 He urged public intellectuals to 
understand themselves and their histories collectively, rather than as agents who 
acted independently. Indeed, Bourdieu held the individual to be a ‘social agent’.93 
 
Bourdieu’s sociological interpretations of peoples’ relationships have 
received criticism. However, these critiques of Bourdieu paradoxically strengthen the 
argument of this study that interwar UK historians and public intellectuals of 
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Germany were an effective collection of individuals. Aspects that undermine the 
interchangeability of Bourdieu’s research into other fields include the different 
circumstances that may prevail, and that lay outside the scope of Bourdieu’s work. 
Another feature of criticism of using Bourdieu involves the exactitude of his 
conclusions, given that the nature of his work could be interpreted to encourage 
precision about various subjects. His work has been interpreted to be weak in 
historical perspective, but also to be applicable in different activities or fields. 
However, although the context provided by an analysis of the interwar UK is specific 
and historical, Bourdieu’s work can be interpreted to transcend time and locality, 
given that much of his scholarship sought to comment on systems, and to 
recommend solutions in order to understand them.  His work can be interpreted as 
relevant while lying within the bounds of historical chronology. In other words, the 
creation of Bourdieu’s works and their reception could convey a sense of them being 
contingent upon theoretical speculation.94  
 
Bourdieu observed that academia, like other professions, is conflictual in 
areas and that there were disagreements over what constituted symbolic capital.95 
Cultural capital has been defined by other social theorists as exceeding the ‘symbolic 
knowledge’ which Bourdieu suggested, and that it incorporated the totality of 
cultural items.96 However, the thesis’ focus is not on the development of sociological 
interpretations or on social and cultural capital per se, but in how it was employed 
and to what effect. It examines the process of historians’ work as public intellectuals. 
Some critiques of Bourdieu charged that his theory was unable to explain 
transformations in the social sphere.97 This viewpoint has received various levels of 
prominence, with some alleging that Bourdieu displayed ‘quietism’ in terms of 
political activism and that his work reinforced a superior culture.98 Some have 
asserted that his work underrates the capability of the working class, and that his 
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research reflects ‘determinism’.99 UK historians and public intellectuals’ enrolment 
at particular educative institutions reflected the centrality that class enjoyed with 
education in their careers. The education system in the UK was an aspect of the class 
system, and rose out of the networks of power to express a willingness for equitable 
reform, as opposed to the interests that stood for maintaining existing power 
arrangements. 
 
Bourdieu suggested that there was a risk that intellectuals’ views were at risk 
of becoming commodified, a situation which he which he named ‘Le Fast Talker’.100 
Many regard Bourdieu’s political involvement and his ‘scientific’ research to be 
interchangeable, but that his research has been misinterpreted by academic 
rigidity.101  Furthermore, Bourdieu saw journalism become entwined with the 
functioning of politics.102 A large part of Bourdieu’s research before the twenty-first 
century found fault with what he perceived as the independence of French writers, in 
that the proximity of journalism with intellectualism was growing so great as to be 
counterproductive.103 However, Vera Mark blamed Bourdieu for ‘scholasticism’, 
which embodied some of the dilemmas in contemporary anthropology to which he 
himself had warned.104  
 
Bourdieu noted how enthusiasm was influenced by the capital that 
intellectuals enjoyed, in that it was derived from social networks in which they were 
located and from the high esteem in which their erudition was held. Bourdieu’s 
‘highly visible political engagements’ throughout the course of his working life was 
noted by his contemporaries.105 He posited that a large number of public intellectuals 
are ‘fortuitously thrust into the limelight’, and that they attained ‘by virtue 
of…accident sufficient name recognition to become sought-after commentators on 
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current events’.106 Moreover, Bourdieu’s characterisations of ‘an intellectual life’ 
included intellectuals’ display of maturity, ostensibly even without them being 
mature.107 He reflected that those members of society who concerned themselves 
with abstract questions were more prone to enjoy this trait.108 The vestiges of 
primordial ideas about honour are evident in looking at the origins in the 
development of the professions.109 A sign of Bourdieu’s influence is the interest he 
showed in intelligence that was not accrued as a result of schooling. This approach 
emphasised how students socialised themselves in relation to their institution and 
each other.110 Bourdieu alluded how intellectuals’ voices were widely heard and 
wrote, ‘[r]egarding the loss of disinterested researchers, I would say that scientists 
are always interested’.111  
 
Bourdieu maintained that in order to know the ‘character of stratification’ in 
an area, it was the examination of intellectuals which was critical for discerning 
where the political and social dynamics of a country lay.112 At the time of the 
interwar period, it was acknowledged that there was a necessity for academics to 
position their analyses within the ambits of generally agreed upon findings.113 This 
limited the likelihood of redundant methods interfering in the development of new 
approaches in understanding society.114 The consolidation of the public space 
provided an opportunity for UK historians in the interwar era to adopt positions that 
could reinvigorate a role for public intellectuals.115 The ‘political context of the 
social environment’ affected the calculus of the participants who operated within 
it.116 Critiques by ‘academic intellectuals’ such as historians within the public space 
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raised the quality of debate and deepened the social and intellectual basis of 
democracy in the UK.117  
 
Methodology 
My research question is, ‘what were UK historians’ roles in analysing Germany, and 
how did they analyse that country in the interwar period?’ To answer this, I explore 
historians’ influence on the public debate regarding Germany, and analyse how this 
facilitated their work as public intellectuals. I argue that UK historians and public 
intellectuals acted as an effective collection of individuals, whose interest in interwar 
Germany created the context for their work across different areas of work and public 
life. The methodology that I adopt is based on a thematic approach and explores UK 
historians’ engagement with Germany in the interwar period. Examining the extent 
of historians’ fluid roles in this era requires identifying areas where intellectuals’ 
commentary identified the course of events. The thesis’ approach incorporates 
primary and secondary sources to identify recurrent themes in the analysis of 
interwar Germany.  
  
This project focuses on a number of key historians. These were selected to 
include UK historians who trained in universities, worked in universities and 
engaged in research that led them to publish material on interwar Germany. They 
were variously employed by the government and contributed to government policy. 
The criteria used to select historians drew on the bases of historians’ careerism, 
meaning institutional affiliation and publishing. The research involves the scrutiny of 
contemporary archival sources holding the personal papers, diaries, letters and 
manuscripts of historians. I have accessed primary source material from British 
archives and libraries, including the British Library, the British National Archives, 
the University of London’s Senate House Library, London School of Economics’ 
Archives, the German Historical Institute of London, Oxford University’s Bodleian 
Library, Cambridge University Library’s Manuscripts, Kings College (Cambridge) 
Archive Centre, the University of Manchester John Rylands Library’s Special 
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Collections, the University of Leeds’ Brotherton Library and, Edinburgh University 
Library’s Centre for Research Collections. Together, this encompasses the archival 
resources of 18 of the UK’s most influential interwar historians of Germany.  
 
The selected historians offer a comprehensive sample of those working in the 
field. There were 92 authors who published books on the subject of Germany and its 
relation to Europe in the interwar period. The thesis’ parameters are exclusive to the 
works published between 1918 and 1940. Many of these same authors contributed to 
edited works that are also included in the percentage of books published. The 18 UK 
historians selected out of the 92 encompass 77 per cent of the number of works 
written by historians about Germany throughout the interwar period. Included in this 
proportion are historians’ public lectures, newspaper pieces and journal articles. The 
selected historians had archival sources that were substantial and commensurate to 
their impact in the interwar period. A number of other historians had a smaller 
archival presence, or none at all, and have consequently not been included in the 
study.118 17 out of 18 UK interwar historians were affiliated with what would 
become Russell Group universities.  
Historians and public intellectuals who had an archival presence up to series level, 
and who I was able to access include: 
 
Charles Robert Ashbee 
Ronald Edmund Balfour  
Sir Charles Raymond Beazley  
Sir Herbert Butterfield  
Edward Hallett Carr  
Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne-Cecil  
William Harbutt Dawson  
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson  
Arthur Elliott Felkin  
Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher  
Norman Henry Gibbs  
George Peabody Gooch  
Arthur James Grant  
Richard Haldane  
Sir James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley  
Arthur Berriedale Keith  
Richard Henry Tawney  
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Arnold Toynbee  
George Macaulay Trevelyan  
Arthur Keith  
John Theodore Merz:  
John Maynard Keynes 
Edmund Dene Morel 
Gilbert Murray:  
Philip John Noel-Baker 
Albert Frederick Pollard 
Thomas Frederick Tout 
Sir Robert Gilbert Vansittart: 
Charles Kingsley Webster 
Henry Wickham Steed 
Alfred Eckhard Zimmern 
 
Historians’ Archival Presence 
Charles Robert Ashbee: 1 location 
Ronald Edmund Balfour: 3 locations of related collections 
Sir Charles Raymond Beazley: 5 locations of related collections 
Sir Herbert Butterfield: 8 locations of related collections 
Edward Hallett Carr: 4 locations of related collections  
Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne-Cecil: 11 locations of related collections 
William Harbutt Dawson: 1 location 
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson: 8 locations of related collections 
Arthur Elliott Felkin: 1 location 
Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher: 33 locations of related collections 
Norman Henry Gibbs: 4 locations of related collections  
George Peabody Gooch: 7 locations of related collections 
Arthur James Grant: 5 locations of related collections 
Richard Haldane: 11 locations of related collections 
Sir James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley: 5 locations of related collections 
Arthur Berriedale Keith: 2 locations of related collections 
Richard Henry Tawney: 12 locations of related collections 
Arnold Toynbee: 10 locations of related collections 
George Macaulay Trevelyan: 25 locations of related collections 
Arthur Keith: 11 locations of related collections 
John Theodore Merz: 2 locations of related collections 
John Maynard Keynes: 11 locations of related collections 
Edmund Dene Morel: 9 locations of related collections 
Gilbert Murray: 11 locations of related collections 
Philip John Noel-Baker: 11 locations of related collections 
Albert Frederick Pollard: 10 locations of related collections 
Thomas Frederick Tout: 3 locations of related collections 
Sir Robert Gilbert Vansittart: 11 locations of related collections 
Charles Kingsley Webster: 11 locations of related collections 
Henry Wickham Steed: 9 locations of related collections  
Alfred Eckhard Zimmern: 10 locations of related collections 
  
 26 
 
Historians and public intellectuals who had an archival presence up to series level, 
and who I was unable to fully access: 
 
Earnest Barker: 16 locations of related collections 
Geoffrey Barraclough: 4 locations of related collections  
Raymond Beazley: 5 locations of related collections  
John Buchan: 38 locations of related collections  
Edward Hallett Carr: 4 locations of related collections  
G. K. Chesterton: 12 locations of related collections  
G. E. R. Gedye: 3 locations of related collections  
William Foster: 3 locations of related collections  
Frank Noel Keen: 3 locations of related collections  
F. J. C. Hearnshaw: 1 location of related collections  
F. S. Marvin: 2 locations of related collections  
T. G. Masaryk: 2 locations of related collections  
Judah Leon Maynes: 1 location of related collections  
Edward Deane Morel: 14 locations of related collections  
Lewis Bernstein Namier: 9 locations of related collections  
Hugh Rathbone: 2 locations of related collections  
Richard Henry Tawney: 16 locations of related collections  
Alan John Percivale Taylor: 10 locations of related collections  
Arnold Toynbee: 10 locations of related collections  
George Macaulay Trevelyan: 25 locations of related collections  
John Wheeler-Bennett: 3 locations of related collections  
 
Not all of these archives contained materials pertaining to the interwar period or UK 
historians’ work covering Germany. Each of these UK interwar historians, however, 
has an archival record that involves series cataloguing. These occasionally included 
materials relating to UK interwar historians and their work in the period.119 Total of 
historians who had archives up to series level and who were not accessed: 21. UK 
interwar historians I did not include because of a lack of series or no archival 
presence: 28. The balance of remaining UK interwar historians have a low visibility 
in the project’s tri-partite criteria for selecting historians, low or no archival presence 
and made minimal edited contributions. There were 21 historians, or 22.8%, 
however, whose archival presence extended to series level that was not accessed. 
Moreover, there were 28 historians, or 30.4%, who had limited or non-existent 
archival presence.  
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UK HISTORIANS OF INTERWAR GERMANY 
UK interwar historians were involved in persuading and advocating on topics that 
resonated beyond academia, and their efforts warrant a level of recognition beyond 
their individual careers. The extent to which UK historians and public intellectuals 
worked across different fields of expertise in the interwar era. For UK historians and 
public intellectuals of Germany who were both active and who wrote in the interwar 
period, the section argues that the significance of their public involvement can be 
demonstrated in four ways. UK historians’ influence drew from activities that 
encompassed academia, politics, policy and the press. Historians’ ability to operate 
across these contexts would prepare them to engage in public discussions about 
Germany. Their flexibility in moving between these areas increased the potential 
scope, effectiveness and resonance of their arguments. Moreover, historians’ work 
reflected the high levels of social capital needed to cross these various spaces. Their 
activities found expression in academic networks, a rising number of non-
governmental organisations and think tanks.  
 
UK interwar historians’ disagreements with the outcome of the Paris Peace 
Settlement saw their partial emergence as self-appointed judges of public opinion. 
The majority of senior academics throughout the interwar period were people who 
were held to be of ‘public and political’ importance.120 As Bourdieu observed, 
intellectuals have competing goals to achieve. He noted that ‘on the one hand, he 
[sic] must belong to an autonomous intellectual world; …on the other hand, he must 
invest the competence and authority he has acquired in the intellectual field in a 
political action’.121 This political activity correlated closely with the interests of UK 
interwar historians, who were among the most dedicated and effective critics of the 
Paris Peace Settlement.122 These men can be characterised as having sought ‘to work 
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collectively in defence of their specific interests and of having the means necessary 
for protecting their own autonomy’.123  
 
Most eminent historians from the generation prior to the beginning of World War I 
were drawn to Whitehall to be employed in intelligence and propaganda work that 
would support British geo-strategy.124 For instance, James Headlam-Morley, Arnold 
Toynbee and Lewis Namier advised military and naval intelligence officers the best 
ways to turn enemy periodicals, such as German newspapers, to British wartime 
propaganda use.125 World War I further opened avenues for many UK historians to 
influence policy via their government employment into the interwar era.126 During 
the war, the Propaganda Department at Wellington House involved prominent 
historians Lewis Namier, Toynbee, Headlam-Morley, R. Seton-Watson, Reginald 
and A. W. A. Leeper, while Alfred Zimmern was employed by the Ministry of 
Reconstruction.127 Sir Frederick Maurice Powicke was born on 16 June 1879, and 
scrutinised Britain’s medieval history. Powicke was schooled at Owens College, 
Victoria University of Manchester, where he was awarded his undergraduate degree, 
and at Balliol College, University of Oxford, where he received First Class Honours. 
Between 1908 and 1915, Powicke was a Fellow of Merton College, University of 
Oxford. Despite this accolade, in 1909 he received a post as Professor of Modern 
History at Queen’s University, Belfast. He stayed at Belfast for a decade. Between 
1919 and 1928, he held the post of Professor of Medieval History at the Victoria 
University of Manchester (which became the University of Manchester in 2004). In 
1927, he was Ford’s Lecturer in English History at Oxford. From 1928 Powicke 
became Regius Professor of Modern History at University the Oxford, and stayed in 
that position until 1947. From 1933 to 1937, he was President of the Royal Historical 
Society. Powicke died on 19 May 1963. 
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Sir George Walter Prothero, KBE, similarly employed ‘historical knowledge’ 
for the British war effort, and cultivated the friendships he nurtured through an 
extensive correspondence with important personages in other countries.128 This was 
particularly so with regard to his efforts in the United States of America.129 
Prothero’s achievements made him a ‘public figure’ and he was charged by the 
Historical Section of the Foreign Office to direct its peace pamphlets operation. He 
succumbed to a flu pandemic in 1922, but had initially led the British delegation to 
the Versailles Peace Conference.130 Prothero was born on 14 October 1848, in 
Wiltshire. He was schooled at Eton, King’s College, University of Cambridge, and at 
the University of Bonn, Germany. He taught at Eton and at the universities of 
Nottingham and Leicester. From 1876, he taught history at King’s College, 
University of Cambridge, where he attained a Fellowship. In 1894, he acquired the 
inaugural Professorship of Modern History at the University of Edinburgh. He edited 
the political journal Quarterly Review, as well as the Cambridge Historical Series. 
Between 1901 and 1905, Prothero presided over the Royal Historical Society.  
 
Prothero taught at many universities, including Cambridge, Oxford and John 
Hopkins. After World War I, he occupied the post of Historical Advisor to the 
Foreign Office. He led the British delegation at the 1919 Paris Peace Settlement, and 
prepared briefing books on countries, territorial and economic questions on behalf of 
the Foreign Office. In 1920, Prothero was awarded Knight Commander of the British 
Empire, but died on 10 July 1922. Other historians who attended, like Harold 
Temperley, had a background in military intelligence, and used their qualifications to 
affect the formation and implementation of British policy.131 Like his colleagues, 
Toynbee wrote books, essays, pamphlets, propaganda and undertook intelligence 
duties. On the war’s end he, too, accompanied the 1919 British delegation to Paris.132 
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The Foreign Office’s March 1918 creation of the Political Intelligence 
Department (PID) saw these historians, including Zimmern, prepare for the post-war 
order, though the war’s outcome was uncertain.133 UK internationalist thinking was 
deeply affected by World War I, and this was revealed in the sentiments expressed in 
UK interwar historians’ analyses.134 UK historians sought to raise the concept of 
internationalism to a practical, implementable idea, rather than a moral 
afterthought.135 The UK intellectuals who attended meetings at the Versailles 
Settlement were mostly liberal and young, and felt themselves able advocates for 
internationalism.136 This impulse was often shared by other members of the French 
and American delegations, but all countries’ delegations sought to advance their 
respective state interests.137  
 
Historians and Universities 
UK historians’ pre-World War I occupations created opportunities for them to be 
able to work across contexts, which allowed their influence to be widely 
disseminated. This was particularly so given the increased social reach of universities 
and political parties in the interwar UK. Universities not only accommodated these 
historians’ employment but fostered their participation in other capacities as much of 
their work was undertaken outside the university.138 Following World War I, 
universities demonstrated themselves to be durable and adaptable institutions that 
were central to UK historians.139 In part, the public visibility of historians was 
facilitated by their association with universities’ organisational frameworks, 
procedures and rules.140 This was particularly the case in the UK, where historians’ 
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notions of affiliation with institutions facilitated intellectuals’ public role, as Klinge 
contended,  
 
 
[t]he rise in the scientific level of the British universities at the turn 
of the century and the relative demise of the aristocratic elite after 
the First World War strengthened the role of the academic world. 
In Britain, the ideal of the free, non-university scientist and author 
continued longer than in other parts of Europe. In Britain and the 
colonies, the academic ideal was sustained more by former students 
of the well-known universities than by the universities and the 
teachers themselves.141  
 
UK interwar historians had early doubts about many features of British 
politics and policy, particularly those arising from the Paris Peace Settlement.142 
Universities were one of a number of sources of specialist advice that the victorious 
allies turned to in the aftermath of World War I.143 The United States’ delegation, for 
example, enlisted the expertise of professional historians from its universities to act 
as advisors.144 The interwar period saw universities remain important localities of 
influence.145 Indeed, the interwar ‘academic intellectualism’ of Oxford and 
Cambridge was characterised by Klinge as a ‘special form’ of influence.146  
 
Universities were important in spreading UK historians’ messages, as 
expanding literacy restored these important locales for public discussion and debate 
to war-weary, cynical populations. Following World War I, many historians returned 
to academic as well as political paths, ensuring that their substantial historical 
knowledge was disseminated through their published works.147 However, the 
dividing line between politics and academia was difficult to fathom in ‘interwar 
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debates on international politics’.148 Casper Sylvest’s work, for example, has 
demonstrated the fluidity present in the newly created international fora that reflected 
this. The European peace movements in the interwar era contained networks of 
‘transnational activists’ who shared a common purpose and political bearing.149  
 
Many UK interwar historians believed in a new order. Though there were 
differences in approach, UK interwar historians were part of a grouping that was 
central to the formation of public opinion in the post-World War I period.150 The 
experiences and relationships nurtured by historians in universities, colleges and 
institutes ensured that their ideas were reflected in their writings. Some, such as Sir 
Herbert Butterfield, had misgivings about the course of modern democracy and the 
weight it afforded to the force of public opinion.151 Butterfield was born on 7 
October, 1900, and was a philosopher of history as well as a political and diplomatic 
historian. Butterfield was schooled at the Trade and Grammar School in Keighley. In 
1919, he entered Peterhouse College, University of Cambridge, as an historian, and 
was elected a Fellow in 1923. In 1924, he won the Prince Consort Prize for his 
analyses on European diplomatic history between 1806 and 1808. Butterfield won 
the Seeley Medal in this period. In 1926, he acquired a Master of Arts from 
Cambridge. He attained the positions of Regius Professor of Modern History and 
Vice-Chancellor at the University of Cambridge, and became Master of Peterhouse 
College. From 1938 until 1955, Butterfield edited the Cambridge Historical Journal. 
He became known primarily for his work, The Whig Interpretation of History (1931). 
Butterfield died in 1979.  
 
Many historians sought to link universities with the achievement of a clear 
purpose and a central organising principle.152 The intellectual Norman Angell’s 
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beliefs about ‘public education’ and leadership were similar to those of E. H. Carr, in 
that Carr suggested that ‘learned folk’ ensured that the doctrines of imperialism, 
nationalism and patriotism were diffused throughout society.153 ‘Elite opinion’, 
remarked Robert Putnam, ‘is most apt to run ahead of mass opinion in periods of 
rapid change and on topics that are new to the national agenda’.154 Lionel Curtis is 
one example of this. An historian and a Beit Lecturer at Oxford University in 1912-
1913, he suggested presciently that the most efficient way of promoting ‘ideas’ was 
to convince a country’s elite of their validity.155 From there, he believed that ideas 
would then trickle down to the ‘respective constituencies’.156 This principle was to 
‘educate the educators’, a process that involved a vanguard of knowledgeable people 
to spread particular messages.157 
  
Historians’ experiences were reflected in their attempts to establish a 
connection between British interests and their own personal ambitions. UK interwar 
historians were public intellectuals who frequently advocated for a new order of 
democratic behaviour. Some historians endeavoured to enable an emerging global 
culture that would reflect and promote a reality of growing interdependence among 
countries. These activities, its proponents argued, would bring about a reality that 
was conducive to peace and harmony, and would have provided the basis for an 
international civil society.158 Harold Temperley was representative of many 
historians in this regard.159 He served as an intelligence officer on the Imperial 
General Staff during World War I and was part of the British delegation at the 
Versailles Conference.160 In 1917, Temperley began to attend Prime Minister Lloyd 
George’s Council of Intelligence, where he advised the Council on the implications 
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of policy decisions in light of his historical and analytical capacity.161  
 
Temperley’s expertise in diplomatic history of the nineteenth century was 
complemented by his earlier experiences. As an example of his wide interests, 
Temperley wrote a book that examined Foreign Secretary George Canning (1822-
27), and was co-author of a successful work on nineteenth century and early 
twentieth-century European history.162 He was reputed to be the leading diplomatic 
historian of the interwar era, and believed that the fluid interchange between 
academia and politics had no conflict of interest.163 Temperley was born in 
Cambridge on 20 April 1879. He was a soldier and diplomat, as well as historian. He 
was the son of a mathematician who had had a Fellowship at Queen’s College, 
University of Cambridge. Temperley was educated at a public school and then 
enrolled at King’s College, University of Cambridge. Temperley was awarded a 
Bachelor’s degree in 1901 and a Master of Arts degree in 1906.164 He lectured at 
Leeds University, and came back to University of Cambridge where he received a 
Fellowship at Peterhouse College. Temperley’s achievements were not as publicly 
acknowledged as those of his contemporaries.165 It was written of Temperley, in an 
edited book several years after his passing, that ‘[i]t is well that he did not live to see 
September 1939, when those international hatreds which he hoped could be softened 
by the disinterested findings of scholars were again let loose in all their fury’.166 
Temperley died on 11 July 1939.  
 
Benedict Sumner was born in 1893 in London. In August 1914, Sumner 
volunteered for the King’s Royal Rifle Corps, and he fought in France until 1917. In 
July 1917, he joined the War Office Intelligence Department. In the 1919 Versailles 
Peace Conference, he was part of the British delegation. Between 1920 and 1922, he 
worked with the International Labour Office. He was awarded a Fellowship at Balliol 
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College, University of Oxford. Between 1940 and 1945, he was Professor of History 
at the University of Edinburgh. Between 1944 until 1951, Sumner occupied the post 
of Warden of All Souls. Sumner died in 1951. Seton-Watson was born on 20 August 
1879 in Perthshire. He devoted much of his work towards analyses about the 
ramifications of the Austrian-German (Dual Alliance) alliance of 1879. He attended 
New College at the same time as H. A. L. Fisher was history tutor. Seton-Watson 
was ‘fortunate in not having to concern himself about earning his own living’.167 
Seton-Watson was witness to the phenomenon where ‘the historian was merged in 
the publicist and politician’.168 From 1938 until the end of World War II, Seton-
Watson advocated to prevent Czechoslovakia from being partitioned by Germany. 
From 1945 until 1948, Seton-Watson was elected as President of the Royal Historical 
Society, and his two sons became academics in history at Oxford University.169  
  
Following Germany’s wartime capitulation, many UK interwar historians 
took advantage of new opportunities to hone their analytical frameworks.170 This led 
historians’ interests towards an emerging global culture that was connected to a 
growing interest in international history. Herbert Butterfield ventured that 
‘…diplomatic history had a kind of heyday in England, and one of the important 
services of Temperley and [Charles] Webster, was the part they played in the training 
of future scholars’ in this regard.171 Charles Kingsley Webster was born on 25 April 
1886. Webster was a diplomatic historian, soldier and diplomat. Webster attended 
Merchant Taylor’s School in Crosby as well as King’s College, University of 
Cambridge. Between 1914 and 1922, Webster had professorial roles in Modern 
History at the University of Liverpool. Between 1922 and 1932, he had a professorial 
chair in Modern History at the University of Wales, as well as a professorial role at 
Harvard University from 1928 to 1932. From 1932 to 1953, he was a professor at the 
London School of Economics. From 1950 to 1953, he was President of the British 
Academy. He attended the Versailles Peace Conference and assisted the British 
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delegation, and acted as secretary to the Military Section of the delegation. From 
1915 until 1917, Webster receive a commission into the Army Service Corps. 
Between 1917 and 1919, he was staffed to the General Staff Intelligence Section, and 
later in 1918, was seconded to the Foreign Office. He attended many international 
gatherings of historians and he promoted networking between them. Webster died 21 
August 1961. 
 
Europe after World War I experienced greater contributions from intellectuals 
in both government and from the emergence of non-government organisations than 
had previously been the case.172 Temperley and his colleagues sought to take 
advantage of what they saw as a chance to refine the development of diplomatic 
history.173 Temperley’s influence extended to younger historians of diplomatic 
history, hoping that his protégés’ success would secure the future of this research. 
Indeed, the interwar era saw Temperley and his colleagues consolidate diplomatic 
history into a leading field of historical analysis.174  
 
Most UK historians involved with developing modern history and 
international relations saw no contradiction between its study and its wider social and 
political applicability.175 UK interwar historians sought to take advantage of the 
opportunities that universities presented. Following the Peace Settlement, Foreign 
Office employees such as Alfred Zimmern, Carr and Philip Noel-Baker determined 
to pursue careers in modern history, a decision that led them to become professors in 
the emerging discipline of international relations. The term ‘modern history’ here 
refers to its use in the context of the interwar period.176 Historians became focused on 
modern history and international relations because of these subjects’ established 
place in politics and World War I. These developments were the fruit of Temperley, 
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Butterfield and their associates, having developed the study of diplomatic history and 
having informed the parameters of what was to become international history.177 The 
‘scientific’ aspects of this field of history were held to constitute the discipline of 
international relations.178 Importantly, its ‘advocates’ promoted knowledge about 
international affairs, and of Germany’s place in it.179  
 
UK historians’ experiences helps to reveal the variety of roles that UK historians 
adopted throughout their careers. They worked as public intellectuals who used 
varying degrees of prior experiences in peace and labour movements. Historians such 
as Temperley and his colleagues, including Edmund Dene Morel, an historian and 
founder of the Union for Democratic Control (UDC), advocated for the release of 
government documents relating to the war.180 E. D. Morel was born in Paris on 10 
July 1873. Morel was an historian, politician, journalist, and pacifist. Morel’s father 
was a French bureaucrat and his mother was English. He was educated at Madras 
Hose School at Eastbourne and then at Bedford Modern School. Morel favoured 
many aspects about Germany, and advocated for a neutral British response if World 
War I eventuated. On war’s emergence, Morel conceded that Britain’s entry into the 
war was a foregone conclusion, and established Union of Democratic Control (UDC) 
with colleagues, Ramsay MacDonald, Charles Trevelyan, and Norman Angell. This 
group tasked itself with getting greater public scrutiny to bear on the conduct of 
foreign affairs. Morel castigated the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles and intoned 
that Germany would seek revenge when the country was stronger. Morel occupied 
the secretaryship until he died, on 12 November 1924. 
 One UDC member, Sir Daniel Stephenson established the Stevenson Chair 
of International History at the London School of Economics to campaign against 
Germany’s war guilt.181 Temperley wanted to influence government policy and have 
an impact on international events. Like his colleagues who were acknowledged 
                                                          
177 Michael Riemens, ‘International Academic Cooperation on International Relations in the Interwar 
Period: The International Studies Conference’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2011, 
p. 923. 
178 Ibid.  
179 Sylvest, ‘Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the Historiography of 
International Relations’, p. 413.  
180 A. J. P. Taylor, The Troublemakers: Dissent over Foreign Policy Makers, 1792-1939, Middlesex, 
Penguin, [1957] 1985, p. 178. 
181 Ibid.  
 38 
 
experts in their respective fields, he was an expert on the Balkans, and felt an affinity 
for the Slavs, having also served as a boundary commissioner for Albania. He had 
carried out roles of both political intelligence and military intelligence, conducting 
activities in the Balkan Peninsula as well as advising his country’s delegation in 
Geneva.182 Temperley’s career reflected the various roles that UK historians 
occupied.  
  
The focus on Germany informed much of the scholarship of these interwar 
historians, and provided a rallying point of agreement among them regarding the 
German problem.183 The pressures from the economic upheavals of the late 1920s 
fell hard on universities and the academics who worked there. UK historians were 
aware of the hardships experienced by university staff, especially their German 
counterparts, which had energised Germans’ activism and helped to intensify 
‘extreme’ opinions in the expression of ‘nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies’.184 
For example, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson was an historian, pacifist and Fellow of 
King’s College, Cambridge. He castigated the CICI’s (International Committee on 
Intellectual Cooperation or Commission Internationale de la Coopération 
Intellectuelle) ‘scandalous’ failure to mention Germany during a funding drive for 
struggling universities.185  
 
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson was born on 6 August 1862 in London, in a 
Christian Socialist family. Dickinson was educated in Chertsy, where he boarded, 
and in Godalming at Charterhouse School. He attended King’s College, University of 
Cambridge, from where he attained a Fellowship in 1887. He had membership of the 
Cambridge Apostles, a name for the Cambridge Conversazione Society. Dickinson 
visited Germany and tried the study of medicine as well as literature. He lectured at 
Norwich, Leister and Newcastle under the aegis of the University Extension Scheme. 
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From 1886 until he retired in 1920, Dickinson taught political science. He taught at 
the London School of Economics for 15 years. With colleagues such as Lord Bryce, 
and others, he directed many of the ideas behind the League of Nations and was a 
visible participant in the founding of the League of Nations Union. He promoted his 
ideas with a large number of books and pamphlets. Dickinson believed that secret 
diplomacy had brought about the war. Dickinson’s career represented an ‘an 
academic life lived before the ossification of disciplinary boundaries’, and his ‘life 
has been described as a classicist, historian and political scientist.’186 ‘Everyone 
around me, all my best friends even, seem to have settled down to live as before, 
pleasantly, cynically, or whatever may be their attitude. I, almost alone, rise and go 
to bed with the constant obsession, is there to be a continuance of the old, to the new 
war, or a radical transformation’.187 He died on 3 August 1932.  
 
Dickerson’s colleague, Gilbert Murray, supported his stance in The Times.188 
Gilbert Murray was born in 1866 and was an Australian-born British scholar, 
classicist and political activist. He attended the University of Oxford and graduated 
at the top of his class in 1887. He was an internationalist and supported the Covenant 
of the League of Nations. The League of Nations Union was formed after World War 
I, and Murray was one of the founding members. From 1923 to 1938, he was 
chairman of the League. He taught at the University of Oxford. He was Regius 
Professor of Greek at Oxford. In 1942, he became one of the founding members of 
the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, or Oxfam, as well as one of its trustees. 
Murray died on 20 May 1957, in Oxford. Toynbee favoured an internationalist 
program to deal with various problems between the victorious powers and Germany, 
particularly from a ‘universal cultural perspective’.189 The new international order 
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was promoted by its advocates as an unprecedented, moral awakening that claimed to 
have made redundant the so-called ‘old diplomacy’.190  
 
Historians, Political Parties and International Movements 
There were close linkages between British political parties and intellectuals in the 
interwar years, and this forms the second means to characterise interwar UK 
historians.191 UK historians’ awareness of the relationship that existed between 
policy and politics assisted them in reaching audiences and readerships. Despite 
changes, few were able to attain secure employment as historians, and flexibility 
allowed the intellectuals the means to influence political debate.192 Some historians, 
such as Philip John Noel-Baker and Zimmern, occupied academic posts that 
correlated with their involvement in political parties.193 Noel-Baker was an historian, 
politician, pacifist and Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary 
Arthur Henderson. He was born on 8 November 1889 in London. Noel-Baker’s 
father had been involved in pacifism, and had sought to repair the suspicion that had 
grown over the Anglo-German naval race. Noel-Baker attended the Quaker school at 
Ackworth, as well as the Bootham School in York. From 1908 to 1912, he went to 
Kings College, University of Cambridge, where he participated in undergraduate 
societies opposed to mobilisation and war.194 Following four years at Cambridge, 
Noel-Baker’s father sent him to Munich University, where he learned German and 
became acquainted with Germans. He studied international law there and had 
corresponded with fellow pacifist Norman Angell.195  
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In 1914, Noel-Baker attained the post of vice-principal of Ruskin College, 
University of Oxford, and in 1915 received a Fellowship at King’s College, 
University of Cambridge. Following World War I, Noel-Baker aided Lord Robert 
Cecil in establishing the League of Nations. From 1924 until 1929, he was the first 
Sir Ernest Cassel Professor of International Relations at the University of London, 
and then taught at Yale University from 1933 until 1934. In 1929, Noel-Baker won 
the seat of Coventry for the Labour Party. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1959. 
Noel-Baker died on 8 October 1982. The administrative environment in which UK 
historians participated in politics had undergone a significant change with the 
Parliament Act of 1911, which ensured that Members of Parliament would be 
paid.196 Britain’s political system still maintained vestiges of Edwardian life after the 
Act’s passage, however, with Douglas Newton claiming that the parliament 
resembled an oligarchy rather than a pluralistic and representative liberal 
democracy.197  
 
The interrelationship between UK interwar historians and their political 
colleagues in the post-World War I era involved opportunities for both collections of 
these individuals to work across contexts. UK interwar historians were often 
democratically elected politicians, such as H. A. L. Fisher, G. P. Gooch, Noel-Baker 
among others.198 Politicians who had undergone a ‘serious academic study’ of 
history did not predominate in the immediate aftermath of post-War War I British 
politics. Throughout this period, however, politicians who were eager to publish their 
memoirs regarding World War I were determined to position themselves publicly as 
historians.199 There was some reluctance among politicians to involve academic and 
professional historians in the preparation of these memoirs, of which David Lloyd 
George’s work was a popular example.200 Keith Robbins observed that there was 
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‘little doubt’ that Lloyd Georges’ War Memoirs had a ‘major impact on British 
political opinion’ in the latter part of the interwar era.201  
 
[T]here is a certain artificiality, beyond a given point, in trying to 
determine what part ‘being a historian’ played in the advancement 
of any particular political career. Success in politics can be so 
arbitrary that while ‘being a historian’ may be very important to 
historians, it may be less important in his advancement than in his 
ability as a speaker, his congeniality as a colleague, or his sense of 
humour. Poor historians, more rounded in these respects, may 
succeed where others, more distinguished, fail, though lack of these 
qualities does not by itself guarantee eminence as a historian!202 
  
Keith Robbins’ musings focused on a central point of this thesis, that a strict 
definition of historians as being professionalised, published and affiliated with an 
institution remained contested at the time. The fluidity of who was considered an 
historian, and able to deploy the authority that came with it, was axiomatic to the role 
itself.  
 
 UK interwar historians were sometimes elected representatives of high 
political office, such as Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher.203 Fisher was an Oxford-
based historian, but was also an interwar cabinet minister and a former president of 
the Board of Education.204 Fisher, OM, FRS, was born on 23 March 1865 in London. 
Fisher worked as an historian, educator, and Liberal politician. He was educated at 
Winchester and New College, University of Oxford, where he graduated with a First 
Class degree and was awarded a Fellowship. In the coalition government of David 
Lloyd George, Fisher was President of the Board of Education. Fisher taught modern 
history at Oxford from 1925 to 1940, and was the Warden of New College. He 
represented the seat of Sheffield Hallam as a politician. He occupied positions on a 
number of political and cultural bodies. Fisher had affiliations with the London 
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Library, the British Museum, and the National Trust. He was connected with the 
council at Winchester, the BBC, the Rhodes Trustees and the British Academy. 
Fisher died on 18 April 1940. Historians, such as Fisher, sought to influence the 
burgeoning debates about British youths of the UK’s exposure to imperialism, 
militarism and patriotism.205 As part of this movement, Fisher cautioned in his 
Stevenson series lecture in 1923 that patriotism was useful only when it was bereft of 
‘instinctive primitive emotion’.206 Fisher was not alone and the interwar period 
witnessed increasing attempts to disseminate ‘national virtues’, such as patriotism 
and respect for veterans.207  
 
A number of UK interwar historians had at some point been elected 
politicians who lamented deteriorations in Anglo-German relations. The Prime 
Minister and Foreign Secretary, Ramsay Macdonald, regarded George Peabody 
Gooch as ‘by far and away our ablest historian’ in 1924.208 Preceding the World War 
I, Gooch had been a Liberal M.P. from 1906-1910.209 Although the two men did not 
represent the same political platform, they had shared commonalities throughout 
their career. In addition to their political service in the House of Commons, both had 
opposed aspects of the UK’s involvement in the Boer War and World War I. Some 
historians who were elected to the House of Commons were also noblemen who later 
transferred to the House of Lords.210  
 
Gooch was born on 21 October 1873, in London. He was educated at Eton 
College, King’s College, London, and at Trinity College, University of Cambridge. 
Gooch was not a lifelong university academic, and with his colleagues exemplified 
historians’ liminal roles. He edited the journal Contemporary Review. From 1933 
until 1936, Gooch presided over the National Peace Council and the English Göthe 
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Society. He was enthusiastic about the League of Nations and sympathetic towards 
Germany. From 1923 until 1926, Gooch was President of the Historical Association. 
Gooch travelled to interwar Germany and headed groups of British historians who 
lectured in Germany and sought to form bonds.211 He was married to a German 
woman. Gooch died on 31 August 1968. Gooch, for instance, had believed that that 
there had been a lost opportunity for an Anglo-German entente during the Boer 
War.212 Despite their differences, Macdonald and Gooch had both previously 
undertaken work in London’s East End, and met under the auspices of a debating and 
dinner group that was composed of Socialists, Radicals and Liberals.213  
 
UK historians appeared more amenable to the Treaty of Versailles’s revision 
than their French and Italian colleagues, and reflected a tradition held by some 
Britons to refuse to be overly committed to European disputes. Like his colleagues, 
Gooch’s presence among the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was 
premised on delivering advice to advance his country’s position.214 The conditions 
the French and the Italians sought to impose upon the defeated Germans impressed 
upon the UK historians the need for counterweights to prevent any single country 
from becoming too powerful.215 Much of British foreign policy was premised on 
ensuring that no single country controlled Europe.216 To this end, Gooch and his 
colleagues produced handbooks for the conference, although they were ultimately 
disappointed with the outcome of President Wilson’s decisions.217  
 
UK historians engaged in activities that incorporated different contexts, 
including roles that encouraged the growth of a new international architecture to 
accommodate Germany. Following World War I, the historian and classicist Murray, 
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advocated for the establishment of a League of Nations.218 The Phillimore 
Committee was officially established to consider the operation of the League in 
January 1918, and Murray was a member. He was successful in uniting the radical 
League of Nations Society along with the League of Free Nations Association into 
the League of Nations Union (LNU) in October 1918. Murray became chairman of 
its management committee in 1923, having sat on its board from its beginning.219 In 
1938, he became co-president with the cabinet minister, parliamentarian and 
historian, Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 1st Viscount Cecil Chelwood CH, 
PC, QC. Robert Cecil was born in London on 14 September 1864. He engaged in 
diplomacy, politics and law. Lord Robert Cecil was educated at his private residence, 
Eton, and University College, thus for the University of Oxford. From 30 May to 10 
January 1919, Cecil occupied the office of Lord Privy Seal as well as Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Cecil argued that the Treaty of Versailles 
should have been less harsh on Germany, and that Germany should be allowed to 
join the League of Nations. With his colleagues, he planned the activities of the 
League of Nations Union. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1937. Cecil died 
on 24 November 1937. Murray became deputy chairman of the International 
Committee of Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) at the Committee’s founding in 1922. 
He became chairman in 1929 and remained so until 1939.220  
 
UK historians’ movement across contexts resulted in instances where roles 
were fluid, and tensions arose with other members of the political elite. Political 
parties and movements were engaged in the formation of assemblies in which 
interwar historians participated. British officials tended to express political, as 
opposed to legalistic, support for the Covenant of the League of Nations.221 
Historians’ authority, and sensitivity to public opinion, helped to support politicians’ 
attempts to secure a new age of peace.222 The main drafters behind the League of 
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Nation’s Covenant were the Foreign Office’s Zimmern, the LNU’s Murray, Jan 
Smuts and Cecil.223 The links between members of political parties and their role in 
movements such as the LNU became problematic as their interests diverged, 
however. For example, Arthur James Balfour, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 
consented to become the League’s Honorary President in 1918. Murray was 
Chairman of the League and Balfour’s niece served on its Committee.224 Murray had 
no power over the statements the League released. In 1923, Balfour was ambivalent 
about the League’s purpose and advocated for the ‘peace group’ to be shut down. 
When the League was not discontinued, he resigned.225 This was representative of a 
conflict between many historians and politicians, and its outcomes contributed to 
setting the context for British policy in the future. 
 
UK historians sought to draw attention to the close relationship between culture and 
institutions. One example, Richard Henry Tawney, regarded himself as a Socialist 
and an advocate of democratic republicanism.226 R. H. Tawney was born in Calcutta 
30 November 1880. Tawney’s father lectured at the university. Tawney attended 
Balliol College, University of Oxford, and graduated in 1903. He read and spoke 
German with ease. He was involved with the Workers’ Education Association and 
taught workers in the North and Midlands of England, and he was the first to start the 
venture in 1908. He favoured war with Germany at the start of World War I, and 
served with the 22nd Manchester Battalion. Tawney was wounded and discharged, 
and thereafter became a member of the Labour Party. He sought to have secondary 
education changed to benefit less advantaged people. Tawney believed that a fair 
society had ‘vacated the public sphere’.227 Tawney died on 16 January 1962. Tawney 
wrote that culture, rather than institutions, would be preeminent for the new 
formation of a modern democratic state. ‘Britain’s tragedy’, he suggested, was that it 
possessed democratic institutions as opposed to a democratic culture and that the 
                                                          
223 Ibid.    
224 Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman, p. 
262.  
225 Ibid.     
226 David Marquand, ‘The Strange Career of British Democracy: John Milton to Gordon Brown’, The 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 4, 2008, p. 471. 
227 Lawrence Goldman, ‘Tawney’s Century: R. H. Tawney and the Origins of Capitalism in Tudor and 
Stuart England’, The Oxford Historian, No, 11, 2014, p. 14. 
 47 
 
country had experienced an inadequate political evolution.228 Tawney resented 
Britain’s retention of ‘the social habits and mentality of the oldest and toughest 
plutocracy in the world’.229 
 
UK historians’ involvement in various circles represented a blurring of roles, 
incorporating historians’ skills with tasks that had public importance. The merits of 
historians’ arguments were anchored in their perceived expertise, freeing them from 
the political considerations of elected parliamentarians. Many historians remained 
interested in the synergies between political advocacy and the activities of public 
intellectuals. Many liberal intellectuals joined groupings alongside ‘established 
Socialist intellectuals’.230 From the beginning of the post-war period until 1931 
(when the second Labour government ended), over one hundred and fifty people, 
including MPs and guests were attendees at the Advisory Committee on International 
Questions (ACIQ) meetings.231 This ‘quasi-academic forum’ was formed to discuss 
questions of the Labour Party’s foreign policy. The regular members of the 
committee included its secretary, Leonard Woolf, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, 
Philip Noel-Baker, Norman Angell, David Mitrany, C. P. Trevelyan, G. Young, W. 
Gilies, N. Buxton, C. D. Burns, and E. Bentham.232 George Macaulay Trevelyan, 
OM, CBE, FRS, was born on 16 February 1876. Trevelyan studied history at Harrow 
School and Wixenford School. He was then educated Trinity College, University of 
Cambridge. Until 1903, Trevelyan taught at Cambridge. Following that period, he 
devoted himself to non-university history writing and participated in World War I on 
the Italian front. In 1925, Trevelyan became a Fellow of the British Academy, and 
was subsequently elected as a Fellow of the Royal Society. In 1927, Trevelyan 
occupied the post as Regius Professor of Modern History at the University of 
Cambridge. In 1940, he became Master of Trinity College. He was the first President 
of the Youth Hostels Association in the United Kingdom. Trevelyan died on 21 July 
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1962.  
  
 UK historians were engaged as public intellectuals who sought to erect a 
global architecture for international cooperation on conflict prevention. Gooch, G. 
Lowes Dickinson, Bertrand Russell and Morel were Liberal intellectuals who were 
part of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), a pressure group that was 
influenced by World War I and that also involved the politicians MacDonald, Philip 
Snowdon and Arthur Ponsonby.233 Such public figures sought to foster fora that 
promoted dialogue and pacifism in the long term. These public intellectuals were 
suspicious of military establishments in any guise, but nonetheless recognised that 
military aggression required prevention and punishment. The interwar period saw 
cooperation between these public men. Headlam-Morley, Fisher, Lord Haldane and 
MacDonald, and the Prime Minister, showed support for Gooch and Temperley in 
their efforts to release British documents relating to World War I.234 Richard 
Haldane, 1st Viscount Haldane Lord Haldane. Lord Richard Burdon Haldane was 
born on 30 July 1856, in Edinburgh. His education included much time spent in 
Germany. Haldane was regarded as one of Britain’s greatest War Ministers. He was 
ennobled in 1911, and occupied the post of Lord Chancellor from 1912, but he was 
judged by much opinion to have been too pro-German and subsequently relinquished 
his position. In 1912, Haldane visited Berlin in an attempt to see relations between 
both Britain and Germany improved. He was known as a Germanophile by many 
Britons. Haldane died on 19 August 1928. The need to release documents was put 
forth by Gooch in International Affairs.235 In 1924 the Foreign Office commissioned 
Gooch and Temperley as co-editors with the volume. The result was the 1926 
publishing of the British Documents on the Origins on the War.236  
 
Many UK interwar historians sought to inculcate Anglo-German friendship, 
as well as seek to imbue a spirit of reconciliation.237 The networks forged between 
historians and politicians crossed academic and political contexts, which in turn 
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facilitated a wider audience for their views. UK historians’ visible engagement in 
political matters indicated their movement within contexts included both academia 
and politics. For example, the first German representative in the UK after World War 
I was the Chargé dʹ Affaires and later ambassador to the UK until 1930, Dr Friedrich 
Sthamer, and Gooch met him at Morley’s residence in London.238 Their meeting’s 
significance lies in the fact that Germany regarded the revision of the Treaty of 
Versailles (particularly War Guilt Clause 231) a priority. The Germans recognised 
that building relationships with prominent UK historians as soon as Anglo-German 
diplomatic representation was re-established was conducive to Germany’s goal of the 
Treaty revision. Gooch gave speeches to the London School of Economics, the 
Historical Association, universities, colleges and the London School Teachers’ 
Organisation.239 He often visited Germany and Austria in the war’s aftermath and 
delivered lectures on British foreign policy whose content both pre-dated and post-
dated World War I.240  
 
Commentary from UK historians showed the extent to which they promoted 
views that combined a domestic and international orientation, chiefly Britons’ 
perceptions of Germany.241 As an internationally known intellectual, Gooch favoured 
a practicable framework for European cooperation, and was open to Britain’s 
involvement in such an undertaking. He was hostile to what he deemed to be the 
Conservative Party’s policy towards Europe in the interwar era, commenting that, ‘I 
detest the Conservatives’ idea that England is not part of Europe but only part of the 
British Empire’.242 Germany was a salient issue for UK public intellectuals in the 
period, and many followed the vicissitudes of Anglo-German relations into the Nazi 
years with interest.243 Nonetheless, Gooch suggested that it was advisable to 
acquiesce to Nazi German encroachments on the territories of Central and Eastern 
Europe in 1937.244 Gooch’s prescriptions on matters such as this brought 
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disagreement among his colleagues, such as Seton-Watson, who favoured a more 
confrontational approach.245 
 
There was great fluidity in the roles and social networks of interwar UK 
historians, and this was reflected in their influence beyond academia. The various 
workplaces of the historians comprised multiple roles. The next section deals with 
their contributions of historical knowledge to the bureaucracy, since the authors 
wrote from a unique position of access to the Foreign Office and possessed 
familiarity with the subtleties of Foreign Office views. 
 
Historians and the Formation of Foreign Policy  
 Academics who did not hold formal government posts were nonetheless often part 
of the policy-making process.246 Many intellectuals served in the British bureaucracy 
and foreign policy establishment, and helped to direct the details of the post-World 
War I world that had been promulgated by the Versailles Treaty.247 As the cases of 
UK interwar historians’ involvement with universities and political parties has 
shown, there was sometimes disagreement between intellectuals over the formation 
and implementation of policy. Yet, historians formed a collection of individuals 
through their involvement in the Foreign Office, and their government employment 
offers another meaningful way to engage with this dynamic collective. UK interwar 
historians’ involvement in policy making is seen through the prism of their direct 
experiences, sometime employment in the Foreign Office, roles in establishing think 
tanks, and in lobbying for foreign policy outcomes. UK interwar historians’ 
willingness to offer substantive critiques to their government’s foreign policies 
varied according to their research backgrounds, personalities and visions of the 
future.  
 
UK interwar historians brought a degree of cultural uniformity to their 
writings. Historians’ intellectual development had incorporated views to complement 
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their arguments about policy. The impacts included historians’ public school and 
university education, and lives spent in the UK following World War I. This context 
was influenced by their proximity to the Foreign Office and think tanks, a 
relationship in which their contributions could be viewed as a function of careful 
analyses and research. Yet, there were differences between these historians in how 
they expressed their disagreement with policies in bureaucratic settings. Headlam-
Morley, for instance, was guarded when it came to critiquing elected representatives, 
and admonished his colleague Zimmern for his public attacks of aspects of Lloyd 
George’s foreign policy.248 Toynbee, Seton-Watson and Lewis Namier, among many 
others, were unified in dissociating themselves from aspects of the Treaty of 
Versailles’s outcomes.249  
Edward Hallett Carr CBE was a diplomat as well as an historian, but he also 
had a degree in Classics, a credential that stimulated his interest in philosophy and 
how he could apply it to the public space.250 Carr CBE was born on 28 June 1892, in 
London to a middle-class family. Carr worked as an historian, diplomat, international 
relations theorist, and journalist. His family came from northern England, however, 
he was schooled in London at Merchant Taylors’ School. His family admired much 
about Germany and this was said to have imbued Carr with affection for the country. 
This was held to have been common at the time for ‘upper-middle class Victorians’, 
who gravitated towards the Liberal and Labour parties.251 He interpreted ‘social 
power’ to be manipulable by the state.252  
 
In 1911, Carr attained the Craven Scholarship so that he could be educated at 
Trinity College, University of Cambridge. In 1916, Carr received a First Class 
Degree in Classics, after which he undertook diplomatic work. He was a member of 
the Foreign Office’s Contraband Department, which coordinated aspects of the 
Allied blockade. At the Versailles Peace Settlement, he was incensed at French and 
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other allied policies towards post-World War I Germany. Carr left the Foreign Office 
in 1936 and continued his work as an historian. Between 1941 and 1946, Carr 
contributed to editing The Times. Carr died on 3 November 1982. Historians 
Zimmern and Murray were also influenced by their shared training as classicists, and 
regarded their contributions to policy as an attempt to reconstruct a peaceful order.253  
 
Some sought solace in bringing about a fusion of their training with the new 
international situation. For example, during the interwar era, Toynbee was idealistic 
in his work as an historian and as a political analyst. Much of his scholarship sought 
to reconcile this approach with what he saw as the ‘polycentric’ nature of world 
order and civilisation.254 His writings included his thoughts on the emergence of 
globalisation. However, his first writings reflected the world view of his teachers, an 
‘evolutionary idealism’ that came under pressure after World War I.255  
 
Government functionaries associated with foreign policy formed a small 
society. As Paul Williams argued, policy formation retained its elite veneer, being 
influenced by historians and bureaucrats trained in history, with minimal democratic 
accountability and control: 
 
[d]uring the early decades of the twentieth century, the making of 
British foreign policy, as well as a wider interest in international 
affairs, remained a relatively exclusive preoccupation. One 
estimate suggested that during this period ‘high policy’ in Britain 
was ‘conducted by about fifty or perhaps one hundred 
individuals’.256 
 
UK historians pursued two parallel tracks regarding foreign policy. The first 
sought to criticise British policy over Germany, while the second involved them in 
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the apparatus of the Foreign Office. Foreign Office work provided the historians with 
an outlet to explain the country’s international interests, and to generate popular 
support. Historians’ proximity around subjects of politics and history meant that they 
were well-acquainted with discourses of power, while their ability to move across 
public contexts empowered their commentary. UK historians’ social networks, 
bureaucratic experience, and analytical skills were to prove crucial to their lobbying 
outside the formal structures of government.  
 
The career of Sir James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley offers one example of this 
process. He regarded the Allied Reparation Policy as leading the German population 
to the brink of mass starvation and deemed that it was counterproductive to British 
interests.257 In 1925, the Foreign Secretary and Cambridge graduate in Modern 
European History, Sir Austen Chamberlain, commissioned Headlam-Morley to 
review the peaks and troughs of British power throughout history.  In reply, 
Headlam-Morley suggested the ‘lessons’ that could be applied to British foreign 
policy making in the post-World War I world.258 Headlam-Morley was born in 1863. 
Morley was educated at Eton, King’s College, University of Cambridge, and in 
Germany, where he studied with German historians Treitschke and Hans Delbrück. 
He was Professor of Greek and Ancient History at Queen’s College, London between 
1894 and 1900. In academia he studied history and the classics. Headlam-Morley 
served in the bureaucracy and consulted governments. In World War I, with his 
colleagues, he directed propaganda against Germany. Headlam-Morley contributed 
to having the Treaty of Versailles written after World War I. He acted as a guarantor 
for his colleague Arnold Toynbee’s entry to Chatham Hose and collaborated with 
Harold Temperley and G. P. Gooch on diplomatic documents on the war’s outbreak. 
Headlam-Morley died in 1929.  
 
Other historians at the Foreign Office were also skilled at dealing with issues 
of public concern. Carr’s book, Britain: A Study of British Foreign Policy from the 
Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War, was in the final stages of preparation of 
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publication when war broke out in 1939. The Foreign Secretary, Viscount Halifax, 
wrote the text’s foreword in which he lauded not only Carr’s administrative 
capacities, but also his ‘sound learning and political understanding’ to enlist support 
for Britain.259  
 
 Members of the new ‘think tank’, Chatham House, had considerable 
historical expertise about Germany, and cultivated close links to the Foreign 
Office.260 They also had close connections with the government. The historians 
Headlam-Morley and Lionel Curtis largely founded the influential Chatham House, 
with little preparation.261 Chatham House, also known as the Royal Institute for 
International Affairs, became what was known as a ‘traditional’ think tank that 
developed and analysed ideas and policies.262 Chatham House’s founders were 
occupied with matters of transnational cooperation as well as with affecting British 
government policy. Although they could be described as ‘liberal imperialists’ who 
understood power politics, they comprehended the significance of the public 
space.263  
 
Toynbee was Chatham House’s first Director of Research, and interpreted 
World War I as being emblematic of Germany’s rejection of a common European 
civilisation. Under the aegis of Chatham House, Temperley spent the years between 
1920 and 1924 editing A History of the Peace Conference of Paris.264 In this manner, 
think tanks served as conduits for UK interwar historians’ views. Another edited 
volume by Carr, entitled Nationalism: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, involved nine intellectuals who attended 
                                                          
259 Cf. Brian Porter, ‘Lord Davies, E. H. Carr and the Spirit Ironic: A Comedy of Errors’, 
International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2002, pp. 88-89. 
260 Hasse, ‘In Search of a European Settlement: Chatham House and British-German Relations, 1920-
55’, p. 373.  
261 Arnold Toynbee, Experiences, London, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 77. 
262 Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 
1931-1983, London, Fontana, 1995, p. 139. 
263 Williams, ‘A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Empire, Intellectuals and the Chatham House Project, 
1919-1939’, p. 38. 
264 Hasse, ‘In Search of a European Settlement: Chatham House and British-German Relations, 1920-
55’, p. 373. 
 55 
 
Chatham House from November 1936.265  
 
Chatham House’s founders comprehended British society from an elite 
perspective, which deemed the ‘public’ to be those who possessed an informed 
interest in history and current events.266 Historians answered this description but also 
advocated for a greater democratising of foreign policy making and sought to 
influence government as well as to enlist the greater involvement of public 
opinion.267 These twin aims were achieved by the continuance discussions following 
the Versailles Peace Conference with colleagues and politicians and by having a 
journal, International Affairs, published in 1922. Chatham House and its German 
counterpart, Institut für Auswärtige Politik, carried out a major part of the interwar 
diplomacy between Germany and the Allies that was concerned with the War Guilt 
Clause, Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty.268 This was the crux of the war guilt 
debate that dealt with responsibility for World War I.269  
 
A plurality of competing interests continued to concentrate historians’ 
minds.270 The beliefs of ‘action intellectuals’, as Inderjeet Parmar termed it, in think 
tanks such as Chatham House were practical, despite the interwar era’s idealism and 
longing for pacifism.271 Alfred Eckhard Zimmern, Curtis and Toynbee were not 
hostile to the concept of a universal government, although they were acutely 
conscious of being from the UK, and of the reality of national interest and balance-
of-power-politics. Their nationalism and their organisation’s character was best 
captured in Parmar’s characterisation of them as ‘patriotic internationalists’.272  
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Zimmern was born on 26 January 1879, to Jewish parentage. His father was 
born in Germany. He was a classical historian, political scientist and educationalist. 
Zimmern attended Winchester College, New College, University of Oxford, and 
Berlin University. In 1903, he was Lecturer of Ancient History, New College, 
Oxford. Between 1904 and 1909, he taught and received a Fellowship at New 
College. Between 1912 and 1915, he was staff inspector at the Board of Education. 
Between 1918 and 1919, he joined the Political Intelligence Department at the 
Foreign Office. Zimmern’s chief was Sir Ian Tyrrell, head of the Information 
Department at the Foreign Office. He fulfilled roles as Wilson Professor of 
International Politics, and between 1919 and 1921, he was the earliest Professor of 
International Politics at the University College of Wales. Between 1922 and 1923, 
Zimmern lectured at Cornell University. Between 1930 and 1944, Zimmern was the 
first Montagu Burton Professor of International Relations at University of Oxford. In 
1919, he co-established Chatham House and participated in the London Round Table 
Group. Along with his colleagues, he supported the establishment of the League of 
Nations Society (LNU). He had the post of Deputy Director of the Institute for 
Intellectual Cooperation in Paris in the mid-1920s. Zimmern died on 24 November 
1957. 
Arnold Toynbee was born on 14 April 1889 in London. Toynbee attended 
Winchester College and Balliol College, University of Oxford. Toynbee investigated 
classics and history. In 1912 he became a tutor and Fellow in Ancient History at 
Balliol College. Three years later, Toynbee worked for the Foreign Office in matters 
relating to intelligence. In World War I, he was engaged with Political Intelligence 
Department of the Foreign Office. Like his colleagues, he was part of the British 
delegation at the Versailles Peace Settlement. Toynbee was then employed as a 
Professor of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies at the University of London. 
Between 1924 and 1943, he contributed to the studies at Chatham House and Balliol 
College, University of Oxford, as there were close connections between the two. 
Chatham House conducted research for the Foreign Office and had close relations 
with members of the office. In 1925, Toynbee attained a research professorship in 
international history at the London School of Economics. While in Germany in 1936, 
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he interviewed Adolf Hitler. Toynbee died on 22 October 1975. 
  
UK interwar historians’ role in policy development rendered them acutely 
conscious of their responsibility to national interest. Their analytical efforts and 
social connections eased this process, with actions that contributed to developing the 
contexts for them to work across. Headlam-Morley’s advice was often dismissed by 
the Foreign Office when French concerns had to be considered.273 It was historians in 
the Foreign Office, such as Headlam-Morley, who despaired of the long-term 
ramifications of the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. Germany’s inability 
or unwillingness to provide telegraph poles, coal and timber (as a form of 
reparations) in a timely manner prompted the Franco-Belgian intervention, moving 
Headlam-Morley to write that: ‘[i]t was now generally recognised that the reparation 
Clauses could not be defended. They can be indeed explained, condoned, excused, 
but an attempt to defend and justify them would almost certainly fail’.274  
  
Historians’ expertise was not always recognised or agreed with, and their ability to 
provide facts was often more valued than their analytical opinion. When Lewis 
Namier was working for the Foreign Office, he attempted to influence his superiors 
to adopt his view of post-1918 Germany. He argued that the UK’s support for 
various Polish factions should have better considered some Poles’ hostility towards 
remnants of the UK’s white Russian allies. Namier was supported in his views by 
high officials such as the private secretary to Lloyd George, Philip Kerr, as well as 
Headlam-Morley, Sir William Tyrrel and Lord Eustace Percy.275 His idealism was 
unsuccessful, however, as more senior policy makers regarded his suggestions on 
Poland to be ‘biased and warped’.276 Nonetheless, Namier felt that the international 
situation was unpredictable, and that the ‘old ruling classes’’ loss of influence had 
created a ‘new and frightening’ Europe.277 Namier was born on 27 June 1888, in 
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Wola Okrzejska, Poland.  
 
Namier’s family came from Austrian Galicia, in a region that was close to the 
Russian border. Although Namier was of Jewish descent, his family had converted to 
Roman Catholicism and adopted aspects of Polish identity. Namier’s surname was 
originally Bernstein, but he Anglicised it to Namier as his admiration of England 
coincided with a determination to pursue his career in the UK.278 The name ‘Namier’ 
came from ‘Nemirov’, the name of the Bernstein’s property, and Namier changed it 
to the English surname ‘Napier’.279 After making his acquaintance with Namier in 
1909, Toynbee recounted that Namier ‘saw international politics with Polish, rather 
than with Jewish, eyes’, and that he wanted the Russian and German Empires to be 
toppled so that Poland could regain independence.280  
 
When Poland reacquired self-determination after World War I, Namier 
rejected Polish nationalism and became a Zionist.281 Toynbee noted that Namier’s 
personality was endearing, but that it could be intense, and wrote that ‘If you crossed 
Lewis on some issue which, for him, was of importance, he was capable of declaring 
total war on you, however old and close a friend of his you might be; and, in making 
war, he was always vehement, sometimes vindictive, and occasionally even 
venomous’.282 Toynbee mentioned that Namier’s advocacy of Zionism did not 
conflict with his ‘love’ for England and the broader UK, which inspired much of his 
research on the history of British politics.283 Namier was ultimately awarded with a 
knighthood. The ‘informal homage’ which Namier was held in the UK was regarded 
                                                          
278 Arnold J. Toynbee, Acquaintances, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 66. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid., p. 67; Toynbee noted the associations between Lewis Namier, Professor Hamish J. Paton and 
himself, all of whom were friends and attendees at Balliol College, Oxford University, and of the 
tasks their collaboration inspired. ‘The time when Hamish saw the most of him was during the First 
World War, when they were working together, for the British Government, on a minute study of the 
ethnic composition of the population around the fringes of the area in which the Poles were 
indisputably in a decisive majority. (The outcome of their joint work was the Paton Line – known to 
the world as ‘the Curzon Line’; research assistants, however eminently intellectually, are seldom 
given the credit for their work)’.  
281 Ibid., pp. 67-68.  
282 Ibid., p. 68. 
283 Ibid., p. 70-75. 
 59 
 
as ‘immense’, though he never received a professorial chair at Oxford University, 
attained employment at a provincial, northern university.284  
 
Namier regarded ‘proper work’ to be synonymous with much of the work his 
colleagues and himself engaged in.285 He pursued political activities and sought to be 
‘in the thick of events’. Norman Rose wrote that Namier ‘buttonholed Cabinet 
members, exerted pressure on political leaders, harassed Government officials, [and] 
canvassed support in the press’.286 Rose suggested that Namier’s sense of Jewish 
consciousness was fluid. His activities in ‘non-academic matters’ frequently 
culminated in his eliciting the attention of ‘psychoanalysts’’ treatment of ‘emotional 
turmoil’.287 Namier was involved with the Foreign Office in World War I and in its 
aftermath, and he maintained an antagonism towards Germans, whom he regarded as 
a ‘deadly menace to Europe and to civilisation’.288 Namier died on 19 August 1960 
in London.  
 
In other instances, historians were able to influence the issue more 
successfully. For example, George Clark, senior clerk in the War Department of the 
Foreign Office, noted that in the case of the Yugoslavs, Dr Robert William Seton-
Watson ‘enabled’ the Foreign Office to ‘derive information’ in order for them to 
make informed decisions.289 Seton-Watson was born on 20 August 1879, in London 
to Scottish parents. Seton-Watson attended Winchester College and New College, 
University of Oxford. He attended New College at the same time as H. A. L. Fisher 
was history tutor. Seton-Watson was ‘fortunate in not having to concern himself 
about earning his own living’.290 He studied modern history and graduated with a 
First-Class degree in 1901. Seton-Watson studied at Berlin University and published 
a number of academic pieces. In the middle of World War I, he established and 
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financed a journal which advocated for the nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, called The New Europe.  
 
Between 1917 and 1919, he engaged in propaganda, and worked at the 
Intelligence Bureau of the War Cabinet in the Enemy Propaganda Department. He 
was present at the Versailles Peace Conference, but was said to not be attached to the 
official delegation at that time. In 1915, Seton-Watson founded the School of 
Slavonic Studies at the University of London. He promoted the disintegration of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Seton-Watson was witness to the phenomenon where ‘the 
historian was merged in the publicist and politician’.291 From 1938 until the end of 
World War II, Seton-Watson advocated to prevent Czechoslovakia from being 
partitioned by Germany. From 1945 until 1948, Seton-Watson was elected as 
President of the Royal Historical Society, and his two sons became academics in 
history at Oxford University.292 Seton-Watson died on 25 July 1951. 
  
UK historians’ contributions to the policy outcomes from the policy-making 
process extended to the issue of colonies in the interwar era. These reflections made 
some historians the champions of those who sought to revise opinion about the cause 
of World War I. Historians’ commentary about the Paris Peace Settlement’s 
implications for Germany was that it was unsustainable and would eventually require 
revisions. Colonies elicited the attention of this thesis’ historians because they were 
regarded as an expression of a country’s demographic and geographic strength, and 
there were widespread perceptions that non-self-governing territories possessed vast 
riches.293 The middle years of the twenties were relatively calm compared to other 
years of the interwar period, and showed some significant foreign policy 
achievements.294 In 1925, for example, the British mandate of Tanganyika made 
provision for German settlers’ return and made room for a legislature at the start of 
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1926, amplifying the spirit of cooperation from the Treaty of Locarno.295 UK public 
intellectuals noted the sensitivities that segments of German opinion held regarding 
the loss of Germany’s pre-World War I colonies. The changing status of colonies can 
be seen in the writings about policy outcomes by UK interwar historians connected 
to the Foreign Office and think tanks. Subsequent interest in the interwar period has 
understandably been focused on the implications of appeasement, and whether the 
war might have been avoided.296 Various intellectuals, such as Kerr, argued that 
Germany could be placated from seeking redress by returning her former colonies, 
particularly those in Africa, so as to restore her symbolic ‘imperial’ status.297  
 
UK interwar historians’ appraisal of foreign policy and history led them to 
various published outcomes. The reinterpretations about how World War I began 
contributed to Prime Minister MacDonald’s 1924 decision to release the British 
Diplomatic Documents that predated the conflict. Gooch received the co-editorship 
along with Temperley, and both sought to be impartial while presenting British 
policy as unsullied.298 The result was the publishing in 1926 of the British 
Documents on the Origins on the War. The editors’ intention was simultaneously to 
offer tentative support for the Versailles Treaty’s legality, and also to promote 
European ‘reconciliation’ amongst the former war’s participants.299  
 
Historians, the Press and Association 
 UK historians sought to cultivate a reputation for impartiality, a perception held by 
their readership which set them apart as a collection of individuals. While they 
remained important in government, interwar historians sought to influence debate on 
the legacies of the Treaty of Versailles by providing reliable analyses to the press, 
often omitting to disclose their close relationship with government when so doing. 
UK interwar historians’ relationship with the press highlighted their role as effective 
disseminators of ideas to various media outlets. For those historians whose Foreign 
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Office employment was concurrent with their journalistic work, their expertise found 
expression because of the ‘special permission’ they received from the Foreign Office 
to provide commentary.300 These historians had aims that other commentators 
presumably shared, in that this collection of individuals induced ideas and opinions 
in others that reflected their own.301 The flow of ideas from these historians reached 
public opinion, and they sought to persuade readers so as to achieve their point of 
view.302 Historians’ interactions with the press and associations can be organised into 
four main categories: their direct experiences with publishing that sought to promote 
various visions of international cooperation, their contributions to the press while 
employed as civil servants, their engagement with collectives that influenced their 
work and, finally, the re-emergence of propaganda. 
 
UK interwar historians aimed to shape the national debate and promote peace 
by publishing their views in periodicals and by organising frameworks for 
international cooperation. Many of these historians held liberal characteristics along 
with their colleagues, such as a belief that intellectuals had a responsibility to 
enhance the practice of politics.303 Gooch, among others, endeavoured to bring amity 
between the Britain and Germany after the war. Gooch attempted to do so in his co-
editorship of Contemporary Review, and by writing for the press and lecturing.304 
Gooch made Contemporary Review the chief British journal on foreign 
developments, and sought to maximise its readership to promote his editorial 
vision.305  
 
The relationship between international dialogue and the press was recognised 
by a number of historians, such as Gooch, Toynbee, Zimmern and others, identifying 
them as a like-minded collection of individuals. Its significance lay in the degree to 
which public intellectuals elevated the importance of diplomacy between countries, 
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as well as its reportage.306 Zimmern sought to promulgate international awareness of 
Germany’s importance via his encouragement of summer schools, recreational 
activities and international student conferences held in Geneva. These events came 
about after Zimmern ceased working at Aberystwyth University and started 
employment with the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, based in Geneva.307 His 
colleague at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Toynbee, supported this 
work. In 1930, Zimmern came back to Oxford, where he began his ‘writings’ in the 
popular press that, throughout the decade, acquired a tone of ‘idealist propaganda’ 
rather than ‘serious’ scholarship.308 He argued that the press would show its 
significance in reporting either the success or the failure of policy and stimulate this 
debate.309 Eventually, however, the post-World War I model of ‘diplomacy by 
conference’ became moribund, despite its previously widespread public support.310  
 
UK historians’ regular access to the press had a powerful influence on their 
ability to self-identify as a cohesive number of individuals. Interwar historians found 
journalistic forays a congenial way to exercise significant influence on the public, 
particularly when the subject was Germany.311 As a collection of individuals, UK 
interwar historians recognised the potential transnational scope of targeting wide-
spread, English-speaking audiences.312 They believed that a favourable outcome in 
the interwar era would require UK historians to be fluent articulators in the press, a 
view which saw them emphasise the cultural affinities between Anglo-Saxon 
nations.313  
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Prominent newspapers’ columns had regular contributions from historians in 
the interwar ear. Temperley, among others, maintained a visible presence in the 
press.314 UK interwar historians’ and public intellectuals’ access to the press, as well 
as the Foreign Office and think tanks, was based on British assumptions about an 
individual’s public involvement.315 As well as Temperley and Headlam-Morley, their 
colleagues included Carr, who contributed articles for The Times from 1937.316 This 
is exemplified in the press contributions of Headlam-Morley, whose output reflected 
the public nature of historians’ work. Gordon Martel commented: 
 
Headlam-Morley’s elevation to the position of ‘Historical Advisor’ 
to the Foreign Office enabled him to make what was an almost 
seamless transition from wartime propagandist to peacetime 
publicist. From 1920 until his retirement in 1928, he produced an 
enormous number of book reviews, essays and articles, amounting 
to some 250,000 words in total. Like the wartime propaganda, the 
vast majority of these were anonymous…It is not going too far to 
suggest that Headlam-Morley became the voice of The Times and 
the Literary Supplement on the subjects of war origins, war guilt 
and the peace treaties.317 
 
 UK historians’ consolidated links with the press enabled them to pursue multiple 
goals.318 These were facilitated by networks with colleagues who occupied places in 
the public space.319 The increased growth of ideology in the interwar period 
influenced the role of the press and associations in providing UK interwar historians 
a platform to visibly display their opinions. They contributed towards the 
implementation of a new international architecture, which they hoped would 
integrate partner states in ever-increasing dependency. By 1936, Carr, Webster and 
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Zimmern had published work on the League of Nations.320 William Harbutt Dawson 
had begun his career in journalism and even wrote for the German newspaper, 
Deutsche Rundschau.321 Dawson told his German readers in 1934 of his outrage at 
what he perceived as the UK press’s unfair discrimination against Germany.322 
Temperley wrote to The Times amidst the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1938.323 He 
praised Czechoslovakia’s leader, Edvard Beneš, as ‘the wisest’ politician in Europe, 
but ultimately supported the UK’s accommodation with Germany on 
Czechoslovakia’s borders.324 Dawson was born on 27 July 1860. He was an 
historian, but had also worked as a journalist and British civil servant. He was 
educated at Humboldt University of Berlin, and the preponderance of his analyses 
concerned Germany and Germans. His two marriages were with German women. He 
died on 7 March 1948.  
 
UK interwar historians largely shared the aims of the various peace 
movements, and sought to gain positive press exposure to attain converts for their 
program.325 Zimmern shared the concerns of his fellow historians that the future of 
peace relied upon the success of international nongovernmental entities in settling 
international disputes.326 World War I had convinced public intellectuals associated 
with the LNU that international affairs would command public interest.327 Zimmern, 
like Murray and others, occupied positions within the League of Nations’ movement 
and in academia, but was ‘sceptical’ of liberal internationalism’s triumph.328 
Zimmern used the press to critique the agendas of the UDC and other groups as 
                                                          
320 Ibid.  
321 Stefan Berger, ‘William Harbutt Dawson: The Career and Politics of an Historian of Germany’, 
The English Historical Review, Vol. 116, No. 465, 2001, p. 102. 
322 Ibid.  
323 Fair, Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm, p. 279; The Times article 
was: Harold Temperley, ‘Czechoslovak Frontiers’, The Times, 4 May 1938, p. 15, available from The 
Times digital archives, (accessed 11 January, 2015). 
324 Ibid.  
325 Helen McCarthy, ‘The League of Nations, Public Ritual and National Identity in Britain, c. 1919-
56’, History Workshop Journal, Vol. 70, 2010, p. 112.  
326 Thomas Richard Davis, ‘A “Great Experiment” of the League of Nations Era: International 
Nongovernmental Organisation, Global Governance, and Democracy Beyond the State’, Global 
Governance, Vol. 18, 2012, p. 415. 
327 McCarthy, ‘The League of Nations, Public Ritual and National Identity in Britain, c. 1919-56’, p. 
112. 
328 Casper Sylvest, ‘Continuity and Change in British Liberal Internationalism, c. 1900-1930’, Review 
of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2005, p. 279.  
 66 
 
unrealistic.329 Through propaganda methods, however, the LNU sought to turn the 
people of the UK into ‘enlightened patriots’.330 These methods constituted public 
gatherings with speakers, writings forwarded to newspaper editors, pamphlets and 
educative materials.331 Historians’ work was published in a context where the 1935 
‘Peace Ballot’ was extolled as a triumph for the League, given it polled nearly twelve 
million votes in the UK.332 The occasion was recognised by historians as a publicity 
coup, and was perceived as an ‘unofficial referendum on the future of British foreign 
policy’.333 Only with the UK’s accelerating rearmament from 1935 did significant 
numbers of historians begin to moderate their views. 
  
UK interwar historians formed a fluid but cohesive collection of individuals, 
which can be understood in a variety of ways. Historians’ increasing careerism, 
commitment to institutional affiliation and publishing laid down a marker for their 
occupational flexibility. Moreover, it facilitated their activities across four areas of 
public life: universities, political parties, policy making and the press. The roles 
fulfilled by UK public intellectuals ensured that historians’ work remained a vital 
and high-prestige occupation, which was central to the life of the country in the 
interwar era. The next chapter examines the manner in which history and histories 
were written and disseminated in the interwar era, and the importance of class, 
ethnicity and gender in assessing the interwar historians’ contributions about 
Germany
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Histories of interwar Britain  
UK historians’ ability to depict themselves as authoritative spokesmen was 
influenced by the socio-cultural context of interwar Britain. The chapter argues that 
UK interwar historians’ analyses were particularly shaped by class and Anglo-
Saxonism, which were both formative aspects of their identity. Class influenced them 
by regulating their access to politics and the public space. UK historians benefited 
from the synergy between class and education, and used the relationship between the 
two to move across different contexts. Finally, the shifting perceptions of Anglo-
Saxonism in the interwar era influenced UK historians’ interpretations about 
whiteness, masculinity and culture. The work they created inspired cultural feedback 
that often elicited political reactions. Historians’ cognisance of England’s place in 
the UK, particularly its position as the metropole in a multiethnic and multinational 
empire set the context for their public involvement. The main interpretations of this 
field are summarised in the existing state of knowledge of these various approaches. 
The chapter discusses the framework in a thematic way, focusing on how these 
aspects interacted in the interwar UK. 
 
The cohort of UK historians who were familiar with Germany, and with 
German history, enjoyed a professional, intellectual identity which stimulated an 
awareness of how they came to comprehend and write about Germany. While the 
literature on relations between the UK and Germany is vast, the perspectives of UK 
historians and public intellectuals of Germany is placed within a context of the 
interwar period. A critical foundation of the thesis, however, uses frameworks that 
analyse Anglo-German relations from perspectives that transcend the periodisation of 
the interwar era. This schema incorporates the intellectual heritage of how UK 
historians and public intellectuals acted, and occasioned effects. Stefan Berger and 
Daren Lilleker contextualised a backwards and forwards continuum of influence 
between Britons and Germans, and articulated that it extended beyond the passing of 
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World War II.1 This pattern was identifiable among multiple actors in both countries 
in the post-World War II period of Anglo-German relations.2 Berger and Lilleker 
acknowledged that post-World War II German politicians gained inspiration for 
democracy by invoking the early twentieth century experience of the UK, in both 
war and peace, under a democratic system.3  
 
UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany recognised that the 
‘German Question’ occupied the centrality of issues that revolved around Cold War 
disagreements in the several decades following World War II.4 R. Gerald Hughes 
and Rachel Owen maintained that the UK had a powerful influence in ensuring that 
the configuration of a future German polity be determined for the advancement of 
British interests.5 W. R. Smyser observed of Germany that ‘no nation’s fury, no 
nation’s fate, had a greater impact on the twentieth century’.6 Similarly to the 
interwar period under investigation, the 1950s saw much opinion emanate from the 
UK on whether the British government should adopt a more flexible posture towards 
the GDR.7 David Childs authored an article about the relationship between members 
of the British Labour Party and the GDR.8 Childs observed that support for closer 
UK-GDR relations was stronger within elements of the British left and that they were 
early advocates of extending to the GDR a degree of legal acknowledgement.9  
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For UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany, the nuances and 
complexities of people who desired better relations for the advancement of their 
respective country’s interests were evident.10 As Anthony Glees held, this was shown 
when representatives from the UK sought to promote the image of the post-World 
War II polity of the GDR to the British public.11 Arnd Bauerkämper emphasised that 
the position of gradually recognising the GDR was supported by some members of 
the British Labour Party members, who hoped to facilitate measures that would 
increase contacts between the UK and the GDR.12 They supported the eventual 
reunification of Germany, and sought to prevent tensions that could escalate into the 
recurrence of another major European war.13 At first, however, the stance of not 
recognising the GDR was relatively uncontroversial in the UK.14 GDR functionaries 
portrayed their own polity as ‘antifascist’ when compared to the FRG.15 As Germans 
from the GDR, they sought to capitalise on the hostility towards anything that was 
deemed to be German by some in the UK, and they aimed to influence ‘specific 
target groups’ to promote the interests of the GDR away from the FRG.16 UK 
historians identified class structure and class mobility as powerful aspects that 
informed their own sense of social standing, the importance of which energised how 
they came to know Germany. 
 
Class  
The significance of interwar UK historians’ understanding of class was shown in the 
synergies realised in the networks between class and politics. As Berger showed in 
how vocal some UK perspectives were in a later period of Anglo-German relations, 
and is a vital basis for this thesis, class was a powerful factor.17 The political culture 
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from which UK historians emerged was complicated by the post-war riots and 
recession of 1919-1921, the 1926 General Strike, and the mass unemployment of the 
1929 Great Depression.18 The Labour Party won government for the first time under 
Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald in January 1924, and the intellectuals associated 
with the party sought to expose its party members to arguments about Germany’s 
place in international relations.19 Such considerations were also characterised by the 
social legacy of World War I, and the substantial influence of the World War I 
‘trench generation’.20 While interwar UK intellectuals recorded World War I 
enlistees’ severe treatment in various publications, their consideration indicated an 
obvious class-based bias in comparison to their commissioned counterparts.21  
 
The manner in which histories were written and disseminated in the interwar 
period show the prevalence of class as a significant category. The merging of class 
and politics brought together a synthesis that involved UK historians. John Field 
drew attention to the strong motivation of those university students who operated 
unemployment camps in the interwar period and their later pursuit of other avenues 
of ‘social service’.22 The Great Depression of 1929 also influenced how Britons 
viewed Germany, and Philip Noel-Baker argued that the ruination of Germany’s 
middle class by the Franco-Belgian Ruhr occupation had a powerful impact on 
British ideas of class.23  
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The historians of this thesis witnessed political machinations that informed 
their views on the roles of property, class, and the public space. The UK’s economy 
had been dominated by sectors of shipping, steel, coal and textiles, and most of the 
unemployed came from these heavy industries when economic downturn arrived.24 
The problem became so pronounced that British governments enacted twenty-eight 
unemployment insurance bills, from 1919 to 1934.25 This was a change in direction 
for public policy, however, given that the state had previously only given its 
functionaries pensions rather than the general public.26 Denis Lineham stated that 
there were wide variations in the spread of economic upheaval in the interwar era, 
remarking that although there was mass unemployment, southern England (where 
most of the thesis’ historians were based) enjoyed something of a boom for long 
periods.27 Daniel Garsk suggested that the interwar era was prominent for 
experiencing the end of cooperation between the interests of property and labour, 
notably apparent, he suggested, within the Liberal Party.28 The Liberal Party’s 
fortunes waned in the period, alongside the simultaneous rise of class antagonisms 
and the Labour Party.29 Garsk indicated that this ‘interwar division of British politics 
along class lines’ was explainable because of the weakening of trade unions in the 
1920s.30 Such changes had a powerful impact on historians’ social networks and 
political assumptions about future international developments. 
 
Class informed UK historians’ discussions at the highest levels of 
international diplomacy in the period, and their interest in nascent international 
institutions is core to the thesis. The interplay between capitalism, socialism and 
social democracy was at the heart of international debates among intellectuals on the 
activist Left.31 Lucian Ashworth maintained that radical and reformist socialists 
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shared similar goals regarding pacifist liberal internationalism,32 but that working out 
the machinery for the League of Nations’ operation was a priority for the reformers. 
As Ashworth contrasted, ‘the League may not have been socialist, but its existence 
could be part of the development of a socialist world’.33  
 
Historians sought to give greater recognition to class as an effective way to 
understand the challenges of the period, and as a reference point for analysing the 
UK as a whole.34 Class-based rhetoric gradually acquired a central position in 
interwar Britain.35 Simon Gunn postulated that class gradually departed from its 
previous association with particular localities in the period from 1918. He noted that, 
while ‘workers…might be identified somewhat vaguely with the north’, the label 
‘middle class’ was increasingly synonymous with that of the nation.36 He suggested 
that the term ‘middle class’ had appropriated an authority that was national in reach 
and had transcended ‘local and specific’ contexts.37 Such authority facilitated 
historians’ public authority. 
 
One aspect of the historians’ ability to access public space through their 
personal and professional networks was the growing reach of serious newspapers that 
catered to all views of society.38 As Adrian Bingham wrote, ‘the circulation of daily 
newspapers doubled in the 20 years after 1918, and ‘by 1939 some two-thirds of the 
population read one’.39 In drawing attention to the rise of the ‘upper-class gentleman’ 
journalist who reflected wider social change of reading publics, Sarah Newman 
noted that newspaper proprietors recognised the ‘highly valuable asset’ of a ‘man on 
the inside’ who would not appear out of place amongst the gatherings of powerful 
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men.40  
  
Historians drew attention to people’s circumstances, and experiences of class 
as an expression of identity.41 Following World War I, many intellectuals invoked 
the concept of ‘Englishness’ to attempt to eviscerate the emergence of alien 
ideological fanaticism from both sides of the political spectrum.42 Arthur Bryant, G. 
M. Trevelyan and H. A. L. Fisher sought to increase the public’s consciousness of 
the UK’s history as a part of this process. Trevelyan, for example, recognised trade 
unions as part of the history of what he termed ‘Englishry’, despite his omission of 
socialist thought from its understanding.43 E. D. Morel viewed ‘the worker as the 
prime agent of twentieth-century politics’, and backed working-class movements that 
campaigned for influence.44 These class-based concepts were articulated within the 
rubric of the UK’s changing identity.  
 
As individuals, they frequently aimed to persuade the public to adopt their 
points of view regarding class. Eric Hobsbawm observed that what came to be 
known as middle-class attitudes had the potential to change behaviour.45  These 
‘practices’ included attitudes about education and were transmitted between social 
groups, such as instances of historians’ promotions of national histories.46 He 
proposed that the importance of ‘invented traditions’ resided in their political and 
social resonance across aspects of identity, education and employment.47 Ross 
McKibbin contended that the interwar period was unique for the heightened intensity 
of feeling among classes in the UK.48  
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Historians took opportunities to maximise the synergies between class and education 
to expand their roles. The majority of UK historians came from the same social 
stratum and had mannerisms and outlooks that were in keeping with their 
education.49 Those UK historians who identified as English had a vast influence 
within the state’s historiography, due to their near omnipresence as teachers and 
tutors.50 The universities of Oxford and Cambridge, as well as the University of 
London, were the locations where many of the conservative historians would remain 
throughout their careers.51 Academics at the London School of Economics (LSE) had 
often received instruction at Oxford and Cambridge, and were of ‘very comfortable 
backgrounds’.52 Reba Soffer noted that ‘even the historians at the LSE’ had 
commonalties with aspects of the ancient universities, and described them as ‘an 
exclusive and almost incestuous community’.53 The public recognition afforded to 
historians further facilitated this. E. H. Carr, whose newspaper was the Manchester 
Guardian, attained a permanent academic posting at his alma mater of Trinity 
College, Cambridge University, because, ‘typically, [they] knew next to nothing of 
his work but took him in because they knew him to be famous’.54  
 
Class in the interwar UK existed alongside an educational framework that 
favoured those with the networks and capital to pursue high intellectual achievement. 
This system rewarded the academic elite whose influence was underpinned by their 
intellect and the continuance of the educational system.55 Gail Savage argued that the 
English Board of Education was staffed by men who were themselves beneficiaries 
of the system. She suggested that the ‘small, meritocratic elite’ was a reflection of 
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the type of government that had traditionally ruled the UK.56 The ‘framing concepts’ 
that intellectuals received from universities, she reasoned, were vital for facilitating 
their career progression, weaving  their ‘professional identity’ with that of ‘social 
identity’.57 In other words, it was an occupational identity. UK university students in 
this period, moreover, encompassed ‘well under 2% of all young Britons’.58 The 
middle and upper class represented the vast majority of those involved in giving and 
receiving education in the university system.59 There were variations in context, 
however, and familial circumstances of UK historians ranged from penury to 
affluence.60  
  
Despite their privilege, ‘academics’ and political functionaries contributed to 
breaking down perceptions of class barriers between different regions.61 UK interwar 
historians and public intellectuals were community figures, who were instrumental in 
convincing public authorities to grant schoolchildren free access to historically 
significant places of the UK.62 Their actions were premised on history’s ‘central 
place’ within a compulsory schooling system.63 In this manner, the prevailing social 
order infused what was positioned as the ‘democratic culture of history’.64   
 
Marxist historical scholarship represented the UK’s history as a revolutionary 
continuum that would lead to Marxism.65 Intellectuals of the Left-leaning Teacher 
Labour League sought to apply pressure to the Labour party at its 26th yearly 
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conference in 1926.66 They advocated for an appreciable inclusion of working-class 
history in history books, and demanded the adoption of policies that deemphasised 
establishment-centred histories.67 In the middle of the 1930s, Marxist intellectuals’ 
attempted to influence their compatriots to forswear ‘the official English history 
taught by official English historians’.68 At the time, government officials identified 
the introduction of ‘communist ideas’ into the education system as tantamount to 
sabotage.69 Despite this, however, the intellectuals of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain often sought to resist the authority of the Soviet Union.70  
 
UK interwar historians recognised the salience of educational access in 
discussions about class, as well as the role of geographic locales in the intersection of 
class and education. In the 1920s, the north-west areas of England were reliant on 
young and part-time workers engaged in textile production.71 Historians showed 
regret that local business interests and ‘some working-class opinion’ had misgivings 
about the worth of educational access.72 The professional classes were mainly 
centred on London, and the business leaders of southern England, embodied most of 
the British ‘elite’.73 In 1928 at Manchester, Fisher, who was then the president of the 
Board of Education, drew attention to how issues around class would have to be 
solved if education was to be improved. Fisher argued for policy changes that 
accommodated the growing sophistication of ‘society’, and deplored how the ‘rich 
learn and the poor earn’.74  
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The intersection of class and education highlighted the prominence of 
masculinity in the UK.75 Typologies of masculinity ranged from definitions of men 
as ‘sensitive and caring’ to being strong, ‘competitive’ men who shunned emotional 
disclosure.76 As a collection of men, historians’ work was both ‘gendered and 
embodied’.77  The ‘monastic origins’ of academia meant that a masculine culture was 
perceived to permeate through their work.78 Their ‘gendered’ influence reflected the 
society that surrounded them.79 Particular attributes of masculinity were associated 
with successful intellectual pursuits and were bound up with the competitive impulse 
to acquire intellectual command.80 UK intellectuals’ public visibility in the interwar 
era drew on their possession of these hegemonic masculine traits. 
 
A number of the men in this thesis embodied a form of hegemonic 
masculinity, requiring its acknowledgment from their peers to be effective.81 Public 
schools and universities had evolved from the nineteenth century and mandated an 
‘education in manliness as the preparation for a governing elite’.82 World War I 
destroyed many men’s pre-war certitudes of masculinity, although Fascists saw 
involvement in the war as having enriched its participants’ masculinity.83 Masculine 
standards were pliable and beheld changeable qualities.84 Veterans, such as Harold 
Temperley, were associated with duty, and intellectuals’ attributes included the 
perception that they were ‘calculating’, ‘unemotional’, and ‘rational’.85  
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A number of interwar Britons held the conviction that World War I had 
advantaged women.86 Within the Board of Education and in schools, women gained 
greater influence and were believed by their male counterparts to hold a hostile 
attitude toward masculine traits. Boys’ militarised activities at school were perceived 
to have been sidelined, for example.87 This resulted in the National Association of 
Schoolmasters (NAS), a teachers’ group with many veterans as members, opposing 
the initiatives of the National Union of Women Teachers (NAWT).88 The NAS’s 
values included ‘imperial masculinity’, and were expressed in the Men Teachers for 
Boys campaign, a public space initiative which sought to shield schoolboys from 
‘effeminising influences’.89 The male teachers sought to guard against interrupting 
boys’ development and to emphasise men’s value in inculcating boys with a 
masculine identity.90  
 
The association between universities and scholarliness provided a place for 
men to embrace the importance of friendship and male bonding.91 Some middle-class 
men abandoned the ‘stuffy formalities of pre-war homo-sociality’.92 For example, 
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, who helped conceive the League of Nations, adored 
being around ‘young men’ in the then single-sex King’s College of Cambridge 
University.93 Dickinson felt that, ‘the best tradition of King’s [is] that of friendship 
and intimacy between undergraduates and dons’.94 However, types of masculinity 
were averse to ‘academic’ success and some intellectuals pursued influence outside 
the academy.95 Unmanly youths were often perceived to be of ‘a particular type’, and 
were cast by some as a ‘cultural enemy’ that was made up of dandified male 
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graduates from comfortable backgrounds.96 The masculine environment of the 
London medical schools in the interwar years emphasised ‘performance’ and 
‘competition’, for instance.97 St Mary’s Hospital educated ‘St Mary’s men’, just as 
other hospitals sent forth credentialed, energetic men.98  
 
The Growth of Anglo-Saxonism in the Interwar UK 
Interwar historians’ analyses of Germany were influenced not only by class, but also 
by shifting expressions of Anglo-Saxonism. The strength of English identity in the 
UK, and its connection to a white north European identity, empowered the historians 
to argue for a more just treatment of Germany in the interwar era. As an assemblage 
of cultural and ethnic assumptions, UK historians used a shared Anglo-Saxon 
heritage to promote friendship between the peoples of the UK and Germany.  
 
To a considerable degree, historians contributed to notions of ethnicity that 
underpinned interwar identity in the UK.99 Intellectuals were broadly involved in the 
policy-making processes that sought to strengthen national identity.100 The early 
interwar era saw intellectuals with backgrounds in history, anthropology, genetics, 
biology and the social sciences produce writings that focused on ethnicity.101 The 
ethnic context of the British Empire provided much of the context for debates 
relating to Germany. Racial diffusionists advanced a notion that supported the UK’s 
moral responsibility to develop its colonies by virtue of their more advanced 
‘progress’.102 They represented the UK’s dominance over non-self-governing lands 
as the latest instalment in a parade of military adventures where a ‘lighter skinned 
monotheistic “martial race”’ gained ascendancy ‘over darker skinned polytheists’.103 
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Social Darwinists, however, maintained that ethnicities were fated to fight until one 
emerged as a clear victor.104  
  
Notwithstanding imperial rivalries, historians sought to remind the English 
population of the UK of their ancestral Anglo-Saxon links (although they often 
assumed that this emphasis on the English included the other constituent nations of 
the UK by default). Historians’ writings about Anglo-Saxon qualities were conducted 
with reference to contemporary notions of whiteness and the historians at the centre 
of this thesis were active participants in public discussions about ethnicity in the UK. 
They did this by referencing the vitality of an Anglo-Saxon tradition, and by using 
Germany’s historical experience to support opinions about that country’s 
resilience.105  
 
The competing interpretations of Anglo-Saxonism in the interwar UK provide 
a segue to understand the role of ethnicity and the salience of whiteness in the period. 
Those people in the UK who articulated a shared Anglo-Saxon heritage most clearly 
included UK historians of English heritage, who felt an ethnic affinity with 
Germans.106 Connections with Germany had an ethnic foundation and were imagined 
to relate to the contact with Teutonic antecedents at Kent.107 German ancestry was 
reputed to have provided the origins for England’s development, with the two 
peoples held to share the same kindred blood and Anglo-Saxon destiny.108  
  
The significance of an Anglo-Saxon and Germanic component to England’s 
identity was redolent throughout historians’ work. They did this by emphasising the 
Germanic roots of England’s commitment to the principles and values of liberty. 
However, this view was complicated by some English views about the source of their 
nationality. ‘The construction of Englishness at any one time and place has been 
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intimately connected to hatreds and antipathies towards those on the continent, or 
rather specific nations’, suggested Tony Kushner.109 Germany occupied a dual role as 
a source of Britain’s ethnic fraternity as well as of a rival nation, having superseded 
France.110  
 
After World War I, analogies were made between the Roman and the British 
Empires, partly in order to compare the strengths and weaknesses of the two multi-
ethnic empires.111 As the UK operated as a nerve centre for a trans-oceanic empire, 
some intellectuals expressed esteem for the ethnicities of British India, along with 
self-criticism for the common civilisation of the West.112 Perceptions of ethnic decay 
and moral turpitude within the UK concentrated the minds of interwar public 
intellectuals.113 Public intellectuals F. L. Lukas, Evelyn Baring and James Bryce 
commented on the contrasts between how the Roman and British empires framed 
ethnicity.114 Post-war public school text books authored were orientated less towards 
ideas around Anglo-Saxon heritage and ethnicity, and large parts that accentuated its 
significance were excised as the country’s connections were radically reimagined.115  
 
In the interwar period, whiteness was an extension of ideas about Anglo-
Saxonism, though Britishness and Englishness were terms that some English people 
frequently used interchangeably.116 The UK’s possession of a multi-ethnic empire, 
however, meant that definitions of the term would complicate a singular reading of 
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Anglo-Saxonism.117 Whiteness theory captures how certain groups gain access to 
privilege in society.118 The concept of whiteness has been described as a ‘slippery 
phenomenon’, emphasising its situational and contextual nature.119  
  
Within the UK, professionals experienced a distrust of foreigners after World 
War I, that often emanated from ethnic and faith-based prejudices.120 Immigrants 
without proper documentation in the UK were deported with regularity as the 
country enforced its immigration laws.121  For instance, some well-known UK 
intellectuals expressed ‘cultural’ hostility towards the Jewish population.122 Part of 
the estrangement was encapsulated in Judaism’s perceived menace to the UK’s 
Christian heritage. Catholic authors, such as G. K. Chesterton, T. S. Eliot and 
Hillaire Belloc, opined that Jewish culture was inimical to social cohesion in the 
UK.123  
 
Historians recognised that the growth of Anglo-Saxonism took place in a 
context where the other constituent parts of the UK maintained less attention to 
Anglo-German relations than did England. Attitudes towards the Irish fluctuated 
across time, but historians’ knowledge of the UK’s history reminded them of the 
complexity and nuances of the state’s multi-ethnic and multi-national composition. It 
has been argued that the interwar era, which coincided with the Anglo-Irish War, saw 
ill-will towards the Irish heighten.124 The Irish did not exhibit ‘racial otherness’, yet 
it has been suggested that UK authorities employed language that positioned the Irish 
as a ‘non-white’, ‘uncivilised’ people.125 The ‘racialization’ of Ireland’s inhabitants, 
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and its emigrants, saw the words ‘Irish’ as synonymous with ‘Catholic and/or 
nationalist Irish’.126 The Irish peoples’ whiteness was juxtaposed with their marginal 
status within the UK’s ethnic taxonomy.127   
 
In the publications of the 1920s, the descendants of English colonists in 
Ireland were believed to possess the ethnic ‘characteristics of Englishmen’, 
maintained in the face of the ‘alien’ Irish ethnicity.128 Furthermore, UK control of 
Ireland over many centuries was noted as evidence that the English were superior to 
the Irish, giving supporters the opportunity to invoke social Darwinian thought.129 
Another theme adopted by the English in the post-World War I era was that the Irish 
people’s alleged primordial state as ‘living fossils’ meant that English efforts had 
been in vain.130 In 1934, a Scottish bishop positioned the Irish as ethnically 
Mediterranean, in contrast to ‘Nordic Britons’.131 The geographic proximity which 
the English and the Irish enjoyed with each other was held to be ‘more acute and 
dangerous than in any other part of Europe inasmuch as the two races in Britain 
confronted each other directly without, as elsewhere, being separated by Alpines’.132 
What amounted to ‘popular hibernophobia’ was salient in the period, having been 
dormant from the beginning of the twentieth century.133  
 
Throughout much of the interwar period the adjective ‘whitest’ was judged an 
accolade, as the eighth Duke of Northumberland, Alan Ian Percy, was called by his 
colleagues.134 Intellectuals such as Lionel Curtis was representative of those who 
believed in the English tradition in the British Isles and who believed increased 
affinity between the world’s Anglo-Saxons was a worthy goal.135 The Duke of 
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Northumberland further developed Curtis’ views to position the English ethnicity as 
the highest ideal.136 Such ideas permeated society, in that the St George’s Society 
expressed disapproval over the 1920 selection of an Irish candidate to fulfil the role 
of Lieutenant-Governorship of Queensland.137 This body of thought was represented 
in how the Scottish, the Irish and Roma were classed as idle and unreliable and the 
Middle Eastern and Mediterranean ethnicities were castigated for their lack of 
redeeming qualities.138  
 
Nazi Germany’s assertive behaviour towards its neighbours from the mid-
1930s influenced UK historians to veer away from using the word ‘race’ as a tool of 
characterisation, partly to differentiate themselves from the Nazis’ particular 
understanding of the term, which significantly changed the context in which the term 
could be used.139 These developments were coexistent with this thesis’ UK interwar 
historians’ writings as public intellectuals. The interwar years also saw increased 
xenophobia between European peoples in general, including anti-Semitism.140  
  
Despite a tendency to categorise Germans into various typologies, the shared 
sense of an imagined common Anglo-Saxon heritage was one of the elements that 
aided the UK’s sense of affinity with Scandinavian countries.141 The writer, P. 
Morton Shand, spoke of ‘our own Viking blood, the only blood in us that matters’.142 
Moreover, the geographer and anthropologist, H. J. Fleure, was a humanist who 
acknowledged that ‘fair hair, light eyes, long head and face, tall stature and boney 
build’ indicated the presence of a ‘Nordic race-type’.143 However, he wrote that 
Germans were often solidly built and ‘broad-headed’, thereby employing current 
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standards of ethnicity to counter the Nazis.144  
  
UK public intellectuals de-emphasised the ethnic aspects of a shared Anglo-
Saxon heritage over time, as the Nazi Party rose to prominence in Germany. These 
ideas were expressed in Julian Huxley and A. C Haddon’s 1935 book, We 
Europeans, which challenged biological interpretations of ethnicity for political ends, 
and was meant as a counterargument to Nazi German writings.145 The anatomist, 
palaeontologist and anthropologist, Sir Arthur Keith, argued that ethnicities coexisted 
in a world of struggle in which the erection of boundaries between populations was 
normal.146 Arthur Keith, Sir Arthur Keith, FRS, was born on 5 February 1866. He 
was Scottish and studied anthropology and anatomy. He became President of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute. Keith died on 7 January 1955. Each country’s 
population were, in this view, ‘actually evolving races’.147 ‘Racial’ signifiers, such as 
skin tone, facial and cranial features, and fingernails were prominent in the writings 
of interwar British racial thinkers.148 A number of ‘radical’ biologists in the 1930s, 
however, queried why ‘racial classifications’ were based on humans’ phenotypes, or 
physical form, and not on their genetic makeup.149 London School of Economics’ 
Professor Lancelot Hogben proposed that genes were apportioned ‘geographically’, 
rather than fit with identikit populations.150 The use of ‘race’ was minimised in 
anthropological and biological practice.151 This was sometimes the result of 
observation of ethnically-informed policies within the colonies. For instance, 
Hogben’s work in South Africa during the 1920s made him hostile to the application 
of ethnically-based scholarship.152  
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Anglo-Saxonism influenced interwar historians’ understandings about the shifting 
notions of masculinity. UK maleness historically operated on assumptions that 
gender was predicated on tough and durable qualities.153 World War I provided a 
dominant context for masculinities in the interwar UK, given its immense impact on 
the social and cultural factors that underpinned gender.154 The building of empire 
was believed to necessitate the involvement of men whose qualities correlated with 
imperial requirements. They were, it was hoped, ‘self-reliant’, ‘resourceful’, and 
‘practical’.155 The men who perceived these aspirations amplified aspects of their 
identity that aligned with the UK’s vision of Imperial Britain.156 ‘Manliness’, as 
believed by youths of the pre-1914 middle class, was associated with martial 
experiences.157 ‘Jingoism’ provided one outlet for men’s energy in a social context 
where the distinctions between classes were less than those that separated the 
sexes.158  
Masculinity was not simply conceptualised as a list of characteristics that 
defined a man, but a set of aspirational ideals to strive for. UK historians’ 
masculinities were created within the UK and the ‘transnational arena’ of the British 
Empire.159 From an Anglo-Saxonist outlook, UK males’ possession of masculine 
ideals enhanced the UK’s ability to pursue its civilising mission.160  
 
UK historians saw Anglo-Saxonism as a celebration of the traditions of the 
English people, a phenomenon which found inspiration from their exploration of 
their imagined descent from manly, Germanic tribes.161 Their support for Anglo-
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Saxon heritage related closely to a construct of hegemonic masculinity.162 This was 
commensurate with the social and cultural context of the interwar UK, and their 
ability to access the public space in a form that was authoritative. 163 Intellectualised 
men’s bodies were a mechanism of cultural capital, as shown in their physicality.164 
Bourdieu expanded on these ideas in his 2001 book, Masculine Domination, in 
which he argued.165 Historians enjoyed a level of social dominance which was 
commensurate with their status as male public intellectuals.  
  
Society in the UK in the early twentieth century challenged interpretations of 
gender roles.166 The UK’s self-perception was linked to the idea that the British 
Empire fulfilled a civilizational calling, and that it was a force for Good.167 
Associated with this undertaking was belief that ‘manliness’ was integral to 
conducting the enterprise.168 The gendered framework of masculinity set itself apart 
from femininity by observing the ‘superiority of reason’.169 This set part of the 
context of UK men’s self-perception and male identity formation in the interwar era. 
This often centred on the dichotomy that separated the public and private space. The 
empowerment of women in various areas was presented as men’s loss of their natural 
roles, with a role-reversal logic that suggested men were ‘emasculated and 
feminised’.170 Moreover, male colleagues of these women were described as 
‘effeminate, intellectual, highbrow and concerned with how other men dressed’.171  
 
Anglo-Saxonism’s influence on manliness in the UK in the early twentieth 
century gradually moved to represent ‘militarist’, secular, and physical values.172 As 
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mentioned in the relationship between class and education, these values were found 
in the public schools and universities.173 World War I exposed a taxonomy of 
masculinities, as servicemen interacted with comrades from various occupations and 
with different social status.174 Men’s ability to be ‘natural, masculine’ and willing to 
take life was held to demonstrate their ‘normativity’.175 Those men who did not 
conform were categorised as ‘psychologically abnormal’, displaying ‘childish and 
infantile’ conduct that was unbecoming of ‘manhood’.176 Despite the slaughter of the 
war, however, there was a belief among many ‘young men’ that combat was still 
heroic and purifying.177 The promotion of the English ‘gentleman’, for example, as 
well as that of the British Empire in publications, extended throughout the interwar 
period.178 The definitions of masculinity had shifted for many UK men, however. 
According to Martin Frances, 
 
[t]he newly re-domesticated male, who preferred dominos and 
home improvement to outwitting rebellious tribesmen on the 
North-West Frontier, became a paradigm, not merely of normative 
masculinity, but of interwar national identity.179  
 
UK historians recognised that these factors would influence the cultural 
assumptions that Anglo-Saxonism relied upon. The shifts that Anglo-Saxonism 
underwent in UK society at the end of the interwar era changed how manliness was 
interpreted.180 As the UK lurched towards war with Germany, aspects of imperial 
manliness were widely thought of as anachronistic. There was doubt over ‘values’ 
that had continued to be promoted in the aftermath of World War I.181  
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The Role of the UK Public Intellectual 
Historians expressed differing views as public intellectuals and there was not a 
uniformity of opinion on all issues. The term ‘public intellectual’, in the context of 
the interwar UK, refers to historians who participated in the public debate about 
Germany, and who addressed matters that related to Anglo-German relations.  The 
distinction between historians who occasionally worked in academia and as public 
intellectuals were their activities in the public space. As Bourdieu observed, one part 
of intellectuals’ function was participation in ‘public activities’, particularly aspects 
that were of ‘a political nature’.182   
 
Intellectuals who aimed to fulfil roles of dispassionate public duty was 
reflected in intellectuals’ interest in politics. The interwar era continued a pattern 
where an ‘ill-defined state of academic boundaries’ had pre-existed, and this 
influenced how historians, among others, analysed politics.183 As Julia Stapleton has 
argued, the rise of intellectuals as “‘public” thinkers’ was associated with the 
commonalities of mission that bound their work together.184 Public intellectuals’ 
membership of the historical profession saw them become part of a ‘social subgroup’ 
which had its own precepts to sustain themselves.185 Herbert Butterfield spent much 
of his time invested in ensuring that specificity in the study of history resulted in a 
public good.186 UK historians’ social and cultural capital was connected with their 
involvement in the public space. As Collini surmised, 
 
 
[i]nsofar as individuals occupy the role of the intellectual, they are 
by definition playing a ‘public role’, since it is precisely the 
movement between their initial specialised or creative activity on 
the one hand and addressing the wider audience on the other that 
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constitutes the activity of the intellectual.187  
 
  
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social capital referred to the benefits that individuals 
or groups acquired when they possessed resources that others deemed valuable.188 
Historians’ social status paralleled the social norms of their class, correlating with the 
status of their work.189 One measure of historians’ familiarity with Germany was 
shown in the formal positions they attained. The Foreign Secretary from 1924 to 
1929, was Sir Austen Chamberlain.190 He was trained in modern European history at 
Cambridge. Chamberlain is known both for reasserting the Foreign Office’s 
independence from prime ministerial control and for the Treaty of Locarno. The 
1925 Treaty of Locarno guaranteed the post-1919 frontiers of Belgium, France and 
Germany and was held by contemporaries to be a major event of high consequence 
in the 1920s. Moreover, it seemed to mark the end of diplomatic unrest that had 
simmered since the 1919 Versailles Settlement.191  
 
The relative uniformity of UK historians’ backgrounds can be juxtaposed 
with their differences of opinion, but there was often consensus. Bourdieu identified 
the nexus that exists between the concepts of fields and habitus, and argued that it 
could be understood as the work of public intellectuals.192 Accordingly, historians 
possessed social authority in their prescribed area of interest in Germany.193 
Bourdieu maintained that a system of an individual acquiring specific characteristics, 
including, among other things, ‘traits, behaviours, properties, titles, academic 
qualifications’, and any feature of the ‘social world’ provided them with capital.194 
They adopted multiple roles and identities in academia, the public service and 
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journalism. To some extent their work overlapped. As private actors, however, their 
work was undertaken outside formal channels. UK interwar historians’ work was 
accompanied by a proximity to the academy, politics, the public service, and 
journalism. These historians availed themselves of the opportunities available to 
intellectuals to articulate issues of public concern and interest.195  
 
Class was a powerful frame of reference for people after World War I.196 
Intellectuals whose work was class-inspired incorporated such diverse figures as 
Oswald Mosley and R. H. Tawney. Their involvement, moreover, was as much 
intellectual as active.197 Indeed, the class-based elements that involved education in 
this period directly informed the consciousness of those who self-identified with a 
particular class. Post-1919 British interwar intellectuals rarely used the terms 
‘idealist’ and ‘realist’, preferring the labels ‘socialist’, ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ as 
either intellectual signifiers or as pejoratives.198 People’s social status paralleled the 
social norms of their class, correlating with work, ‘standards of dress, restrained 
speech and behaviour’.199 These were applicable to both foreign and domestic policy. 
Socialism was associated with a liberal paradigm that sought to transcend pre-World 
War I diplomacy, liberalism with the growth and expansion of internationalism and 
free trade, while conservatism was associated, often by its opponents, with the power 
politics of the state system that produced the war in the first place.200  
 
There was much support for Fascism in countries where the likelihood of 
Communist upheaval was high.201 In 1934, the UK’s population of roughly fifty 
million people included fifty thousand British Union of Fascists members.202 Within 
                                                          
195 Leon H. Mayhew, The New Public: Professional Communication and the Means of Social 
Influence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 140. 
196 Todd, op. cit., p. 71. 
197 Stapleton, ‘Political Thought and National Identity in Britain, 1850-1950’, pp. 262-263. 
198 Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Where are the Idealists in Interwar International Relations?’, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2006, p. 297. 
199 Scott, The Making of the Modern British Home: The Suburban Semi and Family Life between the 
Wars, p. 11. 
200 Ibid.  
201 Richard Thurlow, ‘The Failure of British Fascism, 1932-40’, in Andrew Thorpe (ed.), The Failure 
of Political Extremism in Inter-War Britain, Exeter, University of Exeter, 1988, p. 74. Pp. 67-84. 
202 Lena Berggren, ‘Swedish Fascism: Why Bother?’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 37, No. 
3, 2002, p. 412. 
 93 
 
the UK, however, there appeared to be minimal chances of Communist revolution. 
The outcomes of the Triple Alliance in 1921, as well as of the General Strike in 
1926, revealed the government’s success in controlling ‘neo-syndicalist’ forces.203 
Harold Temperley, for example, supported the Conservative government’s policy 
against the 1926 General Strike.204  
 
Within both the UK and Germany, people who were employed by the state 
experienced harsh conditions following the war, and largely remained so throughout 
the interwar period.205 In Germany, the chief German historians had a social status 
that paralleled that of senior German politicians. The title of Herr Professor and Frau 
Professor was synonymous with belonging to a group with affluence and high social 
standing. Accomplished German academics were able to able to exceed forty 
thousand marks annually.206 They numbered amongst the esteemed personages in 
Germany.207 Following World War I, there was a fluidity of roles that affected 
writers in the public space, including historians, public intellectuals, and journalists. 
Arbitrary cuts in the salaries of those employed on state salaries in German 
universities led to a ‘quasi-proletarianisation of university teachers and their 
families’.208  
The Role of the UK Historian  
This fluidity of the public space had a significant influence on UK interwar 
historians’ public roles. The networks provided by universities, exemplified by the 
latter’s ability to cultivate social and cultural capital, ensured that historians’ 
collegial bonds were a factor in their employment by the government and elsewhere. 
Some history teachers modernised the teaching in their colleges in an attempt to 
enable their students’ greater access to the civil service.209 Such changes and 
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attendant transformations in public perceptions, existed in parallel to ongoing elitism. 
This latter was reflected in the remarks of Lord Chesterfield, when he elaborated 
that: ‘an intimate knowledge of history, my dear boy, is absolutely necessary for the 
legislator, the orator and the statesman, who thence deduce their morals and 
examples, speaking and judging of the present, and by it the past, prognosticating the 
future’.210 Such comments reveal the change in perceptions about the public role of 
historians that occurred during the interwar period.  
 
British universities had a powerful influence on the contexts that UK 
historians would work across in the interwar period. The universities’ curriculum had 
largely been focused on mathematics and the classics before the 1850s, with history 
added as part of the set framework.211 By the middle of the nineteenth century, 
history had become increasingly defined as an academic subject, transforming the 
capital associated with the discipline. As the process accelerated, history teachers’ 
roles gradually became those of university-based, professional staff.212 This process 
transformed historians’ role, but was not to define them publicly.213  
 
  Familiarity with networks provided historians with social opportunities, and 
helped them to influence the centres of power in the interwar period. It was part of 
the acculturating process at the elite universities that they sought to inculcate 
students with ‘gentlemanliness’.214 Peter Novick wrote that British universities 
traditionally concentrated on imbuing their students with gentlemanliness, rather than 
scholarliness.215 Academic prestige was associated with elite and aristocratic 
characteristics. The British upper class’s education was historically transmitted 
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through the prestigious universities of Oxford and Cambridge, as well as other 
ancient universities in the UK.216 The career connections of such students led to the 
pinnacles of power in politics, the judiciary, the clergy, and industry.217 Through 
these trajectories, students were introduced to the political class, were influenced by 
politicians and officials, and were furnished with a conduit for students to become 
involved in politics.218 The Oxford Union, for example, promoted the exchange of 
political and academic discourse among members and visitors (a feature it shared 
with other examples of growing associations in society such as rotary clubs and trade 
unions). The students’ interaction with representatives of government through 
university clubs abetted the transfusion of parliamentary mores, a process started in 
1888 and made more regular as guests of the Union were invited from London.219 
The commonalities that many UK intellectuals shared before World War I included 
this similar educational culture and shared cultural beliefs from a social elite.220  
 
Historians were among those leading the call for reforming the Foreign 
Office and Diplomatic Service’s recruitment.221 European countries had standardised 
the process by which candidates entered the public services during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.222 Prior to this, patronage was still used, often with 
deleterious effects.223 In the UK, the Committee of 1860 and the Playfair 
Commission submitted that successful candidates to the civil service have a 
university education and sit for an examination.224 Despite these changes, however, 
the Royal Commission on the Civil Service in 1914, the Liberal Foreign Affairs 
Committee and radical members in the Commons, maintained that access to the 
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Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service remained too educationally and socially 
exclusive.225  
 
World War I caused UK historians to be directly employed by their 
government to articulate a national narrative that emphasised themes of the popular 
will, sacrifice, social values and Manichean interpretations of the war. UK historians 
often contributed to public debates on issues that involved the use of military and 
naval force.226 The value of learning from history was seen in the British 
government’s attempts to bureaucratise history to facilitate its application to 
policy.227 In September 1906, following the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars, Lord 
Esher recommended that a Historical Section be founded as a subcommittee to the 
Committee of Imperial Defence.228 Richard Bosworth’s writings documented the 
‘intriguing tendency’ of governments’ employment of historians during wartime.229 
The nature of UK historians’ role and their wartime employment included the use of 
their abilities to coordinate and interpret intelligence.230 Bosworth explained that this 
drafting of historians’ tradecraft by governmental bureaucracies showed that, at the 
time, the discipline of history was seen as the ‘pinnacle of the humanities’.231 
Historians throughout World War I knew the value of historians’ role, who used it to 
seek explanations about the conflict, as well as to prevent its recurrence once 
hostilities ceased.  
 
World War I’s outbreak provided an opportunity for UK historians to amplify 
the UK’s traditional self-perceptions of liberty and English notions of British 
exceptionalism, in contradistinction to Imperial Germany’s perceived Prussian junker 
militarism. Three weeks after the beginning of World War I, historians at Oxford 
University’s History School published their first interpretation of Britain’s 
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confrontation with Germany, entitled Why We Are At War: Great Britain’s Case.232 
The publication was an ‘Oxford pamphlet’, but was actually a book in its own right 
that exceeded 250 pages in length.233 Its contributors included some of the famous, 
contemporary Oxford historians, such as F. Morgan, H. W. C. Davis, Arthur Hassall, 
Ernest Baker, L. G. Wickham Legg, and C. R. L. Fletcher.234 It underwent many 
iterations as the war progressed and laid down a marker for similar publications, such 
as Britain’s Case Against Germany (1914), Why We Are Fighting Germany: A 
Village Lecture (1914), Our Duty and Our Interest in the War (1914), Britain’s 
Reasons for Going to War (1915), and, Belgium and Greece (1915).235 Similarly, the 
works of historians such as Gilbert Murray, The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 
1906-1915 (1915), and The United States and The War (1916), also influenced the 
public debate on the war.236 Such historians sought to downplay any association with 
propaganda in their work and claimed that their contributions brought the objective 
detachment of historians’ scholarship to the public debate.237 The historians claimed 
that, ‘we are not politicians, and we belong to different schools of political 
thought’.238 ‘We have’, they continued, ‘…endeavoured to treat the subject 
historically’.239 There was, however, a correlation between the war aims of the 
British Empire and that of the historians’ published works.  
 
UK historians’ war work included their employment by the War Propaganda 
Bureau.240 This task saw historians devote considerable efforts to present the British 
case for the war, in part to agitate elite opinion in the United States of America 
against the policy of neutrality.241 Phillip Taylor declared that historians occupied a 
unique position to oversee this aspect of the war.242 He argued: 
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[t]o all outward purposes, it merely appeared that Britain’s 
intelligentsia had mobilised itself out of spontaneous patriotism 
with no motive other than a desire to explain the issues of the war 
as they saw it from their individual and personal perspectives. This 
approach was linked to a further operational ground rule of British 
propaganda, namely that it should always be based primarily upon 
so-called neutral facts or objective information. Now, of course, 
there is no such thing since all facts are selective. Unpalatable facts 
could anyway always be omitted through censorship procedures. 
And who better to serve as advisors to ensure such principles were 
carried out than historians?243  
 
UK interwar historians’ movement within and across various contexts, 
whether in university or government service, led them to positions where they could 
maximise their social and cultural capital. The war’s effects ensured UK historians’ 
status and social mobility within the corridors of power, and reflected the importance 
that social and cultural capital had for their profession. The consolidation of the 
British public space was a development that aided this process. UK historians’ work 
transcended the brief of informing populations and included their work for the 
government. Throughout World War I, for example, UK historians worked to 
educate many government and private committees in order to abet the direction of 
their country’s war aims.244 These tasks included historians’ analyses of Germany’s 
food supplies, thus highlighting Germany’s vulnerability to a naval blockade.245 In 
the latter years of the war, historians were used to ensure that Britain was well 
positioned to manoeuvre in the post-war world, against erstwhile allies as well as 
former enemies.246 In April 1918, for instance, a Political Intelligence Department 
(PID) was established within the Foreign Office. It was tasked to give the 
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government analysis on current events, share the administrative burden that 
bedevilled other departments, and increase the effectiveness of diplomacy.247 
Furthermore, the many roles that UK historians adopted throughout the war included 
their eponymous role of producing historical scholarship.248 The official 
historiography produced during World War I included, among other works, the Peace 
Pamphlets, the publications of the new think tank, Chatham House, and the large 
histories dealing with the war’s effects.249  
 
As an assemblage of individuals, UK interwar historians remained a highly 
influential collective. Historians were prominent among their country’s delegation at 
the 1919 Versailles Conference, for example.250 In the immediate aftermath of World 
War I, historians were ably positioned at the intersection of public and government 
spaces. Wider changes in the years 1918-1921 did much to lay down a marker for the 
social climate of the interwar UK.251 However, the scale of deaths during World War 
I meant that much of the population regarded anyone associated with military and 
strategic writing as being connected to the mentality that led to the war in the first 
place.252 The historians at the 1919 Versailles Conference included, among others, 
such intellectuals as E. H. Carr, Sir J. W. Headlam-Morley, Benedict H. Sumner, C. 
K. Webster, Sir George Prothero, Sir Maurice Powicke, Arnold Toynbee, Harold 
Temperley, Lord Robert Cecil, G. P. Gooch and Sir Lewis Namier.253 Under the 
leadership of establishment figure and historian, Lionel Curtis, many UK historians 
began work at the newly established Royal Institute of International Affairs at 
Chatham House.254 This institution provided historians with a platform to analyse 
international developments by revealing the historical context of current events.255  
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Cultural History 
The critical foundations of the thesis as laid out in Chapter 1 emphasised the social 
aspects of how the historians worked, and to what extent their social and cultural 
capital composed acts that could meet the definition of interwar public intellectuals’ 
work. The social context was vital, but only to the degree that it provided historians 
with the opportunity to continue to try to affect political influence by using the 
mantle of their cultural authority. Historians engaged with the key theoretical works 
that informed how they acted and influenced how they produced commentary. 
Cultural history within the UK favoured an independent methodological approach 
and empirical observation, while cultural historical trends in Germany were based 
around theoretical and holistic aspects.256  
 
Differences between the UK and Germany provided a setting for which UK 
historians, both consciously and unconsciously, used cultural aspects of their training 
to contextualise political questions. Mathew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy, 
published in 1869, was wary of the promotion of ‘philistine culture’, the expansion 
of which contributed to the rise of electoral politics and reading publics. Class 
divides previously kept political influence to the upper classes, though changes 
within the working class and a middle class affected this system.257 Among many, 
World War I weakened opinions that held the concepts of Englishness and 
Britishness to be synonymous.258 After World War I, the UK regarded their war 
involvement in mostly benign ways, as opposed to the same position among the 
Germans being discouraged.259  
 
The social milieu and the cultural environment of historians often affected the 
nature of the issues that historians would seek to provoke political responses to. The 
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meeting of multiple, related circumstances saw historians’ comprehension of the 
public space as a reflection of actuality.260 For instance, the ways in which culture 
was viewed was changed by shifts in public communication.261 The milieu that 
composed the interwar public space saw that ‘rival national cultural histories’ of the 
UK facilitated the contestation of what culture meant, and which public intellectuals 
sought to interpret.262 ‘Public culture’ existed as an ‘exceedingly complex’ 
arrangement between writers and their readership, as well as between orators and 
their listeners.263 Cultural historians expanded their research to include the cultural 
framework that underpinned in-group characteristics. These frameworks composed 
class, occupation, gender, ethnicity, and ancestry.264 A number of aspects continued 
to influence how intellectuals addressed the public and what filled the content of 
their oratory.265 As historians and public intellectuals, ‘they were men of affairs’, and 
they offered ‘commentary on national or international issues to the press’.266 Thus 
they could be influenced by censure from colleagues as well as from the public at 
large.267 For example, Harold Temperley had testy relations with the academic 
Arminius Vambéry, who Temperley referred as a ‘Great Charlatan’.268  
 
It was widely recognised that culture and politics were interdependent, and 
that those who engaged in political activities would have to understand the synergy 
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that existed between the two to be politically successful.269 Historians were among 
the ‘political and administrative decision-makers’, and as such were regarded as part 
of the ‘professional elite’.270 Culture had different ways in which it could be used, 
and it had a different type of ‘power’ that worked in ways similar to capital.271 The 
interwar era saw much interest in how dynamics around the portrayal of culture 
could negatively affect standards of morality for the reading and listening public.272 
The power of popular culture ensured that there would be complexities involved in 
how and whether changes could be made in political matters. They recognised the 
power of political convictions among people, but that cultural, social or monetary 
aspects could influence political responses.273  
 
The ways in which culture was viewed by UK historians and public 
intellectuals of Germany was changed by the shifts in public communication.274 
Cultural influences ranked large in the ways historians and public intellectuals 
elicited political knowledge. Social and economic history had formerly predominated 
over subjects that interested cultural historians.275 As Michael Schudson has 
postulated, ‘the question of the autonomy of different cultural fields is both 
theoretically and empirically important’.276 Asa Briggs commented on how the 
earlier chapters of his five-volume History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom 
omitted how ‘local, regional and national orientations’ were underpinned by ‘cultural 
factors’.277 In 1938, the Talks Department of the BBC endeavoured to provide 
evening shows about the British Empire. The BBC altered its intention to air the 
show in its original format, following a recommendation from the UK’s Colonial 
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Office that its release would offend German sensitivities. This was because calls 
from Germany to have their colonial possessions in Africa returned were becoming 
vocal. To emolliate the concerns of the Colonial Office and German opinion, the 
BBC broadcast only one talk that dealt with the release of the mandated territories 
back under Germany’s influence.278 However, the BBC positioned itself to broadcast 
an enlarged number of Empire talks in the later part of 1939. The work was to be 
composed of 13 talks about colonial issues, and included the efforts of historians, 
such as Philip Noel-Baker and Professor of Modern History at Southampton 
University, Vincent Harlow.279 The show’s preparation was discontinued due to the 
beginning of World War II.280  
 
UK historians’ representation of Germany, and their engagement with 
Germans in the interwar era, elevated the cultural and political commentary in their 
work. Bourdieu asserted that nationalism, when combined with culture, becomes an 
‘artifact of power’.281 He regarded this combination to weaken peoples’ attachment 
to social values that have ‘universal’ applicability.282 ‘Symbolic’ capital was 
promoted through the social capital of historians’ social and professional circles.283 
The interchangeability of historians’ use of various types of capital reinforced their 
legitimacy to comment on diverse issues.284 The centrality of these issues stimulated 
historians’ production of cultural authority, the display of which attracted political 
attention.  
 
 
Taken as a whole, Bourdieu’s trajectory recounts the genesis of a 
specifically political mode of intervention in which social science 
and civic activism, far from being opposed, can be construed as the 
two faces of the same coin of analysis and critique of social reality 
aimed at contributing to its transformation…This manner of 
intervening into public debate implies the construction of a 
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different point of view on politics.285  
 
 
In a similar vein, after World War I, UK interwar historians’ work included the 
expression of their opinions in ways that made their views more reflective of the 
dynamic changes the world had lately experienced. Likewise, Bourdieu aimed to 
transcend what appeared to be the constants of intellectuals’ involvement in political 
action. He did this by seeing the extent to which public intellectuals’ activities could 
be constrained.286 Bourdieu asserted that ‘culture is what remains when you’ve 
forgotten everything’.287 He explained that a person who has a connection with 
culture affords them with characteristics that would facilitate ‘a cultural 
exchange’.288 The changes in UK historians’ work as university-based, professional 
staff expedited the forming of social bonds and networks. Indeed, historians’ cultural 
and social capital complemented these developments and laid the groundwork for 
their continual role in the public space, providing UK interwar historians with a 
means to maximise their influence. The events of the war meant that there was a 
need for UK historians and public intellectuals to analyse Anglo-German relations.  
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CHAPTER 3: VIEWS OF DEUTSCHTUM 
UK historians of this thesis asked the question that German intellectuals themselves 
sought to answer in the interwar era, namely ‘Was ist deutsch?’ [What is German?].1 
German and UK scholars alike conveyed an image of Germans that reflected the 
‘magnificent successes’ that pre-World War I Germany had attained.2 The chapter 
argues that UK interwar historians were influenced by competing perspectives of 
Germanness (or Deutschtum), which they then used as a tool to inform their analyses. 
The chapter examines how the men’s work to shape interwar policy was affected by 
cultural concepts of Germany. UK historians’ involvement as public intellectuals 
drew on notions of Germanness to help revive and return an Anglo-Saxon sentience 
to British policy. 
 
UK interwar historians’ relationships with Germany were founded on shared 
values and ethnic ties. The public intellectuals examined in this thesis believed that 
the bonds that could foster Anglo-German cooperation were widely shared in each 
country. The chapter identifies three prisms through which Germanness was 
examined. The first section investigates how UK interwar historians considered 
Germans’ thinking about contested interpretations of Germanness. In this way, UK 
historians were able to demonstrate the nuance in their expertise about Germany in a 
manner that could influence public opinion. The second section examines how UK 
historians contemplated Germans’ certainty of their country’s ascendancy, attested to 
by the high quality of German technology and poetic culture. UK historians 
recognised that Germany had the potential to be both a valued partner, with its 
ancestral and ethnic affiliation with the UK, as well as a competitor. The third 
section explores the risks of Germany’s vulnerability to humiliation in the aftermath 
of World War I. The historians justified this as a means to restrain the ambitions of a 
vengeful France through the observance of international norms. The chapter asks to 
what extent Germanness influenced UK interwar historians’ work about the country, 
and whether their understanding of Germanness influenced events. The various 
interpretations of Germanness gave a reference point for historians and suggested 
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that Germans’ behaviour was understandable in the context of self-assertion, 
aggression and post-war insecurity.  
 
Contested Interpretations of Germany: Paradox of 
Germanness 
A strong sense of shared heritage between the English parts of the UK and Germany 
motivated individuals to support Anglo-German cooperation in both countries in the 
interwar era. The historians analysed by this thesis saw themselves as advocates 
aiming to affect UK attitudes about Germany, and were aided in this in their 
successful portrayal of themselves as credible scholars of Germanness. Interwar 
historians’ analyses can be characterised as focusing on four key areas of 
Germanness. Anglo-Saxon heritage and identity gave historians a common bond 
through which to understand associations between Germany and the UK. 
Confessional affinities harmonised the bonds between UK historians and informed 
their sense of the benefits of colonialism. Germany, or Prussia, was characterised as 
being motivated by aggressive aspirations for territorial enlargement.3 German 
intellectualism was perceived by UK devotees to reflect Germans’ widespread 
cultural achievements. As proponents of change, historians used these core areas to 
inform and shift public debate.  
 
Anglo-Saxon Identity 
During the interwar period, definitions of Germanness became a tool for UK 
historians to debate how contemporary Germany should be portrayed.4 UK interwar 
historians believed that Anglo-German relations could be reawakened and rebuilt in a 
spirit of cooperation that drew on a shared heritage and identity. Interpretations of 
Germaness drew on understandings about Germanic blood and culture, and argued 
that this historical legacy had contributed to England’s development at the centre of 
the UK and its empire.5 UK historians were aware that German historians had 
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posited ‘English’ ancestry as being associated within a paradigm of ‘Teutonic and 
eventually, Aryan history’, although they acknowledged their German colleagues’ 
recognition that the English had acquired characteristics that were unique within a 
multinational and multiethnic UK.6  
 
German concepts of Heimat and Volk held that Germanness prevailed 
wherever Germans were located, and shaped UK historians’ ideas about boundaries 
of the public space.7 Historians achieved this by acknowledging the resilience of 
German folklore, and admired the high value that Germans placed on being devoted 
to their homeland. The term Heimat is analogous with concepts of ethnicity and 
location, such as ‘blood’ and ‘soil’.8 In 1924, the philosopher, Rudolf Steiner, noted 
that ‘blood is a very special fluid’. He suggested that the blood was where the 
‘human ego’ was formed.9 The idea of Volk represented the association of Germans, 
and had mystical overtones that encompassed a meaning greater than ‘people’.10 
Awareness of a Germanic identity arose in tandem with interest in ‘Teutonism’, 
meaning the influences of German civilisation.11 These two elements of blood and 
culture were held as conduits for Deutschtum. These concepts originated with the 
philosophers Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried von Herder, who had 
encouraged Germans to have pride in their origins, language, and ethnicity as a 
people (Volk). German citizenship was enacted under these parameters in 1913, and 
remained as such throughout the interwar period.12  
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Devotees of Anglo-Saxon mythology searched for evidence of its reality in a 
‘historically constructed German Fatherland’.13 As ‘Teutophilia’ increased in the 
interwar period in both the UK and Germany, its ethnic dimension was opposed by 
academics such as Professor T. A. Rompelman. Rompelman had examined Old 
Germanic languages and was averse to the notion that German ethnicity equated to a 
singular ‘Germanic’ ethnic group.14 Nevertheless, Raymond Beazley, one of this 
thesis’ historians, opined that Germans ‘are closely related to the Anglo-Saxon 
stock’.15 He elaborated that Germans, ‘represent, when all exaggeration is put aside, 
the finest, most virile and valuable stocks on the Continent’.16 Sir Charles Raymond 
Beazley was born in 1868. From 1909 until 1933, Beazley was a History Professor at 
the University of Birmingham. He was schooled at St Paul’s School, King’s College 
London and Balliol College, University of Oxford. He attained Fellowship at Merton 
College, Oxford but then received a chair at Birmingham University. One writer 
wrote that Beazley was ‘associated with a pro-German tendency within the British 
political and intellectual establishment in the interwar years’.17 Beazley often 
submitted pieces to the Anglo-German Review, a journal created in 1936.18 He was a 
member of the Anglo-German friendship body, the Link, and held a position on its 
National Council.19 Beazley died in 1955.  
 
Confessional Perceptions  
UK historians were familiar with the multi-confessional patchwork of interwar 
Germany, and drew on a shared, dominant Protestant culture.20 Germany and the UK 
were mostly Protestant, although both countries had substantial Roman Catholic 
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minorities.21 Historians studied how religious and regional identities had informed 
German self-conceptions about the ‘soul of true Germanness’.22 They were conscious 
of different regions’ religious particularities, and of the regional rivalries that were 
accentuated by the turbulent events of the Weimar Republic.23 As George Gooch 
assured his readers in 1926, ‘the clerical and conservative Bavarian regards the North 
[of Germany] as the home of Jews, atheism, and revolution’.24 Gooch had been 
raised in an Anglican household but sought to be objective in his analyses regarding 
confessional identity.25 However, his personal prejudices occasionally revealed 
themselves, such as his occasional use of the word ‘totalitarian’ in his descriptions of 
the Catholic Church.26 William Harbutt Dawson was Anglican and hostile to 
Catholicism, but supported German Catholics’ complaints against Polish 
authorities.27 Dawson backed German Catholics’ petition to Pope Pius XI that sought 
to change the Free City of Danzig into a diocese under the Vatican’s authority, a 
move predictably opposed by Polish authorities.28 
 
Various UK historians believed that Germans’ enthusiasm for religion 
strengthened the country’s desire to possess colonies. Part of the lost order of 
Imperial Germany that particularly concerned UK historians was the loss of its 
colonies. This was because the vitality of the British Empire was central to how the 
English thought of their mandate in the world. UK historians saw the loss of 
Germany’s colonial territories as a setback for Christian proselytising and missionary 
work throughout the world. Beazley and Dawson championed ‘Germany’s needs and 
wishes … [and] generous spirit’, when seeking to promote Germany’s colonial 
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record in their 1937 memorial to Baldwin.29 They claimed that Germans’ religious 
inspiration underpinned their colonial ventures: 
 
 
[n]o parliament in Europe showed deeper concern for the humane 
treatment of native populations than the German Reichstag, from 
the beginning of the colonial era. Long before the war German 
colonial administration was admitted, on unimpeachable testimony, 
to be at once conscientious, enlightened and beneficial. Men like 
Cecil Rhodes, Sir Harry Johnston, Theodore Roosevelt, Lord 
Milner and Sir Charles Eliot have born witness to this.30  
 
 
UK historians were aware of views that ranked countries’ importance in accordance 
to whether or not they possessed colonies, and connected faith and vigour with the 
civilisation they were held to represent. Historians’ emphasis on Germany’s ‘singular 
success’ in elevating civilisation would gradually lead to changes in British policy 
towards appeasing Germany in the later interwar years.31  
 
Militarism 
Historians’ attentions shifted onto considerations that reflected the changed realities 
of the post-war period. These realities focused on perceptions of French militarism 
amid Germany’s temporary weaknesses. Germany’s real and alleged wartime 
behaviour hung over discussions of what constituted Germanness, but historians 
recognised militarism as an important means to interpret Germanness. Historians 
understood the importance of the military victories that had led to the emergence of 
the Kaiserreich in 1871. The historical imaginings of Prussia drew on the military 
victories that the state attained in the late nineteenth-century Wars of Unification, 
following Prussia’s successful campaigns against Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, 
Austria in 1866, and France in 1871.32 The decisiveness of Prussia’s victory over 
France in the late nineteenth century was ingrained in interwar UK historians’ 
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analyses.33 Preceding World War I, the journalist and politician, C. P. Scott, named 
Prussia, rather than Germany, as a problem, and that ‘there was a real danger that 
Prussia (it was Prussia really, not Germany, which was in question)’ was likely to 
reshape the heart of the European state system by force.34 Charles Prestwich Scott 
was born on 26 October 1846. He engaged in politics, publishing and journalism. 
From 1872 until 1929, Scott edited the Manchester Guardian and owned that 
publication until his death. Scott attended Hove House and Clapham Grammar 
School. He was educated at Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford. Scott died 
on 1 January 1932. Admiration for Germans’ military capabilities continued to drive 
post-war desires to deepen Anglo-German relations. 
 
Historians contrasted both German militarism’s utility and threat to British 
interests. The contradiction draws attention to historians’ different opinions about the 
connection between militarism and Germanness. Connotations of Germanness were 
entwined with Prussian militarism and an authoritarianism that continued in the 
Weimar Republic.35 On 5 November, 1918, H. A. L. Fisher delivered an address in 
Edinburgh that discussed Anglo-German relations as a microcosm of ideas that 
would affect the post-World War I era.36 He stated that, ‘[t]he opposition between 
English ways and Prussian, which was so present to the minds of [Otto von] 
Bismarck and [Heinrich von] Treitschke, seemed to be one of the great facts which 
would dominate the future of Europe’.37 Fisher’s categorisation of Germany as 
belonging to either a ‘Weimarised’ outlook, or a ‘Prussianised’ one, would typify 
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UK historians’ impressions of Germanness for much of the interwar period.38 Its 
significance lay in historians’ awareness that the UK and Germany had a complex 
relationship, the management of which would require prudence and caution on both 
sides if they were to avert becoming dangerous rivals. 
 
The idiom ‘Potsdam and Weimar’ characterised Germany’s reputation for 
both militarism and culture, and was a motto that concentrated historians’ minds.39 
Pamphlets authored by UK historians in World War I presented Germany in stark 
terms of Prussian and un-Prussian characterisations of the country.40 ‘The real 
Germany’ that Alfred Zimmern wrote of was ‘closely akin to ourselves’, and 
constituted western and southern Germany.41 He and his colleagues wrote of ‘[t]his 
Germany, the Germany of the Rhine country, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Cologne, 
Nüremburg, is the Germany which so many Englishmen know and admire’.42 ‘The 
second and more powerful of the two Germanies’ was Prussia, which detractors like 
Zimmern deemed as ‘an aggressive military monarchy’.43  
 
Notwithstanding the juxtaposition of several views of Germanness and its 
Prussian components, analyses that covered pre-World War I Anglo-German 
perceptions observed that ‘for every anti-German/anti-British quote from the period’ 
there were ‘pro-British/pro-German equivalents, often from the same people’.44 
These quotes showed that the complexities of UK and German interactions were 
multi-layered and overrode simple binaries. Dawson reflected the nuances of the 
signifiers of Germanness and the significance of Prussia’s perceived singularity 
when he wrote that, 
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[n]o one would dream of speaking of Bavarian, or Saxon, or 
Würtemberg [sic] militarism. The words would not fit. The growth 
is a Prussian growth…militarism as it has been forced upon 
Germany by Prussia, a State established by force and maintained 
by force…45  
 
George Walter Prothero had lamented indignantly on the low standing that 
the UK was held in Germany in drafts that he contributed to Fortnightly Review in 
June 1912. He had blamed Germany’s Secretary of State of the Foreign Office and 
later German ambassador to the UK, Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, for the 
state of relations. 46 He had commented that ‘certain British writers’ had the 
appearance of being influenced by Berlin.47 He claimed that UK intellectuals were 
‘inspired’ by friendship overtures from Bieberstein.48 Prothero, too, referred to 
Germany as Prussia, but explained Anglo-German relations through the prism of 
their historic cooperation to contain France. Thus, Prothero wrote, 
 
[i]f we look back into the past we find that England has done the 
very greatest services to Prussia. She saved the Prussia of Frederick 
the Great not only from defeat but from annihilation as a State 
during the Seven Years’ War. Half a century later she supported 
Prussia in her heroic struggle against Napoleon I… As England 
saved Prussia twice at the most critical moments of her history, it 
was only natural that patriotic Prussians looked towards Great 
Britain with feelings of gratitude and of admiration. An 
Englishman was then as much a persona grata in Prussia as he is 
now in Italy and in Greece.49  
  
 
Prothero’s comments show the long relationship of Anglo-German 
cooperation against France that served British self-interest. Anglo-French 
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cooperation at Germany’s expense concerned this thesis’ historians. Dawson noted 
that before World War I, the ‘excellent’ German ambassador, Count Wolf 
Metternich, had been anguished by the fact that ‘France was everything to our 
Foreign Office, his own country nothing’.50 Although in this instance British foreign 
policy’s inflexibility matched Dawson’s own view, it reflected an opinion among his 
colleagues that the advancement of stronger German ties would be beneficial to 
British interests. In the interwar years, UK historians would come to recognise 
Germany’s important place in the European economy, and that that country’s 
impoverishment deprived the UK of a valued trading partner. 
 
UK historians sought to act as honest brokers in Franco-German relations 
following World War I, although they sought to serve British interests. Analysis of 
the writings of historians showed that they regarded themselves as detached 
observers, who sought to distance themselves from the cynicism that characterised 
Old Europe. On 18 January 1923, the British ambassador to Germany, Lord Edgar 
Vincent D’Abernon, noted a conversation with Dr von Rosenberg that was cited in a 
Berlin telegram to the British Foreign Secretary Lord George Nathaniel Curzon.51 
Lord D’Abernon wrote that Rosenberg informed him that throughout the Ruhr ‘[t]o a 
considerable extent, both Germany and France are carrying on a quarrel at England’s 
expense’.52 On 10 August 1922, Robert Sanders observed that the UK appeared to be 
taking the German perspective regarding Germany’s repayments to France. He 
mentioned that ‘it looks as if Germany may collapse. I see no hope of getting France 
to change her attitude in the West’.53 On 29 January 1923, D’Abernon related his 
bafflement in a private dispatch, stating that ‘regarding the idea of evacuation of 
Cologne by English troops – public opinion here [Germany] is distinctly against it. 
Curiously enough opposition is particularly strong in German military circles. Why, I 
cannot say’.54 Revealingly, D’Abernon implied that British policy towards Germany 
                                                          
50 William Harbutt Dawson, The Future of Empire and the Price of World Peace, London, Williams 
and Norgate, 1930, pp. 222-223. 
51 A Letter to Dr Rosenberg on the Situation in Germany, 18 January 1923, The National Archives 
(UK), D’Abernon Papers, Add MS 48925 B, p. 4. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Diary of the Late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol. II. University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-
Special Collections, Papers of Robert Arthur Sanders, 1910-1935, Dep. D. 753, p. 67. 
54 D’Abernon Papers, Add MS 48925 B. p. 164. 
 115 
 
was inspired by a principled position of not taking too committed a role in Franco-
German disputes, but under the aegis of British self-interest. He noted that ‘we have 
resisted with considerable success the attempts at the disintegration of Germany 
through separation of the Rhineland, and we have prevented the occupation of the 
Ruhr’.55 Lord Edgar Vincent, 1st Viscount D’Abernon, GCB, GCMG, PC, FRS was 
born on 19 August 1857. D’Abernon occupied himself with diplomacy, writing 
history, and politics. He attended Eton College before joining the diplomatic service. 
D’Abernon served five years in the Coldstream Guards and then went into the 
diplomatic service. From 1920 to 1925 D’Abernon was the British Ambassador to 
Germany. Lord Vansittart called D’Abernon the ‘pioneer of appeasement’56  
D’Abernon died on 1 November 1941. 
 
In November 1920, Harold Temperley wrote to John Maynard Keynes, who attended 
the Versailles Conference as a delegate of the British Treasury and whose book, The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), echoed what historians more broadly 
thought. John Maynard Keynes was born on 5 June 1883, at his parents’ home in 
Cambridge. Keynes was educated at Eton and then King’s College, University of 
Cambridge. Following Keynes’ acquisition of an undergraduate degree, he joined the 
Home Civil Service and spent two years at the India Office. In January 1915, Keynes 
was employed by the Treasury to give recommendations to Sir George Paish, who 
was tasked with giving David Lloyd George advice.  
 
By January 1919, on account of the Allied blockade, food had ceased to enter 
Germany for the fourth month in-a-row. This was contrary to the provisions of the 
Armistice. Keynes observed that the Germans were required to provide gold as a 
form of payment for food. The French opposed this measure, as they wanted 
Germany’s gold to complement reparations to them. British troops were reportedly 
demoralised by malnourished and infirm children. In December 1919, Keynes’ The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace was published. In 1929 he was made a Fellow 
of the British Academy. He is remembered for his contributions to economics. 
Keynes died on 21 April 1946. Temperley mentioned the ill-starred results of 
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perceived militarism, and wrote that  
 
[t]he Germans seemed to have played their cards very badly all 
through…Subsequently their various demands in their observations 
were in as many cases entirely conflicting... For instance, not only 
are there the cases which you have pointed out but such things as 
upper Silesia must remain with Germany because otherwise she 
cannot discharge Reparation, but the Saar valley must not go away 
from her or Eupen or Malmedy because the question of reparations 
comes in in any case. Again, they demanded a plebiscite in Alsace-
Lorraine and insisted on the freedom of the seas...57  
 
 Perceptions of the Prussian connections to Germany’s military establishment 
resonated with UK interwar historians as they empathised with Germans’ plight.  
 
Intellectualism 
Historians’ work embraced the nuances of the Anglo-German relationship so that 
Germany occupied competing roles as both a ‘model’ and a ‘monster’ for the UK.58 
Supposed German qualities of intellectualism had different consequences when the 
outcomes involved militarism, but historians oriented discussions towards its 
significance as part of a shared Anglo-Saxon heritage. Many in the UK had a 
romantic image of Germany as the land of Dichter und Denker (poets and 
thinkers).59 Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson believed that Germany represented the 
civilisation of thinkers and music composers. In 1920, he visited Berlin to familiarise 
himself with the concept of Germanness, and related its significance on his thinking 
to his colleagues.60  
 
Others ought to propagate this view to those in authority. On 14 April 1937, 
in Raymond Beazley and William Harbutt Dawson’s petition to British Prime 
Minister Stanley Baldwin on improving Anglo-German relations, Germany was 
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presented as their country’s ‘Teutonic neighbour’.61 The implication of 
neighbourliness suggested that a warm familiarity existed between the UK and 
Germany, and that two men’s self-identities involved Anglo-Saxonism being the 
pinnacle of civilisation. In addressing the prime minister, Dawson and Beazley 
represented themselves as ‘experts’ on Germanness.62 They advised the prime 
minister that ‘no existing nation except our own has distinguished itself so greatly as 
the German in the spheres of exploration, scientific and particularly pathological 
research, and pioneer settlement’.63 Their petition to Baldwin represented a climax of 
their involvement as UK advocates of Germanness. ‘No English writer knows more 
of German ways than Mr. Dawson’, noted The Spectator during World War I.64 
Raymond Beazley informed the Anglo-German Review, a publication in the late 
1930s, that the UK were ‘specially called upon to have friendly relations with 
Germany’.65  
 
Interwar UK historians believed that Germany was a beacon of intellectual 
culture.66 Gilbert Murray termed the ‘beelike industry’ of German intellectualism as 
a process that UK intellectuals recognised and identified with.67 Herbert Butterfield 
suggested that UK historians, such as Gooch, were the only foreigners equipped to 
understand German history as Germans understood it.68 Butterfield posited this 
because Gooch was influenced by Sir John Acton, the well-read Liberal historian 
who studied with the German Church historian, Johann Joseph Ignaz von Döllinger, 
in Munich for six years. This experience contributed to Acton’s promotion of liberty 
through his protégés.69 It was ‘under German influence’ that Acton became 
acquainted with what he perceived were superior aspects of German 
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historiography.70 Acton sought to bring German methods of scholarship into the 
UK.71 UK historians sensed the connection in the achievements at the centre of 
Germanness, and hoped they provided an emulative example for UK historians ‘to 
catch up with German scholarship’.72 Germanness’ intellectual aspects played a part 
in UK historians’ commentary about what it was that formed Germans’ 
characteristics. 
 
Germany’s intellectual culture shaped UK interwar historians’ approaches to 
Anglo-German relations. UK historians, such as R. W. Seton-Watson, believed that 
German nationalist historians had managed to influence many Germans by their 
work.73 Seton-Watson sought to show that the German historian, Heinrich von 
Treitschke, influenced how Germanness was defined throughout much of the pre-
interwar era. He observed in a statement, that  
 
 [Treitschke’s] influence upon the popular consciousness and upon 
the journalistic world can hardly be exaggerated. The fact that in 
our own country his name was hardly known before the war, save 
to a handful of historical writers, and seemingly never quoted save 
by the omniscient Lord Acton… serves to emphasise our neglect of 
German history and political thought. Treitschke certainly did more 
than any other man to poison the wells of historical science in 
Germany and to give currency to the seductive motto, ‘my country, 
right or wrong’.74 
 
Seton-Watson and his colleagues were aware that the histories that Treitschke 
and his colleagues produced were premised on Prussian historians’ adage that ‘strong 
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men make the age’.75 This view resonated with UK historians, who generally agreed 
with Butterfield’s assertion that ‘the men at the summit were always interesting’.76  
 
After World War I, UK historians, such as Fisher, lauded Germany’s 
achievements and stressed the UK’s recognition of its unique development and 
progression. His commentary pointed out the hollowness of some Germans’ claims 
that the UK neglected Germany’s prior successes. He claimed that, 
 
[w]hereas in Germany dislike of England was fostered by every 
academic art for a generation, there was no corresponding effort on 
our side. There were anti-German newspapers and anti-German 
magazines, but the great influences in education, if not actively 
favourable to Germany, were certainly not antagonistic. In music, 
in philosophy, in philological and historical research, as well as in 
the domain of physical science, we were eager to acknowledge our 
great and enduring debt to German industry.77  
 
Fisher’s address was one of a number that revealed UK interwar historians’ 
awareness of contemporary Anglo-German interactions. Many Britons took holidays 
there.78 In addition, high-ranking Germans in the interwar period possessed deep 
knowledge of the UK and maintained contact with people in London.79 This reveals 
that Germany was more than a subject for UK interwar historians’ analyses, but was 
also a location that held meaning for their intellectual development. 
 
The eccentric Dickinson had German ‘cultural sympathies’, and was largely 
opposed to the French.80 He was not alone, however, and many UK intellectuals saw 
German intellectual endeavours as superior to those of the French.81 According to 
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Fisher, many UK officials concurred that Germany need not be a strategic adversary 
given its cultural similarity to the UK, and regarded the recent conflict with Germany 
as ‘painful’.82 This was because the historians had acquired ‘vast stores of learning’ 
when they had studied there and had formed many friendships.83  
 
In contrast, George Prothero posited that Germany’s relationship with the UK 
was based on Anglo-German rivalry.84 This rivalry was shaped by what some UK 
historians perceived as the institutionalisation of Anglophobia in Germany, a view 
that contrasted with British images of Germany as a non-threatening, passive land of 
intellectualism. British perceptions of Germans’ animus were entwined with their 
knowledge of the German government’s effort to push German public opinion 
against the UK. Prothero’s model of Germanness revolved around perceptions of 
challenges to British interests. He noted a pre-World War I trip by the Germanophile 
UK official, Lord Richard Haldane, which shaped Prothero’s thoughts. He stated,  
 
[i]n February, 1912, Lord Haldane went to Berlin in the hope of 
improving Anglo-German relations. He was well-received and 
treated with every courtesy, but immediately after his arrival 
violent attacks upon Great Britain appeared in the Press throughout 
Germany… a pamphlet entitled England’s Weltherrschaft und die 
Deutsche Luxusflotte appeared soon after Lord Haldane’s 
departure…it is thoroughly representative of a large number of 
anti-British pamphlets which have recently been published. The 
anonymous writer is so well informed on political, military, and 
naval matters that he was probably inspired by Government… The 
pamphlet depicts with diabolical skill and in the plausible manner 
the British nation as the enemy of the human race which deserves 
to be held up to execration and contempt. The unnamed author was 
described as a well-known admiral by the German Press, which 
praised the pamphlet highly...85  
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While impressed by German intellectualism, UK interwar historians were 
distrustful that its application to the scientific and industrial areas could fuel 
militarism. This was especially so when German activities touched on UK 
sensitivities that involved naval capacity, as reflected by Prothero’s comment.  
 
Recognition of the Peculiarities of Germans’ Political Culture  
UK historians’ own political system influenced their estimations of Germany’s 
political culture, which was a key area by which they characterised Germanness.86 
Gooch observed that Germans’ reverence for the state was evidenced by German 
philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s praise for the German civil service, as 
well as in historian Treitschke’s assurance that ‘the State is power’.87 UK historians 
were aware that German intellectuals had invoked what they believed to be the 
shortcomings of ‘English liberty’ in their own attempts to outline ‘the German idea 
of Freedom’.88 The implications of this were identified by Pollard, where he 
mentioned the ‘complicated’ dilemma of the ‘German view that crime ceases to be a 
crime when it is committed by a state’.89 UK public intellectuals were aware that 
their German counterparts did not mistrust the State in the same way that Britons 
often did, and advocated a return to old, non-capitalist virtues. In this sense, to 
Germans, the West represented the foreignness of UK, French and American 
cultures.90  
 
H. A. L. Fisher had similarly written that support for democratic principles 
was weak in Germany, and wrote that ‘the modern German is all for Caesarism, for a 
big state, a big army, a big navy, and for a long course of progressive national 
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expansion under the dazzling guidance of the Hohenzollern house’.91 The historian, 
John Theodore Merz, was trained in Germany, had a German father and was born in 
Manchester. John Thedore Merz was born in 1840. Merz was a German-British 
historian, chemist and industrialist. Merz was born in Manchester and was educated 
at Göttingen, Heidelberg and Bonn universities in Germany. Merz died on 21 March 
1921. He commented that  
 
[t]he German nation may pride itself on possessing…the most 
powerful and best equipped army…With greater pride it may boast 
of having trained in the course of centuries the largest and most 
efficient intellectual army, ready at any moment to take up and 
carry to a successful issue great scientific undertakings demanding 
the intense thought and labour of a few secluded students or the 
combined efforts of a large number of ready workers. The army is 
scattered through the length and breadth of the land.92  
 
UK historians contributed to an awareness of Germany’s significant role as a 
sophisticated provider of goods to civilisation. They opposed beliefs that held 
Germans as ‘scientific and intellectual giants but moral dwarfs’ in writings that 
advocated greater Anglo-German cooperation.93 On 30 December, 1924, Dickinson 
wrote to his colleague, A. J. Grant that he was:  
 
 
[s]tudying all the time an active form of that chronic disease called 
international politics for which I fear our civilisation will shortly 
perish…I continue to be intrigued by Goethe and to think him a 
man of vision in spite of the disquieting fact that there is very little 
of him that I can read. Only a German, perhaps, could manage to be 
at once a pedant and a genius, an official and a poet, a novelist and 
a preacher, etc., etc. He achieved anyhow, the greatest of triumphs, 
which is continuing to live to the last moment...94  
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Motifs of Germanness that emphasised modernity were juxtaposed by British 
admiration for Germany’s cultural and intellectual tradition. UK historians and 
public intellectuals vocally raised awareness of Germany’s progress in science, and 
their esteem increased when its application in industrial output was considered.95 
There were differences between how the UK and Germany viewed the ‘national 
importance’ of technology, however.96 Despite the temporary drop in reputation for 
efficiency due to their country’s World War I defeat, German ocean liners, zeppelins 
and aircraft captivated global interest in the interwar era.97 In the Weimar Republic, 
nationalistic impulses rose in tandem with achievements in research and 
innovation.98 Germans characterised technology as the means to free themselves 
from impediments that were perceived to have thwarted their national community’s 
destiny. In public discourse, Germans regarded the importance of technology in tones 
that were more belligerent than those adopted by the UK.99  
 
Vulnerability and Humiliation 
UK historians recognised that the victorious French regarded themselves in 
an aggrieved manner after World War I. This recognition caused historians 
to move away from the opinions they had expressed during the war. German 
humiliation about reparations and war guilt informed UK historians’ open-
minded approach for dealing with matters of Germanness. The way UK 
historians regarded the plurality of opinion on Germany’s treatment 
suggested that they were ahead of their time and prefigured the direction of 
British public opinion and policy.  
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Many UK historians’ analyses predated later shifts in public opinion. 
Temperley and Gooch critiqued aspects of former British Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Edward Grey’s actions harshly, particularly regarding his ‘military conversations 
with France’. In assessing their critique, Herbert Butterfield maintained that it was 
erroneous to see the increased relevance ‘of contemporary history as merely a 
marginal affair’.100 Historians, such as Butterfield and his colleagues, were 
representative of public intellectuals who aimed to draw attention to Germans’ 
vulnerability so as to calibrate British policy more effectively.  
 
Germans’ defeat in World War I destroyed the certainties of national identity 
created by Bismarck, according to Zimmern, Germany was ‘stupefied and 
bewildered’ by defeat.101 UK historians and Germans alike portrayed the country as 
‘the victim of a complete breakdown’.102 As UK historians analysed in this thesis 
were largely from privileged backgrounds, the sense of class-based solidarity was 
palpable as they familiarised themselves with the German elites’ circumstances.103 
Sanders encountered the English-born Princess Evelyn Blücher at Oxford on 19 June 
1921, and discussed the elites’ sense of disempowerment.104 She said that following 
the war the Kaiser enjoyed no freedom of action, and that ‘the announcement of his 
abdication was actually made before his signature was obtained’.105 Their shared 
class backgrounds and the sense of cataclysmic crisis transcended the barriers of 
international politics.  
 
UK interwar historians recognised the ignominy felt by Germans, but sought 
to highlight it within a paradigm that could serve British interests. They noted in 
diaries, in particular, how the appropriation of Germans’ wealth at a time of hunger 
was influencing Germany’s willingness to cooperate with other states. On Sunday 1 
August 1920, Sanders wrote of the UK’s anxiety regarding the prospect of Germany 
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forming a treaty with the Soviet Union. He wrote, ‘[i]f Germany likes to tear up the 
treaty and join hands with the Bolsheviks the situation will be very serious indeed. 
The French are most anxious to occupy the Ruhr district which would hobble? [sic] 
Germany economically’.106 Notwithstanding these concerns, UK historians continued 
to be driven by the UK’s trade requirements.107 On 29 January 1919, a letter passed 
between the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. In it, UK officials (who had received training as historians and who 
worked under the aegis of the Foreign Office), sought to recoup UK losses incurred 
by their merchant fleets. The letter reveals the balance between humanitarian motives 
and the acquisition of valuable enemy assets. It noted, 
 
[i]n advancing these suggestions, Mr Prothero has had in mind not 
merely the question of an immediate increase in the available 
supplies of food, but also the importance, pending a decision upon 
the policy advocated in the Board’s correspondence above referred 
to, of keeping a hold upon the German fishing vessels and 
preventing the possibility of their being otherwise disposed of. I 
(Henry G. Maurice, Assistant Secretary in Charge of the Fisheries 
Division) may say that Mr Prothero would be gratified by the 
receipt of any information which Mr Balfour is able to furnish on 
this subject, in order that the Board may be fully apprised of the 
position of affairs.108  
 
Historians were particularly aware of reparations in their reflections on 
Germans’ defeat and vulnerability. They were swept up in the manner in which they 
were required to deal simultaneously with Germans’ defeat, their protection from 
French desires for revenge, and the protection of British interests. This revealed itself 
in Prothero’s lecture notes on the relevance of historical relations between France 
and Prussia to the present situation, when he noted that ‘between the two 
governments, as between the two countries, that most dangerous of international 
conditions, mutual distrust and the fear of surprises, subsisted more and more’.109 On 
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Sunday 22 July 1923, Sanders remarked in his diary on the position which the British 
cabinet adopted towards France and Germany. He wrote with concern that ‘much 
time has been spent in Cabinet Consideration of the notes to Germany and the Allies. 
The result on the whole has been to make things very civil to France. Curzon seems 
to assume the French would be delighted with them, but doubts German 
acquiescence’.110 Temperley and his colleagues were similarly concerned, and felt 
that the consequences of ambiguous wording in the treaty documents that could have 
created ‘a loophole’.111 He regarded the eagerness to paralyse Germany to be 
counterproductive, and went on to write to Keynes that  
 
[o]ne of the great dangers of all Treaties – and I am sure we shall 
find it in a very short time in the Treaty of Rapallo – is that small 
phrases of this kind are inserted and subsequently become of 
considerable importance. Mr [William Morris] Hughes’s arguments 
as reproduced seem to me to show that he is either completely 
dishonest or a fool; I wish I could think the latter. But I am inclined 
to agree with the comment of a reviewer of [Bernard] Baruch’s 
book in The Times that Mr Hughes did more harm than anybody 
else at the Conference, and quite apart from this part of the 
negotiation was I think largely responsible for the Japanese 
success. I heartily wish that we had had one of the Japanese 
delegation and they had had Mr Hughes. I do not know if you have 
seen the debates in the Australian Parliament? They are not 
calculated to raise one’s estimate of the intelligence of that body. 
The Chief line seems to be that Mr Hughes was a traitor for letting 
Germany down easily.112  
 
UK historians’ interpretations of Armistice and Treaty documents 
significantly conflicted with French versions in the years that followed World War I. 
On 27 November 1920, Keynes wrote to Temperley that the French had complicated 
the UK’s response and got their delegation into ‘great trouble’ due to their ‘altering 
the wording of one of the Armistice documents after it had been signed’.113 Keynes 
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noted that it was ‘significant’ that the French Finance Minister, Louis-Lucien Klotz, 
‘made use of the text which had been tampered with’ to bolster his position before 
the Reparation Commission.114 Keynes continued that ‘can there be any doubt that 
the text as signed by the Germans contained  the word ‘renonciation’, and that at 
some time later this was altered in the French official version to ‘revendication’; 
whereas the official English version is a translation of the original and authentic 
text’.115 On 29 November 1920, Temperley wrote back and informed Keynes that his 
‘letter’ was ‘highly interesting and even sensational’.116 Temperley, Keynes, and 
their colleagues’ correspondence regarding Germany’s treatment suggests that the 
historians were ahead of their time and prefigured the course of public opinion about 
the Treaty’s shortcomings.  
 
Important issues that fed UK historians’ revisionism in the early 1920s 
included reparations, policy differences with France, and Weimar’s hyperinflation. 
These issues inspired protective impulses in UK historians, who believed Germans 
were vulnerable to the excesses of vindictive French policies. These French policies 
were counterproductive to British interests.117 The German government led the way 
in its use of documents from archives to prove that they were not solely responsible 
for the war, an action that was later replicated by the other combatant nations.118 The 
rise in revisionism gradually spread into the Allied countries.119 The occupation of 
western areas of Germany was a contentious feature of relations between the Great 
Powers, since it taxed Germany’s economy and fed hostile nationalism among all 
countries involved. Foreign troops’ presence on German territory promoted a re-
articulation of German patriotism, and increased Germans’ hostility to the Weimar 
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Europe’, Archival Science, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2013, p. 16. 
119 Ibid., pp. 16-17.  
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Republic.120  
 
UK historians who experienced this phase of interwar Germans’ humiliation 
were active in their recommendations. However, they were often bystanders to 
events in which Germans sought to deal with the growing hyperinflation. In 
November 1922, D’Abernon wrote a memorandum to Foreign Secretary Lord 
Curzon on the position of German finance and currency. He blamed the 
hyperinflation on the ‘insane action’ of the German Reichsbank’s ‘unlimited printing 
of notes’, which he compared to ‘a runaway horse with an incompetent and nervous 
rider’.121 He suggested that the crisis was resolvable by ‘a little courage on the part of 
the rider’ to reintroduce confidence.122 D’Abernon maintained that Germans’ despair 
was partly to blame, as they undermined their own currency quicker than the amount 
of money in the economy. He wrote that throughout recorded history, ‘no dog has 
ever run after its own tail with the speed of their Reichsbank’.123 By 10 November 
1922, he foresaw that Germany’s ‘most powerful weapon’ for obfuscation of 
reparations payments had been the destruction of the mark by means of 
hyperinflation.124  
 
UK historians’ critiques of the reparations clauses and the French actions 
undermined perceptions of the inviolability of the Treaty of Versailles. They 
questioned the justice of the reparations amount, setting them ahead of their time. 
Scepticism about the Treaty of Versailles contributed to the British government’s 
policy of appeasement towards Germany in later years. It bewildered Keynes that 
Lloyd George ‘never in a public speech’ indicated that he was aware of the pre-
Armistice aspects of ‘Germany’s capacity to pay’.125 On 3 August 1923, Sanders 
wrote that the French and Belgian responses regarding the Ruhr were ‘all as 
unsatisfactory as can be’, and that there was a likelihood that Curzon could put the 
                                                          
120 Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1990, p. 120; See also: Goebel, ‘Re-Membered and Re-Mobilised: The “Sleeping 
Dead” in Interwar Germany and Britain’, p. 493. 
121 Dated November 1922, D’Abernon Papers, Add MS 48925 B.  
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid., p. 20. 
124 Ibid., p. 34. 
125 ‘Keynes Letter to Temperley on Germany’s Capacity to Pay’, 13 May 1932, King’s College 
Archive Centre, JMK CO/11/256. 
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issue of their Allies’ intransigence to the League of Nations.126 Fisher believed that 
the Ruhr occupation was illegal, and that France’s threats to occupy Germany were 
‘a general threat to renew the war’.127  
 
Fisher and his colleagues saw that UK interests were not served by seeing 
Germany embarrassed, or seeing its national foundations undermined. Fisher 
observed that their Allies were also competitors, as UK merchantmen around 
Cologne ‘found themselves encircled by a Franco-Belgian Customs ring and their 
business were brought to a standstill’.128 He saw that Germany’s campaign of passive 
resistance was discontinued on 26 September 1923, amid successful negotiations to 
ensure freedom of transit and provision of taxes.129 UK historians were also aware of 
French initiatives to detach parts of Germany to form an independent buffer-state 
between their countries. Fisher remarked with satisfaction that this move was 
unsuccessful when he wrote, 
 
[P]oincaré claims that the net profit for 1924 will be 3 milliard [sic] 
francs and the question arises as to whether the cost of the Ruhr 
occupation should enjoy priority of all allied claims or be counted a 
purely French charge. The legality of the occupation being [sic] 
denied by the British Law Officers on April 11th 1923. Further, 
during the whole period of occupation French encouragement was 
given to a movement, which seems now to have failed, in favour of 
setting up a Rhineland State.130  
 
 
UK historians’ views of Germanness gravitated from empathic feelings for 
Germans, which was an instinct inspired by historical imaginings, towards a 
synthesis where Anglo-German relations could be redirected towards ever-greater 
cooperation. As Lord D‘Abernon indicated, Germany regarded the UK as ‘being 
                                                          
126 Diary of the Late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, 3 August 1923, Vol. II. Dep. D. 753, P. 67. 
127 Liberal Research Department’s German Reparations, 11 August 1923, University of Oxford: 
Bodleian Library-Special Collections, Papers of H. A. L. Fisher, MS. Fisher 172, p. 4.  
128 The Occupation of the Ruhr, Liberal Research Department: A Compendium of Dates and 
Information Chronologically Itemised with the Significance of the Day, Date, September 1923, MS. 
Fisher 173.  
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., p. 2. 
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nearer to them and closely interested in European affairs’.131 The affinity was 
expressed by Lloyd George, whose government was ‘looked upon as Germany’s 
first, or even only, line of defence against French aggression’.132 D‘Abernon noted 
that it was only due to the UK that German delegates were able to have their 
concerns presented at international meetings.133 These empathetic sentiments 
reflected the cooperation that enabled UK historians and diplomats to see their 
German partners accommodated.  
 
UK historians helped cause a diminution in their country’s support for the 
Treaty of Versailles and its reparations burden on Germany in the early 1920s to the 
1930s. UK historians played a leading role in revising views of the justice of the 
Treaty’s implementation. Over the years, much public opinion would come to 
consider that Versailles had been too severe and supported its revision.134  
 
UK historians’ search for the sources of Germanness noted at the beginning 
of this chapter underlined the complexity of interwar interpretations of Germanness. 
The UK interwar historians identified in this chapter worked in close collaboration 
with their colleagues in government and identified the sensitivities of Germans in the 
aftermath of World War I. As public intellectuals, UK interwar historians 
contemplated contested interpretations of Germanness. By doing this, UK historians 
were able to have their historical knowledge of Germany conceptualised into an 
accessible way that shifted public opinion. Among historians, there was unanimity 
that Germany had a unique and rich cultural, scientific and historical tradition. These 
achievements concentrated UK historians’ minds to see Germany as a competitor, as 
well as a close partner with ancestral and ethnic connections with the UK. They also 
acknowledged the bitter troughs of Germans’ post-war vulnerability. UK historians 
regarded this within a paradigm that emphasised the solidarity and cohesion of a 
distinctive form of Anglo-German relations. UK historians viewed this posture as a 
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counterweight to an aggrieved France. The historians became enthusiasts for 
morality and international norms to protect Germany from French initiatives.  
 
The UK historians examined in this chapter evaluated aspects of Germanness 
in order to draw attention to Germany’s significance. The historians’ roles were 
increased by the breadth and depth of their knowledge of Germanness. They argued 
that Britons should care about Germany, despite their wartime conflict. The weight 
of these perceptions focussed attention on the development of German democracy, 
and it was here that UK historians sought to influence views about the machinery of 
government.  
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CHAPTER 4: GERMAN DEMOCRACY  
UK interwar historians analysed Germany’s nascent democracy in the context of 
their understanding of British democracy. For UK historians, interwar German 
democracy was often viewed somewhat simplistically as a contest between forces of 
expression and repression. Historians’ familiarity with the long-term historical 
patterns helped them to identify the transitional processes in Germany’s democracy 
and the particular democratic crises of the Weimar Republic. Interwar German 
democracy evolved within the new democratic framework. Moreover, their 
commentary helped to shape Britons’ discussion of the new Germany.  
 
UK interwar historians’ views were part of a thorough debate in wider 
society, and the chapter argues that they contributed to Britons’ understanding of 
Germany by raising awareness of the challenges faced by republican democracy. The 
chapter examines how UK interwar historians sought to interpret the evolutions of 
German democracy, and how this was reflected in cooperation between the two 
countries. UK historians’ experience with interwar Germany’s political cultures was 
juxtaposed with Germans’ own involvement with democratic practice.  
 
The chapter analyses two key ways in which UK historians contributed to 
developments in interwar German democracy. The first explores the interrelationship 
between UK historians’ teachings, educational campaigns, and the founding of 
German democracy. The second investigates UK historians’ interpretations of the 
interwar order that had been facilitated by the Treaty of Versailles. The chapter asks 
to what extent UK historians’ contributions to German democracy predominated 
over other forms of engagement with Germany, and whether their impact was 
identifiable. 
 
Founding a Democracy: Democratisation  
Historians used their familiarity with concepts of democratisation to increase 
awareness of Germans’ active engagement in their democracy. They did so in their 
writings to the press, petitions, and letter-writing. UK historians’ educational 
campaigns and teachings on constitutions complemented contemporary 
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understandings of the founding of the Weimar democracy, and reminded their 
readers that the influence of elected politicians had been weak in Imperial Germany. 
UK historians were aware that the character of the historical German monarchies had 
been dissimilar to the ‘democratic monarchy’ that had developed in the UK.1 Given 
this, some UK historians held that German democracy had originated on the 
battlefields of World War I, as such, and was uniquely represented by the Weimar 
Constitution.2  
 
Historians observed the degree to which many Germans were not supportive 
of the constitution of Weimar Germany. The Professor of Modern History at the 
University of Berlin, Professor Hans Delbrück, was considered to be a ‘concise and 
moderate’ source of information about Germany.3 They acknowledged, in a Political 
Information Department report to the Foreign Office, that Delbrück had ‘not rated 
very highly’ the work done on the Constitution and the results of the National 
Assembly at Weimar.4 Delbrück wrote that, ‘[t]he new Republic, whatever the form 
of the Constitution, is by no means popular, let alone suggestive of enthusiasm to the 
great majority of Germans’.5 This raised particular problems, given the perceived 
lack of depth to their democratic experience. 
 
UK historians drew on the characterisations of German democracy that 
aligned with Delbrück’s own. In A. F. Pollard’s marginalia to his lectures notes on 
27 January, he mentioned the ‘monarchical basis of Modern Germany’ as a means to 
understand contemporary democracy in that country.6 To invoke his grasp of German 
democracy, Pollard highlighted in disjointed sentences what he perceived as the 
indigenous and organic growth of German democracy. He scribbled, ‘[n]ature did not 
                                                          
1 Walter H. Kaufmann, Monarchism in the Weimar Republic, New York, Octagon Books, 1973, p. 11. 
2 G. P. Gooch, ‘German Views of the State’, in G. P. Gooch et al (eds), The German Mind and 
Outlook, London, Chapman and Hall, 1945, p. 35. 
3 Professor Delbrück on the Situation in Germany, August 1918, The National Archives (UK), FO 
371/4382, PID 563, p. 2; The archival document indicated that Professor Delbrück was referring 
solely to the situation in August 1918 but he mentioned the situation many months later, as well. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Lecture Notes, Miscellaneous, 1912-1933: Correspondence, including with Longmans Green about 
possible book on English (or British?) history, lecture notes on modern Germany, letters from readers 
of Pollard’s books, University of London: Senate House Library, 20 January 1916, Pollard Papers, 
MS 860/19/4 Pollard. 
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foresee Prussia. Not a natural frontier to any state. Work of Monarchy [sic]. People 
couldn’t make it themselves’.7 Albert Frederick Pollard was born on 16 December 
1869. Pollard gained a scholarship to Jesus College, University of Oxford. Between 
1915 and 1915, Pollard was President of the Historical Association. From 1903, he 
was Professor of Constitutional History at the University of London. Pollard had the 
inspiration to establish an Historical Association for England and Wales. He also 
founded the Institute for Historical Research at the University of London. He served 
on the Government Committee on the League of Nations. In 1920, Pollard was 
elected to the British Academy. Pollard died in 1948. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
history underpinned the study of international relations in contemporary universities. 
Many works, such as those by Pollard, were standard works throughout the British 
Empire. Thus, on 1 February 1921, the Canadian scholar, A. W. Kennedy wrote to 
Pollard from Toronto, calling his book ‘a boon and a blessing’.8 Kennedy maintained 
that he was ‘using [Frederic William] Maitland’s memoranda of Parliaments for 
seven years past at the History School here’, but noted Pollard’s work as incisive.9 
By engaging with topics of Germany and democratisation, Pollard provided one 
framework on which to understand Germany’s polity.  
 
Pollard’s work on contemporary Germany was firmly based on historical 
reflection, which would foreground the value of history. During World War I, he had 
asked himself, ‘[w]hat would Bismarck have done in this war?’ His response 
conveyed a belief in the vitality of the German nation. He felt that [Bismarck] ‘would 
never have made this war at all’, but that there had been uncharacteristic ‘atrophy’ in 
the German people.10 In so doing, Pollard refined his belief that Germany’s state 
system could only be sustained in the presence of ‘great men’ such as Bismarck. 
 
Pollard’s prestige meant that he conveyed the importance of history to the 
development of German democracy and diplomacy. On Saturday, 8 January 1927, he 
                                                          
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., On 2 March (1917?) in a lectures entitled, ‘The Progress of the War and the Prophets of the 
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addressed an historical conference at Eastbourne and emphasised ‘history as key to 
the world problems’.11 In this address, he stressed the relationship between history 
and values, and especially its role in ‘Humanising Education’.12 The crux of this 
civilising aspect was how the ‘[m]eans of historical study…were the one factor that 
might in the future humanise education, particularly the education of democracy’.13 
Sir Charles Batho, the Lord Mayor of London at the time, spoke at the address, and 
said that the ‘utmost value’ of knowledge was history, and that ‘real educational and 
social progress’ required recognition of the subject’s centrality in education.14 
‘History was the key to the solution of many of our world problems’, Batho 
maintained, and the UK’s avoidance of unnecessary ‘social experiments’ required 
their compatriots and fellow Europeans to be reminded of democracy’s value by their 
country’s historians.15  
 
UK interwar historians sought change through actions that accentuated 
democratic awareness.16 Historians’ social network augmented their influence on 
analysing aspects of democracy in Germany. H. A. L. Fisher’s diary on Wednesday, 
20 March 1918, noted having met with representatives of the press and upper classes 
of the UK, such as the Asquith, Gulland, Firth, and Balfour families. Later that day, 
he attended a symposium that included [Seebohm] Rowntree, Acland, Lord 
Gladstone, Barron, [R. H.] Tawney, [Sir Alfred] Zimmern, Sir E. Pollock, [and 
politician W. C.] Bridgeman. Fisher mentioned that ‘question centres 
                                                          
11 Coming-of-Age Conference to celebrate the twenty-first anniversary of the Historical Association; 
Historical Association, 1906-1932: Miscellaneous documents relating to the setting up and running of 
the Historical association. Some Historical Association leaflets, eg., “Books on the teaching of history 
in schools” and “A summary of historical examinations affecting schools”, 8 January 1927, University 
of London: Senate House Library, Pollard Papers, MS 860/17/1. 
12 Ibid; Pollard founded the Historical Association in his house. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid., Address by Professor A. F. Pollard, Historical Association Coming-of-Age Conference at 
Eastbourne; See also: H. A. L. Fisher, ‘Education in England and America’, Report of the Meeting of 
the Education Guild of Great Britain and Ireland, 6t January 1925, p. 5, p. 10, pp. 1-15. Fisher 
remarked that at the Conference of Educational Associations, held at University College, London, that 
‘numerous schools in England and Scotland’ were ‘almost entirely staffed from the Honours schools 
of the universities’. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Undated Notes, Some Trends in Scholarship 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History, Cambridge 
University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, Sir Herbert Butterfield: 
Papers, MS Butterfield 400, BUTT/400, p. 10. 
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round…constitutional education’.17 He was lauded for his ability to weave 
constitutional elements into his understandings of democracy in works about 
European history. On 24 June 1938, for instance, Fisher received a letter from lawyer 
Avrace Willis who visited Oxford, and who praised Fisher’s ‘colossal work’ on 
democracy and political economy.18 Willis attested that the importance of Fisher’s 
work communicated across boundaries, and was of relevance to the legal community, 
academia and business. He wrote, 
[I] felt that I must write to you to say how much I have enjoyed 
your history of Europe...It has had to be read to me as I have for 
many years been totally blind, a fact which has never hindered the 
interest I have always had in political questions.19  
 
UK historians, such as Fisher sought to highlight administrative history in 
discussions about threats to German democracy. Fisher argued that each country’s 
histories meant democracy must be adapted to reflect circumstances.20 On 5 March 
1918, Fisher was received at Buckingham Palace by King George V.21 After World 
War I, Fisher advocated for greater university funding, and sought to have 
Germany’s experience with university funding examined for its applicability to the 
UK.22 Fisher’s had argued for an exploration of links between democratic 
constitutions, as important sets of principles that could direct countries’ 
development.23  
 
UK historians’ public engagements sought to elevate understanding about the 
interrelationship between British values and German democracy. Harold Temperley 
                                                          
17 Fisher’s Diary, 20 March 1918, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, Papers 
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22 H. A. L. Fisher, Our Universities: The Centenary Oration, Thursday, June 30 1927, London, 
University of London Press, 1927, p. 20. 
23 H. A. L. Fisher, ‘The Present Position of the League of Nations’, [Unpublished Notes], 1923, p. 9. 
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attempted to coordinate his colleagues’ conference to ensure that their commentary 
was received by the relevant people in appropriate contexts. Temperley argued that 
UK historians’ expertise on democratisation should be reflected in the endeavours of 
their organisations. He also wrote that he was responsible for being an ‘historical 
experts maker’, given he promoted perceptions about UK historians.24 On 31 May 
1926, Temperley communicated to Thomas Frederick Tout the necessity that UK 
historians’ ‘principles’ about being ‘British’ should be declared before they all 
attended an upcoming Anglo-American Conference.25 Within several months 
Temperley was back in Germany, conducting research and advocating for an 
increase in Anglo-German cooperation.26 Temperley suggested that the input of UK 
historians’ presentation should be conveyed the same way as happened in 
international fora, such as at the ‘Assembly or Conference as at the League’.27  
 
Historians’ capability to analyse the development of a consensual political 
culture contributed to an awareness of Germans’ experiences of democracy. The 
historians were attentive to the peculiarities of German history, and sensitive to the 
speed of changes occurring in Germany following the Treaty of Versailles.28 Within 
the UK, the belief that Germany had been treated severely by the Treaty increased as 
the interwar years wore on.29 UK historians were responsive to views that 
emphasised the need to understand the relationship between German democracy and 
British interests. 
 
Founding a Democracy: Democratising History 
UK historians’ teachings positioned Germany as a country that should be of deep 
importance to the UK, notwithstanding their knowledge of the challenges to 
Germany’s nascent democracy. UK historians, such as Herbert Butterfield, identified 
                                                          
24 A Letter from Harold Temperley to Thomas Frederick Tout, 31 April 1924, The University of 
Manchester: The John Rylands Library Archive Centre, Papers of Thomas Frederick Tout, Harold 
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28 Ibid.  
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patterns in Germany’s political development when he analysed interwar German 
democracy. Butterfield referenced the ‘Prussian school’ of history that was used for 
the benefit of the state, and which dominated the preceding decades in Germany.30 
This concept, known as ‘statism’ in German historians’ research, or Etatismus, 
endured until the end of World War II.31 Pollard, among his colleagues, was a 
member of the ‘historical investigation’ that sought to locate the ‘prevailing political 
ideas’ in the portrayal of the pre-war era.32 Germany was the first country to publish 
their diplomatic documents, catalysing interest in Germany among UK historians.33 
The aftermath of Germany’s military collapse in World War I demanded that UK 
historians contextualise the new era in the light of the recent past.34  
 
UK historians taught history in the hope of benefiting both British interests 
and Anglo-German relations more broadly. Despite historians’ deep knowledge, men 
such as Pollard asserted that ‘no subject [as history] was often so badly taught’.35 His 
colleague, George Walter Prothero, wrote a one-page pamphlet about history’s uses 
for enlarging the public space with questions of post-war Germany and democracy.36 
                                                          
30 Some Trends in Scholarship, 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History; notes of ‘A Centenary 
Address’, Read on 6 December 1968, BUTT/400, p. 5. 
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Pollard and his colleagues proposed that the Historical Association have different 
aims from English Historical Review or the Royal Historical Society, so that their 
Association could promote historical instruction in the UK’s schools.37 The 
Historical Association argued that children ‘for their own future as citizens…should 
not leave school without some interest in, and some knowledge of, the machinery of 
government’.38  
 
 
The historian Charles Robert Ashbee had written approvingly of the 
‘mechanical order’ of democracy in the years before World War I.39 Ashbee had 
claimed that ‘[t]he danger now is mechanism, in…the unintelligent use of power’.40 
Charles Robert Ashbee was born on 17 May 1863, and was a designer as well as a 
businessman. As well as an historian he innovated the Arts and Crafts movement. He 
was inspired by John Ruskin and the Socialism of William Morris, examining the 
beliefs of romantic socialism. He was schooled at Wellington College and read 
history at King’s College, University of Cambridge, from 1883 to 1886. In 1918, he 
attained the position of civic advisor under the auspices of the British Mandate of 
Palestine. He supervised construction and laid rules that guarded architectural sites. 
Ashbee chaired the Pro-Jerusalem Society and counted Goldsworthy Lowes 
Dickinson as his friend. Ashbee died on 23 May 1942.  
 
On 1 May 1921, the scholar Geo Veitch, who was not German, wrote a 
‘delighted’ letter to Pollard in which he informed him of his joy that Pollard’s plans 
for a school of research were being realised so that it might inform contemporary 
debate on politics.41 This was the Institute of Historical Research based at the 
University of London, which Pollard would use to train historical researchers.42 Such 
                                                          
should be to make the student think; lectures to be supplemented by problems; the subject to be taught 
for its own sake’  
37 Establishment of Historical Association, 19 May 1906, MS 860/17/1 Pollard. 
38 Ibid; HA Memorandum on the ‘scope and aims of history teaching in central schools, senior classes 
of elementary schools’. 
39 Survey of English Speaking Universities, 1912, Cambridge University: King’s College Archive 
Centre, The Papers of Charles Robert Ashbee, GBR/0272/PP/CRA pp. 6-7.  
40 Ibid. 
41 A Letter from Geo S. Veitch to A. F. Pollard, 1 May 1921, MS 860/19/4 Pollard. 
42 Fisher, ‘Our Universities: The Centenary Oration, Thursday, June 30 1927’, pp. 16-17. 
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places of research trained colleagues about the contemporary international system. 
Moreover, the broader culture of the UK’s elite universities also facilitated 
expression and a pluralism of voices on Germany. These research institutes 
propagated a set of intersecting values about German democracy. In them, highly 
educated Germans directly informed the works of UK historians about the challenges 
of making Germans enthusiastic republicans.  
 
Historians’ familiarity with Germany facilitated ongoing interest. On 13 May 
1932, Temperley confessed to John Maynard Keynes that he was ‘not much of a 
publicist’ and asked if Keynes could review a recent chapter in his co-written work 
with A. J. Grant, Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.43 Temperley 
noted that ‘[t]his book will certainly be read by some thousands of young people, it is 
as well to get the ideas as weighty as they can be in popular treatment’.44 Temperley 
did not suggest that there was any possibility that his works may have been 
prescriptive as well as analytical. Yet, many were fearful as to the course of German 
democracy, and of the possibility of revolution within that country.  
 
Founding a Democracy: German revolution  
Horror at the barbaric loss of life was palpable for those UK interwar historians who 
sought to engage with the post-World War I world.45 Butterfield noted with regret 
that some of Temperley’s accomplished students had become casualties in World 
War I.46 For example, Temperley had attempted to have a ‘brilliant’ student of his 
elected as ‘a second Historical Fellow’, but he had been killed in World War I.47 
Ashbee claimed that ‘[t]he conflict between the gentleman and the barbarian’ 
converged during the interwar period.48 Historians’ views about war legacy were 
informed by discussions in Germany. Their German colleague, Delbrück, thought 
that Germany’s soldiery was an accurate representation of Germans’ sentiments 
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47 Ibid. 
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following World War I. He noted that Friedrich Ebert (Weimar Germany’s first 
president) had expressed democracy to them as a hollow concept with the result that 
many of his countrymen struggled to embrace it. Delbrück surmised, 
 
[w]hen the first German troops returned to Berlin and Ebert greeted 
them with the words: ‘You must be glad to find the Fatherland 
politically free’ his words struck me as a blow, and millions of 
Germans felt as I did, and still more millions have since come to 
feel this, to know in their own persons what this ‘freedom’ 
means.49  
 
UK interwar historians’ interaction with the revolutionary periods of German 
democracy existed in a context of political and economic uncertainty within the UK 
and Europe. On 7 February 1918, Fisher interviewed colleagues such as James W. 
Headlam-Morley about teaching history, but scribbled that the ‘Irish situation’ at the 
time was ‘very serious’ and ‘desperate’.50 Ronald Edmund Balfour’s miscellanea 
included Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson’s musings and notes, which were full of 
rancour on the European state system. He posited that communism was a ‘live 
institutional covenant’ and was a ‘big venture’ that sounded the future.51 He noted 
that ‘[t]heir European civilisation is bound to perish...Communism appears our only 
hope’ and ‘ally’.52 Ronald Edmund Balfour was born in 1904 and was schooled at 
Eton, as well as at King’s College, University of Cambridge. He matriculated from 
here in 1922, and thereupon became a Fellow of the College upon his election in to 
that body in 1928. He became a Lecturer in History in 1930. In World War II, 
Balfour was a commissioned officer and a member of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 
and, on account of his historians’ training, was charged to see that historical artefacts 
and buildings were salvaged in Germany, France and Belgium. On 7 March 1945, 
Major Balfour was killed by a shell while saving a statue from a destroyed church. 
On 28 December 1925, Dickinson wrote to A. J. Grant about the ‘enormous changes’ 
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that he thought were needed for the reordering of the world. He noted ominously that 
‘no one can say whether a great destruction will come before they do’.53  
 
A Home Office Report described some areas under the jurisdiction of the 
Weimar Republic, which were troubled by the persistence of revolutionary 
outbreaks. The report noted, 
 
[t]he government appears to have abandoned their earlier hope of 
fomenting Bolshevism in the Allied countries, and to be genuinely 
alarmed at the spread of communism in Germany. It has even made 
overtures to our service in the occupied territory to make common 
cause against the Spartacists, whom it represents as planning to 
send agents into France with the labourers for the devastated areas. 
In the area occupied by the British Army the Socialist Party 
appears to be gaining ground; the revolutionary ideas of returning 
soldiers are even affecting the peasantry, and the Church is said to 
be losing its influence over the people.54  
 
 
Germany loomed large in the interpretations of UK historians as its stability 
was held to be as a centre of gravity for surrounding countries. On 3 January 1918, 
Fisher made a speech to a ‘dull audience of about 500’ people from the C.U. [Credit 
Union] of Teachers at the YMCA in Totttenham Court Road, after which Fisher 
conversed with his colleague George Trevelyan. Trevelyan had just returned from 
Italy and was worried about the fragility of the Italian army, due to the attenuated 
state of their morale and inadequate income.55 Arthur Elliott Felkin’s papers 
suggested that his colleagues had trouble discerning the nature of civil war and 
revolution in the southern European countries that surrounded Germany.56 Arthur 
Elliott Felkin was born on 31 December 1892. In 1911, Felkin was admitted to 
King’s College, University of Cambridge. After graduating, he worked as an 
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interpreter in prison camps such as Frongoch Prisoner of War Camp near Bala, 
Wales, and Blandford, Dorset. Felkin did this until he was employed as a personal 
assistant to Lord Salter, who was General Secretary of the Reparation Commission in 
Paris and later head of the Economics Section of the League of Nations Secretariat. 
Felkin was a member of the Finance Section of the Commission, and was a member 
of the Secretariat of the League of Nations in the Financial Section and Economic 
Intelligence Service. His work included diplomacy. Felkin died in 1968. 
 
 
The renown of UK interwar historians, such as Fisher, helped disseminate 
their work about German democracy to wide audiences. On 25 April 1939, H. W. 
Spalding wrote to Fisher from Columbia University to inform him that the University 
President [Nicholas Murray Butler], who was also a diplomat, peace activist and 
historian, had addressed the student body and lauded the value of history in 
identifying the strengths and weaknesses of democracy. Spalding related to Fisher 
how Butler finished his lecture by stating to the students that Fisher’s ‘incomparable’ 
works numbered among the ‘most important of all books’.57 Butler particularly 
mentioned the last chapter in one of them, entitled ‘New Dictatorships and Old 
Democracies’, which he ranked as equivalent to the Decline and Fall.58  
 
The comments of UK interwar historians, such as Goldsworthy Lowes-
Dickinson, revealed their belief that Germany’s problems sprung from the Treaty of 
Versailles. On 3 September 1927, Dickinson wrote to Grant from Geneva and 
commented that the interwar period’s ‘perpetual, futile, murderous nationalisms’ 
made him feel more at home in the eighteenth century, rather than the nineteenth 
century.59 Dickinson and Grant both shared an admiration for Orson Wells’ socialist 
views of international cooperation, as well as Manichean views of history. He wrote 
to Grant that the League of Nations at the time was in ‘a depressed condition’ 
because of ‘British snubbing’.60  
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Interpreting a Democracy: Versailles and War Guilt  
The Treaty of Versailles accentuated the complexities of UK historians’ positions on 
German democracy. To UK historians, the Versailles Treaty came to explain why 
aspects of Weimar’s experience of parliamentarianism failed to create a lasting 
commitment to democracy.61 There was a sense that the UK saw its duty to be the 
promotion of peace and international cooperation. UK historians’ commentary about 
the Treaty hinged on the ‘deepest wish’ of like-minded people to construct ‘a world 
safe for peace and democracy’.62 The men’s perspectives of German democracy, 
while maintaining a diversity of opinion, were significantly influenced by the 
interwar era, and the financial and economic hardship the Treaty of Versailles caused 
Germans.63 This was reinforced by the effects of the upheaval of the Treaty of 
Versailles on Germans’ own self-perceptions.64  
 
At the Versailles Conference in Paris, historians regarded the War Guilt 
Clause of Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty to have ‘distressed’ Germans, who 
maintained that any judgment on the issue should only be examined by ‘neutral 
historians’.65 In discussing the original text, the Germans had insisted that 
‘professional historians’ be tasked with any analysis.66 Instead, the Allied-imposed 
War Guilt Clause incensed the German representatives of the Peace Conference. The 
result was that large numbers of Germans regarded democracy as illegitimate and 
imposed, and rendered the country’s political culture vulnerable to political 
extremism and militarism.67 The British Foreign Office functionary and historian of 
Germany, A. W. G. Randall, acknowledged historians’ close involvement in the 
attribution of war guilt, when he reported an exchange that he had with a Dr Field. A. 
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W. G. Randall was a Far Eastern Department Officer with the Foreign Office. 
Randall wrote, 
 
[D]r Field informed me that he knew Dr Grelling, the author of 
‘J’Accuse’, quite intimately and wished to say that Dr Grelling was 
willing to be called as a witness or to give his advice on the 
question of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war, which he 
had studied more closely perhaps than any other living man.68  
 
 
UK interwar historians supported revisionism in the period. The notion that 
Germany was not completely at fault for the conflict gained greater recognition 
following World War I. By the latter stages of the interwar period, a majority of 
Britons believed that no one country or alliance system could be held responsible.69 
Among the historians and government functionaries, however, there was a variety of 
opinion. For instance, the South African soldier and politician, Jan Christiaan Smuts, 
disliked aspects of the Treaty. Harold Temperley claimed that US President 
Woodrow Wilson was only persuaded to adopt tenets of the Treaty by his legal 
team.70 Temperley asserted that Smuts persuaded Wilson on matters that pertained to 
Smuts’ memorandum. He wrote that the principles underpinning the Great Powers’ 
action at Versailles were often at odds, and said: 
 
Wilson’s chief interest was always territorial or political and Lloyd 
George and Clemenceau were always thinking of reparation [sic] 
the President may have got rather muddled up. Do you know or did 
you ever hear of an utterance of his in which he spoke of the Allies 
being entitled to “full reparation”? I do not know what ‘full 
reparation’ means but here again is an expression of a general 
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character which opens the door to a good deal of 
misunderstanding.71  
  
UK historians engaged with the minutiae of the Treaty, were sensitive to the public’s 
perceptions of it, and to its effects on the brittle quality of German democracy. On 
Wednesday 10 March 1920 from London, Prothero wrote in his diary about 
Canadian-born American historian, James T. Shotwell, and his views of John 
Maynard Keynes. He suggested that Wilson was intelligent, but felt that he was 
unfamiliar with Europe, and that his advisors often contradicted themselves in the 
advice they offered him. For example, the boundaries of the Saar region were 
proposed as permanent by Wilson’s advisors. The French wanted the entire region 
annexed. He sadly concluded that ‘Wilson made grave mistakes’ in his discussions 
with the French, who had demanded ‘complete annexation’. 72 Shotwell thought 
instead that alternatives in policy were required.73 Other historians agreed with 
shortcomings of the Conference, and how its effects impacted countries on 
Germany’s periphery. Temperley noted the importance of having ‘Austrian and 
Bulgarian Reparation and Economic clauses’ examined in order to get a sense of the 
proportionality of the blame apportioned to Germany.74  
 
UK historians observed that many Germans distrusted the motives of parties 
that supported the Treaty of Versailles, and recognised that this also underpinned 
Germans’ views about their foreign counterparts. Keynes recalled that all parties at 
the Peace Conference delegated the armistice conditions to representatives from their 
militaries without their Treasury counterparts.75 The visibility of military 
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representatives impressed upon UK historians’ minds how World War I continued to 
affect Anglo-German relations. They were conscious of their German colleagues’ 
views, such as those of Delbrück, whose opinions were given in translated extracts of 
the political magazine, Preuβische Jahrbücher (which he also edited). Delbrück 
mentioned that, ‘[o]ur conscience may smite us, but we will not humiliate ourselves 
before people who, because they have conquered us, want to make the world believe 
that they are our moral superiors’.76  
 
Historians examined how the Treaty impacted Germany’s role in 
international peace. For example, they produced handbooks for the Peace Conference 
and Historical Surveys which sought to analyse the prospects of international 
harmony. Pollard noted that treaties were, after all, ‘frail bonds’.77 He wrote that a 
‘world state or Roman Empire’ provided an untenable basis for Germany’s 
involvement.78 He suggested the formation of an International Peace Council to 
promote partnership between peoples. Pollard nevertheless felt that ‘after so much 
mutual destruction’ the time had arrived for more international governance.79 
Historians promoted the realisation of democratic institutions by supporting these 
processes amid popular sentiment. In a letter to the editor in 1934, one reader 
believed similarly that Anthony Eden’s work with the League of Nations would be 
‘fully realised by our public opinion’.80  
 
UK historians hoped their work would assist in deepening democracy in 
Germany, and the interwar period saw them largely preoccupied with the provision 
of analyses for their colleagues. On 3 June 1919, from the Permanent Undersecretary 
of the Foreign Office, British Delegation Paris, Lord Charles Hardinge, extended his 
appreciation for historical analyses that informed British policy makers’ work on 
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Germany, complimenting the historian in question and his colleagues for the 
professionalism of their work.81 He wrote,  
 
[o]n behalf of Mr. Balfour and myself I wish to thank you most 
sincerely for the valuable assistance you have been good enough to 
give the Historical Section in the compilation of the series of 
Handbooks for the Peace Conference. These books, which are the 
product of much learning, literary skill, and hard work 
ungrudgingly given, have not only earned glowing testimony 
throughout all ranks of the British Delegation, to which they have 
been of very great benefit, but will undoubtedly prove of lasting 
utility and interest. With many thanks for your share in their 
success, believe me. Yours sincerely, Hardinge of Penshurst.82 
 
These books and the contributions of their authors in the aftermath of World War I 
helped British policy makers understand the background to German democracy in an 
accessible format.  
 
UK historians were very cognisant of the emergence of Bolshevism and the 
risk of its spread, during their discussions about German democracy. The historian 
and British ambassador to Germany from 1920 to 1925, Lord D’Abernon, wrote that 
Germans’ sentiments towards the Treaty compelled them to turn away from the UK. 
Germany and the Soviet Union were both dissatisfied powers. Given this, he claimed 
that ‘[i]n so far as policy is governed by individual ministers, and not by public 
opinion, the danger of Germany turning to the East is today somewhat less than it 
was under the [Chancellor from 1921 to 1922, Joseph] Wirth regime’.83 Some 
historians familiarised themselves with new political realities by travelling to the 
Central and Eastern European nations created by the Treaty of Versailles. There were 
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exceptions, however, and Pollard informed Tout that he was not motivated to travel 
internationally, and that he did not plan to attend an event held in Warsaw.84  
 
Interpreting a Democracy: Parliamentary Systems 
Notwithstanding their general support for revisions to the Treaty of Versailles, UK 
historians also noted the many defects in Germany’s parliamentary democracy. UK 
historians regarded the durability of parliaments and democratic procedures as vital 
for determining Germany’s relationship with the UK. UK interwar historians, such as 
Pollard, perceived democracy and parliamentarianism as an array of institutions and 
values that complemented each other. Historians drew attention to how democratic 
norms were arranged and sought to apply them to Germany. They helped raise 
awareness about parliamentary government and favoured outcomes that could 
promote a democratic culture. George Gooch, for example, understood that the 
Weimar Constitution was approved largely because Imperial Germany’s downfall 
had not left an alternative. Like many of his colleagues, he admired the contributions 
of German politicians such as Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau, and Chancellors 
Gustav Stresemann and Heinrich Brüning, but recognised that the support for the 
parliamentary Republic was weak.85 This sentiment was shown in Delbrück’s 
mention that Germans were ‘vexed at the many stupidities’ of how members of 
Weimar’s National Assembly were pre-occupied with ‘patents of nobility, titles and 
orders’.86 Delbrück mocked the Assembly’s pretentions to have established a 
framework of guiding rules from which Germany could have prospered, and noted 
with exasperation, ‘[f]resh ideas, originality, there is none’.87 UK interwar historians 
argued against the spread of sentiments that suggested that democracy was alien to 
Germany. 
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UK interwar historians were aware that many Germans saw their polity as 
unresponsive to Germans’ needs. Historians recognised that forms of government 
other than democracy were accepted by many people, because they were seen as ‘the 
way of the future’.88 UK historians used the British parliament as an example to 
provide insights into Germany's parliamentary system.89 For example, following the 
1848 revolutions, many German states established parliaments ‘on the English 
model’ that included dynastic heads of state.90 The perceived failure of these 
parliaments to evolve meant that historians such as Pollard perceived the UK to be a 
unique example of democratic expression. Such historians argued that power in the 
UK lay with the consent of parliament and public opinion, although they also 
acknowledged that its historical origins lay partly in Germany.91 Contemporary 
Germany was recognised to be experiencing new and difficult situations though. 
Pollard viewed ‘equality [to be] as dangerous and as dubious a term as 
independence’.92 He argued that the growth of mass societies would cause novel 
social pressures for parliaments such as Weimar Germany’s.93  
 
Historians were actively involved in the education of Foreign Office 
personnel, and used the opportunity to discuss their view on the evolution of German 
democracy. Fisher, for example, was ‘[a] learned and eminent historian, the true 
foundation for statecraft’.94 The education of the Foreign Office was a task deemed 
to be of central importance to the historians’ peers.95 However, despite the scope of 
their work across various contexts, their influence remained bounded. The British 
Foreign Secretary at the time, Austen Chamberlain, had trained in Modern German 
History at Cambridge, but was seen as ‘hopeless’ at the Foreign Office, according to 
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the opinions of some members of historian Robert Arthur Sanders’ Conservative 
party.96  
Robert Arthur Sanders, 1st Baron Brayford of Stoke Trister, PC, JP, was an 
historian and politician. Sanders was born on 20 June 1867, in London. He was 
schooled at Harrow and at Balliol College, University of Oxford. Sanders was a 
Conservative Member of Parliament for Bridgewater, Somerset from 1910 until 
1923. He also served from 1911 to 1917, as a Lieutenant-Colonel with the Royal 
North Devon Yeomanry. He served at Gallipoli, Egypt and Palestine. He was 
appointed a deputy lieutenant of Somerset in 1912. Sanders died on 24 February 
1940. Nonetheless, historians’ influence in the Foreign Office enabled them to 
promote the institutionalisation of democratic processes in Germany as a key 
component in that country’s post-war stabilisation. They did this by being able to 
work across contexts in ways that could maximise public intellectuals’ roles. Arthur 
Keith, moreover, believed that historians were ‘entitled to advise’ on matters that 
concerned the content of their work, including interpretation and implementation.97  
 
Interpreting a Democracy: The Public Space 
UK historians’ proximity to political power was aided by organs of democratic 
cooperation and the press.98 Historians were aided in their efforts by ‘Teutonic 
theory’, which held that historians forged political developments and helped 
determine the outcome of events.99 Historians were part of a circle that contributed to 
the preparation of important occasions. Fisher recounted how Lloyd George made a 
‘long, interesting, rather lifeless’ address to the parliament on Europe and Germany’s 
circumstances. Nevertheless, Fisher recognised the prime minister’s address as ‘a big 
statement’.100 On 12 January 1921, Fisher wrote how he had introduced Temperley 
to Lloyd George and noted how ‘curious’ it was to see his colleague’s 
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participation.101 Fisher alluded to the influence prominent historians such as himself 
exercised, and claimed that he put Temperley ‘where he now stands’, among 
politically significant cliques.102 Seton-Watson noted more modestly that while ‘[i]t 
is true that no historian has played more than a secondary part in public affairs’, 
many worked in very influential government roles.103 Temperley, according to 
Butterfield, ‘liked to tell stories about his connections with the great, and in the 
twenties he still belonged to that group of historians who were bewitched because 
they were on the fringe of that magic circle of people who govern us’.104  
 
Despite their limitations, historians were influential at the Versailles Peace 
Conference because they publicly identified the challenges faced by German 
democracy. Temperley, for example, predicted that ‘new sentiments’ would arise as 
a consequence of their work.105 The web of contacts that historians used to 
contextualise current events deepened as the interwar period progressed. In 1922, 
Temperley wrote to the Lord President of the Council, the Conservative Party’s 
Arthur Balfour, about how he had consulted the sources of a French colleague on 
matters about the Peace Conference.106 Temperley framed the discussion so that his 
analyses were presented for the public interest. On a matter that related to Central 
and Eastern Europe, he was unable to comprehend how a particular journalist ‘could 
know so much’, implying that historians should have priority to access information 
about Germany when it became available.107 Nevertheless, Temperley had previously 
suggested in 1922 that there must have been collusion with their own Foreign Office 
personnel and newspapers, and noted that ‘a plenipotentiary’ from the Versailles 
Conference could have been behind what he termed as ‘puzzling’ problems that 
represented the dilemmas of understanding the boundaries of the public space.108  
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UK historians recognised that the public space was strongly present in their 
analysis of Germany’s democratic framework. Historians such as Pollard drafted the 
Historical Report for the League of Nations, and collaborated with the half-German 
and German-educated diplomat, Sir Eyre Crowe, who was noted as an expert on 
Germany. Articles 27 and 28 of Pollard’s Historical Report declared that a strong 
public space must contain elements of the democratic process. He hoped that the 
‘will of the people’ would offer a more stable future.109 This marked the beginning of 
an interwar context for decisions about how to deal with challenges to democracy. A 
consolidated public space would thereby facilitate new ideas and support 
democracy.110 Such sentiments were expressed in a number of Pollard’s works, such 
as, The Evolution of Parliament.111  
 
UK historians solidified the public space in order to shape public opinion 
about the often attenuated state of German democracy. They did this by employing 
their social and cultural capital in a way that showed their understanding of Germany 
to be not completely bound by the conventions or rules of historical study, as it was 
then understood. Fisher and his colleagues sought to have “British public diplomacy” 
applied to Germany in the interwar era. He wrote that ‘[t]he democracies of Europe’ 
required smart ‘propaganda’ that should aim to expedite ‘international harmony’.112 
It was in this vein that historians received support for their actions from the British 
monarchy. In this instance, they argued that historians should promote the British 
culture and system of government as being of benefit to Germans and British 
interests.113 In other words, they were tasked with ‘showing the world what they 
owed Britain’, as King George V declared it.114  
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MS 860/16/1. 
110 Ibid; Pollard The Committee on the League of Nations Submission to the Committee of an 
alternative version of a conclusion to our historical report by Eyre A. Crowe of the Foreign Office, 
June 18, 1918. 
111 Evening Post, New York, 14 May 1921; Albert Beebe White of the University of Minnesota cited: 
‘the main feature being an imperial second chamber, based on a principle suggested by the United 
States Senate, to replace the House of Lords and all other second chambers throughout the Empire’.  
112 H. A. L. Fisher, The Present Position of the League of Nations, [Unpublished Notes] 1923, p. 9. 
113 Peter Aspden, Selling Democracy? The Past and Future of Western Cultural Relations and Public 
Diplomacy, London, British Council, 2004, p. 12. 
114 Cf. Ibid. 
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UK interwar historians’ efforts to shape the growth of the public space took 
on unique forms of engagement, as demonstrated by the renown of their Peace 
Handbooks. On 14 October 1919, Prothero wrote to the Historical Section of the 
Foreign Office about how the Foreign Office had decided to publish historians’ 
Peace Handbooks. He acknowledged that although they were created by the 
Historical Section for ‘confidential’ purposes, and the ‘service of the State’, many 
people had requested that they be made publicly available.115 Prothero insisted that 
‘as these will be Government publications, the names of the authors will not be 
given’.116 These briefing books were made for British negotiators at Versailles and 
dealt with many of the questions raised at the Peace Conference.117 With a ‘kind 
willingness’, historians agreed that their colleagues and other ‘experts’ from the 
Foreign Office could have their books re-examined so that current events were able 
to be incorporated.118 They represented a type of engagement which directly enlarged 
the UK public’s awareness of the state of German democracy.  
 
UK historians’ work as public intellectuals ensured that their activities would 
shape public attitudes about German democracy. Fisher highlighted the development 
of institutes that promoted better understanding of the world and of the UK’s foreign 
policy with regards to Germany. The UK historian-staffed Institute of International 
Affairs was one of the outcomes from the Versailles Peace Conference that Fisher 
alluded to as an instrument for investigating German democracy in the public space. 
He wrote: 
 
[t]he Institute of International Affairs is a product of the Peace 
Conference. It has been founded to promote the dispassionate study 
of contemporary politics…in democracies...Many good modern 
historians have been trained in journalism, but the best 
                                                          
115 Prothero to Professor Keith, 14 October 1919, From the Foreign Office, Historical Section, 1, Lake 
Buildings, St. James’s Park, S. W. 1. University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections 
(CRC), Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero  Keith, Gen. 145/2/165a. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Keith to Prothero, From 122 Polwarth Terrace, 26 September 1919, Gen. 145/2/168. 
118 Prothero to Keith, 19 September 1919, Gen. 145/2/171a. 
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preparation… [is knowledge of] the art and science of politics.119  
 
Historians’ public involvement with issues relating to German democracy 
was one of the factors that changed them into public faces of intellectualness. This 
aligns with Pierre Bourdieu’s reasoning that public intellectuals’ importance can be 
measured by how they are perceived by others.120 In the light of such recognition, the 
Sub-Dean of University College, London G. Schwarzenberger wrote to Butterfield 
about the contributions of his colleague, Temperley. He was particularly interested 
about the latter’s investigations to publish historical journals in German, English and 
French. Temperley defended the integrity of his institute’s ‘research work’, as well 
as its validity in being applied to public debate and the strengthening of the public 
space.121  
  
UK historians elevated interwar German democracy’s importance so as to 
inform the UK’s public discussion about Germany. They proved themselves both 
savvy and adept articulators of the significance of German democracy in the public 
space. They articulated German democracy by informing Britons about Germany, 
and by informing Germans about British democracy. Their analyses of German 
democracy explored various elements of interwar German society, including the 
Versailles Treaty, parliamentary systems, and the public space. UK historians viewed 
democracy in Germany as a means of Germans’ political and cultural expression, 
realised through democratic institutions. Their ability to connect German democratic 
issues with the UK’s was central to their influence. Crucially, it was historians’ work 
across different contexts while writing and giving lectures that augmented the effects 
of their analyses of German democracy. The relationship between the founding of 
German democracy and UK historians’ work reinforced their commitment to a robust 
democracy and public debate in Germany. Yet, their commentary about German 
democracy existed in the context of Germany’s dissatisfaction with its post-World 
War I borders. It was Germany’s borders that concentrated UK interwar historians’ 
                                                          
119 Notes that contributed to H. A. L. Fisher’s article: ‘The Institute of Historical Research and the 
Anglo-American Historical Conference’, History, Vol. 6, No. 23, October 1921, p. 146, MS. 167.  
120 Junpeng Li, ‘Intellectuals’ Political Orientations: Toward an Analytical Sociology’, Asian Social 
Science, Vol. 6, No. 12, 2010, p. 5. 
121 Butterfield and Temperley, BUTT/8, 3 May 1949. 
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minds, and where consensus on the significance of Germany’s power was reached. 
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CHAPTER 5: GERMAN POWER BEYOND AND ALONG 
ITS BORDERS 
UK interwar historians’ analyses of Germany’s power were formulated amidst that 
country’s transformation into a new polity with new borders. Historians’ 
commentary about interwar Germany’s influence outside its frontiers made reference 
to the threats they perceived Germany to represent, as well as their judgement of 
Germany’s vulnerabilities. Their analyses of interwar Germany’s extraterritorial 
power reinforced their capacities as public intellectuals.  
 
UK historians recognised that the outcome of World War I left contested 
interpretations of where Germany’s borders should be, and their attitudes about this 
evolved in tandem with those of many Germans. The chapter argues that UK 
historians raised awareness of the importance of Germany’s borders to British 
interests. The chapter examines how some UK historians invoked Anglo-Saxon 
kinship in their interpretations of Germany’s power beyond its borders, and in 
suggesting new directions for Anglo-German relations. They did this by publicly 
commenting about the changes to Germany’s borders, and the effects of Germany’s 
loss of colonies to long-term British interests. In doing so, they evoked Germany’s 
historical conflict with neighbouring states, and Germans’ experiences with people 
movement. Taken together, the different aspects were included in UK historians’ 
recognition of the importance of German power beyond its borders to British 
interests.  
 
The chapter includes interpretations that examine UK historians’ perspectives 
about interwar German influence through three pillars. The first explores the linkage 
between UK historians and issues that included renegotiating the changes of 
Germany’s borders. One element of this involved historians’ involvement with the 
League of Nations, as they used the League as a means to draw attention to 
Germany’s borders. It argues that UK historians drew on their knowledge about 
Germany’s borders to project their influence in the public space. The second 
considers how UK historians sought to use bodies such as the League of Nations to 
help foster an eventual return of Germany’s seized colonies. It argues that UK 
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historians saw a stronger Germany as desirable for British interests, and that 
Germany’s usefulness as a counterweight to other powers required the eventual 
return of its colonies. The third shows that UK historians realised that the reshaping 
of Germany’s borders around interwar interpretations of sovereignty and people 
movement had unnecessarily complicated Anglo-German relations. Historians’ 
analyses implied that the resumption of harmonious relations between the UK and 
Germany could incentivise Germany to restrain and redirect its power for the 
betterment of Anglo-German relations. 
 
Renegotiating Germany’s Borders and the League of Nations 
UK interwar historians drew on their knowledge of Germany’s borders to argue for a 
re-examination of that country’s frontiers. They sought to project their influence in 
the public space by using the League of Nations’ treatment of Germany’s borders to 
raise awareness of British interests in the dispute. Historians used Germany’s borders 
to elicit sympathy for that country on the basis of a shared Anglo-Saxon heritage. 
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson regarded the management of Germany’s power to be 
an important issue for the League of Nations. He felt that once hostilities had ended, 
the UK should have ensured that there were no recriminations since the Germans 
were entitled to Britons’ help as Anglo-Saxon brethren.1  
 
Historians sought to renegotiate Germany’s borders, and used the League of 
Nations in order to show their willingness to work with the League as a feature of the 
post-World War I order. On 14 April 1937, one day before British Prime Minister 
Stanley Baldwin’s private secretary took receipt of the memorial from UK historians 
William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley that began Chapter 1, they had 
written a six-page letter to Baldwin suggesting why the UK should have used its 
influence in the League of Nations to have Germany’s colonies re-adjudicated. 
Firstly, they acknowledged that foreign policy solutions should not be subordinated 
to the caprices of politics. They then ‘strongly’ invoked their authority as historians 
of Germany to facilitate ‘the early and sympathetic treatment of the German colonial 
                                                          
1 E. M. Forster, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, London, Edward Arnold, 1934, p. 186.  
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question by our government’.2 By mentioning the League’s moral authority, Dawson 
and Beazley sought to question whether Germany’s power reflected its post-World 
War I borders. UK historians’ appeal to their prime minister reflected their 
confidence in revisiting the justice of Germany’s borders at the highest level.  
 
World War I’s aftermath provided an opportunity for some historians to 
rethink the durability of Germany’s interwar borders, and to ponder the veracity of a 
common Anglo-Saxon heritage.3 Historians were aware that World War I’s ferocity 
had destroyed for many the claim (explored in Chapter 4) that British freedoms were 
Teutonically inspired.4 Historians used the post-war period to seek to be detached 
observers of German power in the interwar world. They sought to show that their 
ability to address the justice and morality of an issue objectively was unimpeded by 
any framework they worked under. In Herbert Butterfield’s words, UK historians 
ought to have the ‘essential truth’ revealed in order to firm Britons’ understanding of 
the public space, although his aim was to inform the public about Germany.5 George 
Gooch and Harold Temperley co-edited British Documents on the Origins of the 
War, a work that was only finished in 1938. They saw themselves as ‘independent 
historians’, and accepted the task because of an ‘invitation’ from the prime minister.6 
Despite critiques from some government officials, Gooch and Temperley published 
‘[g]limpses of the kind of material that was relevant to policy-making’.7 UK 
historians’ positions in government meant that they were at the centre of debates 
about the intersection of borders and power in Europe after World War I.8  
 
                                                          
2 William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley’s Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Cambridge 
University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, Stanley Baldwin’s Private 
Papers, Baldwin 91-96. 
3 Some Trends in Scholarship, 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History; notes of  ‘A Centenary 
Address’, Read on 6 December, 1968, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and 
University Archives, Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers, MS Butterfield, BUTT/400 p. 25. 
4 Hugh Kearney, ‘The Importance of Being British’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 1, p. 21.  
5 Some Trends in Scholarship, 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History; notes of ‘A Centenary 
Address’, Read on 6 December, 1968, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and 
University Archives, Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers, MS Butterfield, BUTT/400 p. 25. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Kearney, ‘The Importance of Being British’, p. 21. 
 160 
 
Many UK historians had been active in regions that had historically been 
prone to German influence. Temperley had served with the British army at Gallipoli, 
but was then seconded to the War Office to produce intelligence reports for the 
Balkans region. On 3 July 1919, he wrote that he was the ‘chief interpreter with [the 
then-Foreign Secretary, Arthur] Balfour’.9 Temperley had served in the Balkan 
Peninsula, and had conducted much work for the British government while his 
protégé and colleague, Butterfield, studied at undergraduate level at university.10 
Historians’ activities were practical as well as intellectual. A typical aspect of 
Temperley’s work can be seen in his approach to the allocation of land in the 
aftermath of World War I. Of Balkan population centres he wrote, ‘[t]he Peekommije 
and the Baranya with the 7 villages I gave to Serbia were settled – extension was 
reformed in the Barnat’.11 He later gave ‘permission to occupy’ the town of 
Prenoninya.12 UK historians’ participation in redrawing borders reflected the wide 
scope of their influence.  
 
UK historians’ roles often included their work as civil servants rather than 
being primarily identified as historians. Historians’ willingness to serve on various 
government bodies showed that they were central to the founding of international 
institutions on matters relating to Germany. As Chapter 5 alluded, the then Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, historian, and one of the architects of the 
League of Nations, Robert Cecil, wrote to A. F. Pollard in December 1917, asking if 
Pollard was willing to serve on a ‘small committee of an entirely private nature’.13 
Pollard’s attendance on the committee of historians and Foreign Office functionaries 
was viewed as being of the ‘greatest assistance’. They were tasked with investigating 
‘from a juridical and historic point of view into various schemes for establishing, by 
                                                          
9 Temperley: Notes, mostly on the life and career of H. W. V. Temperley, consisting in part of copies 
and extracts from his correspondence and diaries, 3 July 1919, Cambridge University Library, 
Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers, MS Butterfield 
BUTT/8. 
10 Autobiographical Writings in Butterfield’s Hand, Cambridge University Library, Department of 
Manuscripts and University Archives, Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers, MS Butterfield, BUTT/7. 
11 Temperley: Notes, mostly on the life and career of H. W. V. Temperley, consisting in part of copies 
and extracts from his correspondence and diaries, 23 July 1919, Cambridge University Library, 
Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers, MS Butterfield 
BUTT/8. 
12 Ibid.  
13 League of Nations, December 1917, University of London: Senate House Library, Pollard Papers, 
MS 860/16/1 Pollard.  
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means of a League of Nations or other device, some alternative to war as a means of 
settling international disputes and report on their practicality’.14  
 
Many UK historians wanted the League of Nations to succeed and this was a 
conviction shared by supporters of Anglo-German cooperation, who saw it as a 
means to reawaken an Anglo-Saxon consciousness. The Committee on the League of 
Nations had UK historians adopt roles that incorporated advocacy and analysis. On 
the fourth meeting of the committee, held on 20 February 1918 at the Foreign Office, 
Pollard and Sir Julian Corbett suggested that uncertainty would be attached to any 
scheme if there was no mechanism to protect stronger powers from weaker powers. 
However, the rest of the Committee opposed these suggestions as unworkable. 
Pollard and another member, Dr John Holland Rose, subsequently examined ‘the 
historical side of the questions’ of the work that they were engaged in.15  
 
John Holland Rose was born in Bedford in 1855.  Rose, ‘like most of his 
colleagues, received little formal historical training in schools and universities’.16 
Rose studied at Bedford Modern School, and then at Christ’s College, University of 
Cambridge, and examined diplomatic history and international relations, especially 
of the Napoleonic era. In World War I, Rose supported Britain’s war effort by 
contributing a number of patriotic articles for publication. He contrasted Germany’s 
aims in the early twentieth century with the ambitions of Britain’s former continental 
adversaries in previous centuries.17 Rose died in 1942. UK historians sought to show 
the nascent League of Nations’ as an opportunity to awake humanity in order to 
achieve the goal of international harmony. UK historian Alfred Zimmern, for 
                                                          
14 Ibid; See also: The minutes of the 1st meeting of the Committee, held at the Foreign Office, on 30 
January 1918, included Sir Walter Phillimore (Chairman), Sir Julian Corbett, Professor Holland Rose, 
Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir William Tyrrell, Mr Hurst, Mr Kennedy as secretary, Pollard was ill. The first 
subject of discussion was Colonel Sir Hankey’s Memorandum for the War Cabinet of 12 January 
1918, on the League of Nations. 
15 Ibid; Pollard Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee of the League of Nations; On 27 
February, in the minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Committee, Pollard postulated that they could 
categorise the existence of two sets of powers, in the great and the not-so-great. He thought that this 
would have the issue of ‘voting power’ resolved. Pollard observed that a second section of the Draft 
that began with Article 3, could have been included in another treaty. 
16 E. Wilson Lyon, ‘John Holland Rose’, in Bernadotte E. Schmitt (ed.), Some Historians of Modern 
Europe: Essays in Historiography, Port Washington, Kennikat Press, [1942] 1966, p. 367.  
17 Ibid., pp. 384-389. 
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example, submitted an article that was entitled, ‘The League of Nations Peace’, in 
which he intoned that ‘[a]ll men, and we in particular, of the League of Nations 
Society, must prepare our imaginations and our minds to rise to the height of the 
opportunity offered’.18  
 
On 20 March 1918, Pollard, Corbett and Rose resolved to provide an 
historical memorandum for the committee at its next meeting in Sir Eyre Crowe’s 
office at the Foreign Office.19 A judge met with Pollard at the Foreign Office on 27 
June 1918, and they traded opinions on the League of Nations’ capacity to enforce 
peace. He had previously sent Pollard some documents that had laid out the League’s 
policies, and which had been adopted at their recent convention on 17 May 1918. He 
also transmitted an early draft of a treaty for the League of Nations, which had been 
supported by the League’s executive committee on 11 April 1918.20 Pollard oversaw 
the credentials of countries’ delegates to the League of Nations, including those of 
France.21 Dickinson supported the notion of a League of Nations that was a European 
polity, but believed that its implementation was unlikely.22 The ‘Draft Historical 
Report’ was made by Pollard, Rose and Corbett. The Chairman of the committee, 
however, observed that their report was not concerned with ‘modern schemes of a 
League of Nations’.23  
 
Historians drew on their knowledge relating to the boundaries of Germany’s 
power when they sought to project influence in the public space. George Walter 
Prothero wrote from Edinburgh University to a newspaper on 30 September 1918, 
                                                          
18 Pamphlet for the League of Nations Society, No. 12, December 1918, University of Oxford: 
Bodleian Library-Special Collections, Zimmern Papers, MS. Zimmern 171. 
19 Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Committee of the League of Nations, MS 860/16/1; The time 
and date of the meeting was 11:30 a.m. on 24 April. 
20 Pollard Judge correspondence: Judge William H. Wadhams of the Court of Central Sessions in New 
York, sent Professor Pollard of the Foreign Office, Downing Street, the enclosed papers, 27 June 
1918’, MS 860/16/1.  
21 Pollard Correspondence from A. R. Kennedy, July 13 1918’, MS 860/16/1. 
22 G. L. Dickinson, The Choice Before Us, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1918, p. 172. 
23 Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the Committee held at the League of Nations The Committee of the 
League of Nations, 10th Committee Meeting, 10 May 1918’,  MS 860/16/1 Pollard; ‘It was decided 
whether the report should not be supplemented by that part of the Chairman’s paper (Part 4) which 
deals with modern schemes’. 
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and characterised the League of Nations as reflecting the realities of German power 
given its impending exhaustion. 
 
 
[s]ir, The importance of the peace terms proposed by the President 
of the United States may justify some comment on the questions 
discussed in your leader of this date. In the first place it would 
seem that the President’s speech on September 27 does definitely 
contemplate the inclusion of Germany in the League of Nations: his 
whole argument for the formation of such a League by the Treaty 
of Peace rests on the necessity of including Germany, and he 
demand the establishment of effective means to carry out the Peace 
Settlement because he contemplates that Germany will be a 
member of the League; if this was not his view, his objection to the 
formation of the League before the Treaty of Peace would be 
without meaning. In the second place the President’s terms do 
affect in one important aspect of the Paris Resolutions. They do 
not, I agree, touch upon the relations ...of parts of one nationality, 
and therefore are not inconsistent with either the French policy of 
preserving to the metro-pole the trade of her colonies nor with 
preference between the different parts of the British Dominions. 
Nor, of course, do they demand the adoption by any nation of 
merely revenue tariff. On the other hand it is impossible to deny 
that they do not permit of any differential treatment by one member 
of the League of Nations of another member. They demand that 
Germany should abandon her economic plans for the east, but they 
are equally inconsistent with any scheme for preference among 
members of the present Western alliance. Nor is this policy in any 
way surprising.24 
 
Some historians contributed to the later renegotiation of Germany’s borders 
by analysing the experiences of Germany’s neighbours. Robert Sanders saw that the 
early interwar period had increased the vulnerability of smaller nations. This was an 
irksome observation, as the UK had nominally entered World War I against Germany 
to defend the integrity of Belgium.25 Dickinson wrote that the ‘future of mankind’ 
                                                          
24 30 September 1918, a newspaper, most likely The Times, The University of Edinburgh: Centre for 
Research Collections (CRC), Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero, Gen. 
145/2/197. 
25 Sunday, 16 September 1923, Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol II. Diary of the 
Late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Monday, 13 July 1924, Vol II., University of Oxford: Bodleian 
Library-Special Collections, Papers of Robert Arthur Sanders, 1910-1935, Dep. D. 753.  
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and the League of Nations were synonymous.26 ‘Smaller states’, he assured his 
readers, wanted the League of Nations supported.27 Sanders, however, referenced the 
cases of Greece and Italy in 1923.28 Other UK historians, such as H. A. L. Fisher also 
saw the 1923 Corfu border dispute incident between Italy and Greece as more 
ominous than reported French predations on Germany.29 Sanders sardonically wrote 
that France was ‘much impressed’ by the uncertainty that the League of Nations 
symbolised.30 Meanwhile his colleague, Fisher, wrote of the seriousness of the 
situation between Italy and Greece by analogising it with the Ruhr occupation. He 
noted that  
 
 
[t]he Italian bombardment of Corfu, which compared with the 
French occupation of the Ruhr, was a trivial and transitory event, 
administered a shock to the friends of the League all over the 
world, because it was a clear violation of the most important 
undertaking which one member of the League assumes towards 
another under the Covenant.31 
 
UK historians sought to synthesise the unresolved questions of Germany’s 
power beyond its borders with the emerging rules and procedures of new 
international institutions.32 On 13 January 1921, Pollard and Fisher both examined 
topics that revealed the extent to which German power remained and counselled on 
the risks that this entailed. Pollard contributed to the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs meeting at which Fisher read the paper, ‘The Assembly of the League of 
Nations at Geneva’.33 Temperley wrote that he was a member of the Committee of 
the British Representative in Paris in 1921, and that at Geneva he was the British 
                                                          
26 G. Lowes Dickinson, ‘Italy and the League’, The Nation and The Athenaeum, 15 September 1923, 
p. 739, London School of Economics Archives: British Library of Political and Economic Science, 
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson Papers. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Sunday, 16 September 1923, Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol II. Dep. D. 753. 
29 H. A. L. Fisher, The Present Position of the League of Nations, [Unpublished Notes], 1923, p. 8, 
University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, Papers of H. A. L. Fisher, MS. Fisher. 
30 Sunday, 16 September 1923, Diary of the Late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol II. Dep. D. 753. 
31 H. A. L. Fisher, The Present Position of the League of Nations, [Unpublished Notes] 1923, p. 8. 
32 Forster, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, p. 186.  
33 Pollard Notes, 13 January 1921, University of London: Senate House Library, Pollard Papers, MS 
860/44/1. 
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advisor until 7 October.34 Nonetheless, historians such as Dickinson observed that 
the plight of Germany was frequently ignored at Geneva.35    
 
League of Nations and Colonies 
UK historians argued that the seizure of Germany’s colonies undermined previous 
British claims that World War I had been fought to return morality to international 
relations, and they asserted that British interests would be served by returning the 
colonies to Germany. For most historians who were interested in positive Anglo-
German relations, both countries’ pursuit of colonies served to highlight their 
peoples’ commonalities of purpose. UK interwar historians particularly sought to 
discuss the issue’s relevance to British interests, referring to Germans’ dissatisfaction 
with the Allied seizure of their colonies. Dawson and Beazley’s message to Prime 
Minister Baldwin mentioned that Germany’s colonial experience from 1883 until 
1918 was ‘far from inglorious’, and had even served as a model for other countries.36 
For historians seeking to promote British interests, Germany was a potential partner 
rather than a competitor. 
 
UK historians in the interwar era held the UK and Germany’s relationship 
about colonies as a barometer of the strength of Anglo-German relations more 
broadly. The importance of these lands’ resources did not escape Zimmern, who 
noticed how his colleagues had emphasised the growth of the UK’s possessions since 
the end of World War I. Britons drew pride in the fact that the interwar British 
Empire was bigger and richer than the United States of America.37  
 
                                                          
34 Temperley: Notes, mostly on the life and career of H. W. V. Temperley, consisting in part of copies 
and extracts from his correspondence and diaries, MS Butterfield BUTT/8  
35 Forster, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, p. 186.  
36 William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley’s Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 
91-96. 
37 VII. Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories: Imperial Conference, 1926. Summary of 
Proceedings, Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, November, 1926. London, H. M. 
Stationary Office, 1926, p. 31, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, Zimmern 
Papers, MS. Zimmern 171.  
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Colonies that formerly belonged to Germany served to galvanise historians’ 
public commentary. Their arguments privileged economics, security and morality, 
and further increased their public roles in debate. They also recognised Germany’s 
resilience, as the economic impact of Germany’s colonial losses took place alongside 
a ‘national effort’ to develop the country’s industry and technology.38 It was noted by 
contemporary commentators that a prosperous Germany meant a richer UK. Public 
intellectuals acknowledged that ‘leading industrialists in the Republic’ had observed 
that German power beyond its borders had world-wide benefits, ‘not only for Great 
Britain and Germany, but for the world’.39  
 
Prothero regarded German power beyond its borders as primarily connected 
to Germans’ wish to have their colonies returned. From Edinburgh University on 9 
November 1918, he elaborated on this perceived slight in a letter to the Editor of The 
Times.40 In this case, Prothero was consumed with defending the complaints of the 
Australian Prime Minister, William Morris Hughes, over the latter’s criticisms of 
how ‘principles of the terms of peace’ were resolved without the Dominion 
governments’ involvement.41 He thought that it was important for the Australian 
prime minister to understand the British ministers’ decisions at Versailles. Prothero 
believed that consultations with the Australian prime minister would have revealed to 
him how the confiscation of Germany’s colonies related to the broader debate over 
concerns of German power beyond its borders. He wrote: 
[t]he interest of Australia in the war is as great as that of any of the 
minor powers, and every consideration of expediency and prudence 
demanded that Mr Hughes should have been asked to accompany 
the British Ministers to Versailles, where he could have learned in 
communication with the representatives of the allied powers the 
cogent reasons which rendered it desirable to abandon the natural 
demand for an indemnity for the costs of the war, and which 
justified the failure to state expressly that the allies interpret 
                                                          
38 Hugh Quigley and R. T. Clark, Republican Germany: A Political and Economic Study, London, 
Methuen, 1928, pp. 300-301. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Prothero’s letter to the editor of The Times, 9 November 1918, The University of Edinburgh: Centre 
for Research Collections (CRC), Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero, Gen. 
145/2/191. 
41 Ibid.  
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[President] Mr Wilson’s terms as rendering impossible the return to 
Germany of her Colonies.42  
 
Historians’ views sought to accentuate the positive aspects of Germany’s 
international influence, and worked to highlight that country’s global position. 
Dawson and Beazley’s note to the British prime minister in the later 1930s reflected 
the significance that UK historians at Versailles played on the seizure of Germany’s 
colonies. They emphasised to Baldwin that the UK’s ‘best public opinion’ and ‘best 
statesmanship’ was achieved when the UK supported Germany’s colonial 
aggrandisement.43 They referenced previous British public figures’ approval of 
German power beyond its borders by mentioning the earlier opinions of historians 
such as Charles Wentworth Dilke, as well as those of politicians William Gladstone, 
Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Salisbury, Lord Rosebury, and Sir Edward Grey. Dawson 
and Beazley claimed that Germany’s aims never conflicted with British interests, and 
that Germany’s development necessitated that country’s provision with colonies. 
Moreover, they pointed to a significant colonial pact that the UK and Germany had 
worked on until June 1914.44  
 
UK historians’ capacities as public intellectuals related to their ability to 
analyse Germany’s power beyond its borders. The finer points of the politics about 
colonies emanated from the Versailles Conference, and on this basis, Dawson and 
Beazley appealed to their prime minister on grounds of morality and justice. They 
wrote that: 
 
 
[d]espite initial mistakes, such as often marked the colonial 
beginnings of other nations, Germany on the whole steadily and 
remarkably developed peace, order, and prosperity in her overseas 
possessions. Not only so, but, (though practically without 
constitutional influence on imperial policy) no parliament in 
Europe showed deeper concern for the humane treatment of native 
populations than the German Reichstag, from the beginning of the 
colonial era. Long before the war German colonial administration 
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was admitted, on unimpeachable testimony, to be at once 
conscientious, enlightened and beneficial. Men like Cecil Rhodes, 
Sir Harry Johnston, Theodore Roosevelt, Lord Milner and Sir 
Charles Eliot have born witness to this.45  
 
Given this past record of diplomatic bonhomie, UK historians strove to be 
eloquent advocates for change during the interwar era. Historians’ views on 
Germany’s treatment evolved over time, but remained accepting of colonies’ 
continued value. Temperley wrote to his colleague, Thomas Frederick Tout, how a 
‘German sequence’ shaped how they studied history.46 Thomas Frederick Tout was 
born on 28 September 1855, in London. He attended St Olave’s Grammar School, 
and then Balliol College, University of Oxford. In 1874 Tout received a Brackenbury 
history scholarship to study at Oxford, where he eventually became a fellow of 
Pembroke College. Tout began his academic responsibilities at St David’s University 
College, Lampeter, in 1881. From 1925 until 1929, he was President of the Royal 
Historical Society. From 1910 until 1912, Tout was president of the Historical 
Association. In 1890, Tout was appointed Professor of Modern History at Owens 
College, which became the University of Manchester in 1903. In 1902, he became 
Professor of Medieval and Modern History. In 1920, He became Professor of History 
and Director of Advanced Studies, but retired in 1925. Tout also introduced original 
research into the undergraduate programme. This produced a Final Year thesis 
established on primary works. He was active in many different spheres of public life. 
Tout had once wrote to Pollard that ‘historians should organise along with the rest’.47 
Tout died on 23 October 1929.  
 
It was in this way of looking at things that Prothero wrote to Professor Arthur 
Berriedale Keith and asked if he could have his decision regarding colonial 
handbooks reconsidered. These books had ‘essential’ ‘historical information’ about 
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colonies in Africa, and Keith wanted them withdrawn.48 He argued that Keith’s 
decision would have meant a lacuna of knowledge that ‘historians and politicians’ 
needed to know.49 Arthur Berridale Keith was born on 5 April 1879 in Aberdeen. 
Among other things, Keith’s work involved Scottish constitutional law. He attained 
the posts of Regius Professor of Sanskrit and Lecturer in Constitutional History in 
the University of Edinburgh. In 1952, historian Norman Henry Gibbs published a 
revised version of Keith’s British Cabinet System, and increased many of the 
contributions towards the history of the British War Cabinet. Keith died on 6 October 
1944. Prothero noted that these matters particularly concerned those states ‘now 
composing the League of Nations and also Germany’.50 
 
Norman Henry Gibbs, a historian and soldier, was born on 17 April 1910 in 
London, and followed a similar career path. Gibbs was educated at Magdalen 
College, University of Oxford. Following Gibbs’ graduation, he pursued research 
work and from 1934 to 1936 attained a position as an assistant lecturer at University 
College, London. Gibbs attained a MA and DPhil. In 1936, he taught modern history 
at Merton College, University of Oxford. In 1939, Gibbs joined the 1st King’s 
Dragoon Guards, following the beginning of World War II. Gibbs developed an 
affection for military history. In 1943, Gibbs was seconded to the Cabinet Office, a 
rare development that tasked him with helping start work on an official history of the 
war. Thus, he was a member of the Historical Section, War Cabinet Office. In War 
Cabinet Committee minutes, dated 16 October 1939, Gibbs noted the ‘discussion 
[on] whether information concerning War Cabinet Committees should be given to 
Parliament.51 From 1953 until 1977, Gibbs was Chichele Professor of the History of 
War at University of Oxford. Gibbs died on 20 April 1990.  
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UK observers of Germany saw that Germans’ desire for the restoration of their old 
colonies was reenergised in the early 1930s.52 This phenomenon existed alongside a 
feeling among many Germans that they were destined to expand beyond their current 
borders in an easterly or southerly direction.53 These developments confirmed 
suspicions of men such as Sir Robert Vansittart. Vansittart was a Foreign Office 
official whose later Germanophobia at the end of the interwar era led to the creation 
of the word ‘Vansittartism’, meaning views that demonstrated ‘an extreme and 
obsessive anti-Germanism’.54 However, Vansittart noted in 1934 how the issue of 
colonies had divided opinions within Germany, and had divided opinion about 
whether the country could best attain its goals with or against the UK. 
Notwithstanding such debates, he asserted that all Germans wanted colonies to be 
reacquired.55 Lord Robert Gilbert Vansittart, GCB, GCMG, PC, MVO, received 
several British orders of chivalry. Sir Robert Vansittart was born on 25 June 1881. 
He attended at Eton and joined the Foreign Office in 1902. He fulfilled many 
diplomatic roles in his career. In 1920, he attended the Versailles Peace Settlement 
and became a Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. He was known for 
his harsh views towards the Germans. Vansittart died on 14 February 1957. 
 
UK historians argued that it would not be antithetical to British interests if 
Germany reacquired greater power. Their suggestion implied the return of 
Germany’s colonies. Historians regarded colonies as a channel through which to 
explore German power beyond its borders, and it provided critical elements for their 
public empowerment. They sought to project an image of British political culture that 
was cosmopolitan and outward looking, and they also wanted pragmatism for Anglo-
German relations. UK interwar historians conducted themselves as public 
intellectuals who analysed the implications of Germany’s increased capacity to 
project power beyond its borders. It was on the matter of the UK’s policy to 
Germany’s lost colonies that Dawson and Beazley again appealed for change. They 
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wrote that, 
 
[i]t ought to be possible to find a safe and a satisfactory [sic] via 
media. Without presuming to make definite proposals we would 
suggest that the largest renunciations still practicable would involve 
but a slight sacrifice by Great Britain and France, which even 
without the confiscated German colonies possessed territories (the 
British Dominions not counted) so much vaster and richer than 
their Teutonic neighbour. We would mention further that no 
existing nation except our own has distinguished itself so greatly as 
the German in the spheres of exploration, scientific and particularly 
pathological research, and pioneer settlement.56  
 
UK historians such as Dawson and Beazley used the issue of Germany’s 
confiscated colonies as a tool to persuade senior public figures that a re-evaluation of 
Germany’s international role was needed. Historians’ awareness of Germany’s long-
term developments in foreign policy motivated these historians to focus on colonial 
matters specifically. For instance, Dawson wrote the Introduction to a book authored 
by Dr Heinrich Schnee, the former Governor of German East Africa, in which 
Dawson emphasised his disagreement with British policy by writing ‘[i]t is not 
comforting to be told that it is permissible to ignore territorial treaties which stand in 
the way of national interest.57 
 
UK historians believed that their country’s national interests would be better 
served by building a stronger basis for Anglo-German relations to develop, and not 
by viewing British interests narrowly. Historians sought norms-building institutions 
to embed international peace and German democracy. They continued to believe that 
the League of Nations represented a potential framework in which British interests, 
German friendship, and multilateral cooperation could develop. UK interwar 
historians’ fame as orators demanded their involvement at public speaking 
engagements. Lecturers in diplomatic history, such as A. J. Grant, were seen as 
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‘missionaries’, who could disseminate history that aimed to inculcate peacemaking 
with Germany.58 Historians such as Grant participated in ways that approximated 
community outreach. Grant did this at universities, colleges, schools, public lectures, 
and to branches of the League of Nations, the Historical Association, and to 
philosophical and literary societies.59  
 
Arthur James Grant was born on 21 June 1862, and schooled at Boston 
Grammar School and at King’s College, University of Cambridge. In 1884, Grant 
graduated with a BA in Classics. Grant worked as a University Extension Lecturer. 
From Grant’s papers, it was written that ‘[t]hese early lecturers were, in a real sense, 
missionaries, knowing that upon their shoulders lay the responsibility of imparting 
both knowledge and wisdom to those who were clearly now going to play a much 
more active part than they had ever played before in the affairs of mankind’.60 In 
1897, Grant was Professor of History at Yorkshire College, which became the 
University of Leeds in 1904. The historian and educationalist, Sir Michael Sadler 
reportedly said that, ‘[h]e is one of the best speakers in Britain’.61 Grant was reputed 
to be a gifted orator, and addressed the Historical Association, various schools, 
colleges, League of Nations branches, philosophical and literary societies, Men’s 
Fellowships and Women’s Institutes. Between 1897 and 1927, Grant was Professor 
of History at the University of Leeds. Between 1930 and 1932, he taught at the 
University of Egypt, Cairo as a Professor of Modern History. Grant died on 24 May 
1948. 
  
UK interwar historians were influential voices, who managed to analyse 
Germany’s international power through peacemaking institutions while remaining 
conscious of British interests. Historians amplified their voices in two main ways. 
The first was in framing how peaceful coexistence with Germany was discussed in 
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public space. The second was their preoccupation with bodies such as the League of 
Nations. In these ways, the historians shaped the UK’s perceptions of German power 
along and beyond its borders, and set an important role for themselves in the process.  
 
UK historians were political activists who believed their analyses of Anglo-
German relations were vital to increase support for the two countries’ positive 
relationship. Historians viewed the League of Nations and coloniality as central 
means through which to analyse German power beyond its borders. Further to this, 
historians assessed sovereignty, conflict and migration as further elements of German 
power outside its borders. Historians strove to be public intellectuals, who analysed 
the justice of Germany’s interwar borders. UK historians’ analyses consolidated the 
public space in the process. Thus, the historians of this thesis pursued two parallel 
tracks. The first sought Germany’s power to be enveloped within structures that 
could increase British interests, while the second resulted in the firming of the UK’s 
public space.  
 
The Reshaping of Germany’s Borders 
Historians sought to occupy a niche for themselves as a collection of individuals who 
understood Germany, and where their identity was distinguishable by their 
arguments as both historians and public intellectuals. Some of the historians of this 
thesis observed that a strong Germany would be useful for British interests, and 
sought to enable this through their interpretations of interwar Germany’s power. 
They expressed these views as intellectuals, who recognised the effects of post-war 
events on Germany’s sovereignty. After World War I, new polities had been 
established on the grounds of national self-determination, but this had resulted in 
large numbers of Germans who now lived outside the state identified as their own.62 
These former ‘Reich Germans’ conceived nationalism within paradigms of ethnic 
identity, rather than ‘state borders’ that did not align with their experience of 
reality.63 Underlying it all was UK historians’ perceptions that Anglo-German 
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relations had been unnecessarily complicated by the reshaping of Germany’s borders. 
 
UK historians’ views about Germany’s reshaped borders were expressed in 
their commentary about Germany’s relationship with the countries that neighboured 
it, many of which had been newly created in the interwar era. Historians offered a 
wellspring of contributions about aspects of reshaped borders on lands that abutted 
Germany. These focused on concepts that conferred legitimacy to polities, and 
included sovereignty, independence, jurisdiction, and nation-states’ rights to absolute 
authority in its territories. Some historians viewed Germany as a potential threat as 
well as a partner. Fisher, for example, prepared the book, The Åland Islands, under 
the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office. He was concerned about 
the Åland Islands’ historical vulnerability to powers such as Germany, once the latter 
re-emerged as a power that could project its influence.64  
 
 
Contemporary geopolitical and strategic conditions set much of the context 
for UK interwar historians’ work about Germany’s reshaped borders. UK historians 
believed that the new circumstances of the Russian Revolution, and the revolutions 
that had erupted in Germany at the end of World War I, ensured that Germany would 
seek to be closer aligned and politically oriented toward the Soviet Union.65 In the 
early interwar era, the British ambassador to Germany, D’Abernon, noted the 
importance of German Chancellor Joseph Wirth and the Foreign Minister, Walter 
Rathenau, who ratified the Treaty of Rapallo. This Treaty established diplomatic 
relations between Germany and the Soviet Union on 16 April 1922. Historians 
reported that the German elite emphasised to their compatriots that the country’s 
isolation required it to secure allies.66 The Soviet Union was the only power left that 
met Germany’s requirements. France threatened Germany’s western borders, and 
new polities created by the Versailles Settlement threatened the country’s eastern and 
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south-eastern frontiers.67 D’Abernon asserted that British policy stabilised those 
called the ‘Western Party’ in Germany.68 These circles sought to deepen the 
economic relationship with the United States of America and the UK.69  
 
Many Britons rationalised that Germany’s renewed prowess would provide a 
bulwark against Communism, and should be supported with this aim in mind.70 
Historians saw the relationship between Germany’s borders and Communism as an 
intersection between British interests and ideology. Historians gave the impression 
that their comments were uniquely informed by virtue of their occupation as 
historians and public intellectuals. They received news about what the specifics of 
Communism might mean for the UK. Historians’ perspectives about Communism 
varied, though they continued to lobby and disseminate their views widely. At the 
end of World War I, German military formations had suppressed Communist 
uprisings within Germany; one example of the Weimar Republic’s catalogue of 
political turmoil and economic crises.71 The Soviets’ triumph in Russian Civil War 
became a reference point in UK historians’ deliberations about Communism.72 The 
emergence of Nazism would later be seen as a counterweight to forces sympathetic 
to Communism. For many within the UK, the Soviet Union represented sinister 
challenges that exceeded the threat from Nazi Germany.73 UK historians held that the 
dangers of Communism threatened the global needs of the British Empire, 
significantly affecting the UK’s policy towards Nazi Germany.74 
 
Some UK historians observed that Nazism’s hostility to Communism entitled 
it to the UK’s acceptance above any other considerations. Public intellectuals’ 
suspicion of Communism was reinforced by the re-emergence of conservative ideas 
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in Weimar Germany, as well as respect for Hitler’s achievements.75 Just after the 
Nazis solidified their position in Germany, the Comintern proclaimed that trade 
unions, Socialists, and Communists should cooperate to defeat Fascism.76 Peace 
groups that historians had earlier associated with, however, now mostly viewed 
Communism with either neutrality or sympathy. Peace groups on ‘the Left’ remained 
distrustful of each other’s motives, and were very mindful of having their agendas 
co-opted.77  
 
Germany’s reshaped borders set part of the context for UK historians’ 
analyses regarding spheres of influence and ideology. Herbert Butterfield contributed 
‘his only projection into the public sphere in these years’ in 1933, when he wrote his 
views on aspects of Communism in the Scrutiny magazine.78 Butterfield was hostile 
to how Communism seemingly elevated what was termed ‘science’, but dismissed 
religion.79 He believed the writer, Herbert George [H. G.] Wells wrote in a manner 
that harmed his notion of God in history.80 He was opposed to what he saw as the 
increasing acceptability of Communist conceptions of history and progress, which 
accelerated in the later years of the interwar era.81  
 
Historians’ knowledge of the Soviet Union influenced their perspectives of 
UK politics. Gooch’s left-orientated opinions provide one example of this, which 
were shared by many in the Liberal Party, of which he was a member. He 
appreciated the Labour Party’s goals and was hostile to the Conservative Party’s 
platforms. Gooch’s frustration with the Liberal Party related to what he believed was 
its ineffectual stance towards the Soviet Union.82 Furthermore, in December 1937, 
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Temperley presented a segment on BBC radio entitled ‘Revolution in Russia – 
Twenty Years after the Bolshevik Triumph’.83 The BBC asked Temperley to narrate 
the show because they held him to be a detached commentator on political issues. 
Temperley presented the program, however, some UK listeners thought that he was 
overly generous in his portrayal of the Soviet Union.84 This was notable as 
Temperley remained nominally opposed to the Soviet Union. 
 
UK historians analysed Germany’s diplomacy and retained their interest in 
the formation of global alliances.85 On 27 November 1922, the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Lord George Curzon, was informed by his staff that Germany would 
only approach the Soviet Union for a Treaty if rejected by other powers. Historians 
argued that Germany preferred to be associated with neutral and strong countries. If 
Germany was threatened by other powers that sought its encirclement, then 
Germans’ only choice was to adopt a policy of ‘close intimacy with her great 
neighbour on the East’.86 D’Abernon emphasised that if the UK or the United States 
of America declined closer associations with Germany, then Germans would 
‘unquestionably’ seek help from the Soviet Union.87 Yet, he noted with relief, that 
the Germans had misgivings and suspicion about the Soviets. D’Abernon, and others, 
were encouraged by Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno’s moves to seek closer relationships 
westwards. However, D’Abernon felt that the chief of the Russian section of the 
German Foreign Office, Baron Ago von Maltzhan, would seek to stymie such 
moves.88  
 
UK historians were cognisant of the salience of realist impulses throughout 
history, and were aware that forces within Germany that were dissatisfied with the 
new borders would seek to reassert themselves once stronger. UK historians, such as 
Pollard, used interwar concepts of reshaped frontiers to analyse German power 
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beyond its borders. Pollard was exasperated as he explored the precepts that guided 
British foreign policy towards German sovereignty. He wrote, ‘[w]hat is it? As a 
whole?’89 The solutions to the query encapsulated the dilemmas of public 
intellectuals whose investigations of interwar German sovereignty overlapped with 
the attention now given to international relations in academia. Some of these 
perspectives emphasised states’ existence within an anarchical system. One of 
Pollard’s answers to this question included British Foreign Secretary George 
Canning’s classically realist comment that it was a case of ‘every nation for itself’.90  
 
For UK historians, Germany’s relationship with France epitomised the 
quandaries that were associated with dealing with reshaped borders and sovereignty. 
D’Abernon hinted that French motives had sinister applications, since they coveted 
the coke reserves of the Ruhr.91 Regions such as the Ruhr had much technology 
located within their boundaries, demonstrating the potential of Germany’s post-war 
power.92 The French knew of the significance of the Ruhr in wartime, and the UK 
suspected that they wanted the whole industrial region of Germany annexed. 
D’Abernon ominously noted that such an occurrence ‘would affect the whole balance 
of power in Europe’.93  
  
Historians in the early interwar period discussed Germany’s reshaped borders 
in the context of Germany’s relations with France. On 10 August 1922, Sanders 
affirmed that the UK was determined to see that its rights were honoured by both 
Germany and the Allied powers.94 On 7 October 1922, the UK journalist and 
political advisor Sir Malcolm Fraser wrote to Sanders and mentioned a recent 
meeting with the former ambassador to France, Lord Derby. At the meeting, Derby 
had informed Fraser that he was ‘strongly’ opposed to the UK’s foreign policy, 
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especially towards France. Sanders communicated his displeasure to the incoming 
Lord Privy Seal and the Leader of the House of Commons, Austen Chamberlain, 
who had studied for a period in Berlin.95 On 7 February 1923, D’Abernon wrote 
from Berlin,  
 
[i]n Germany, the invasion of the Ruhr has strengthened the belief 
that political and territorial advantages were the real objective, and 
this conviction has featured largely in recent speeches of German 
statesmen.96   
 
The fluidity of Germany’s borders was represented in the fate of its non-self-
governing territories. Dawson and Beazley claimed that the dispossession of its non-
self-governing territories was unjustified, and unreasonable given its consequences 
for Germany’s public space. They asserted that the ‘ruthlessness’ of the measure 
corresponded to a continuation of war.97 They lamented the public feelings after 
World War I that was ‘typical of Versailles and of 1919’.98 The British, French and 
Italians claimed to have annexed Germany’s territories legitimately at the beginning 
of World War I. Dawson and Beazley reasoned that ‘[no] minds, indeed, except 
those dominated by strong hatred and total ignorance could have accepted the 
extravagant and unproved indictment’.99 Following World War I, Germans imagined 
their national borders to have been violated, and many worried that their humiliation 
correlated to the colonial treatment that was given to ‘non-European countries’.100 In 
their memorial to Prime Minister Baldwin, Dawson and Beazley wrote, 
 
[t]he argument (we used so freely at Versailles and since 
Versailles) that the German colonies of little value, and therefore 
might well be confiscated in toto (‘They never would be missed’) is 
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worthless except as a piece of macabre humour. It is unworthy of 
serious politics in the civilised world, and we protest against its 
cynicism and its hypocrisy. On broad grounds of political decency, 
we submit, it is right – on grounds of statesmanship it is entirely 
wise - to refuse to adopt an absolute stone-wall attitude on this 
question. Are we asked to restore all? Are we determined to refuse 
anything?101  
 
UK historians involved in government agreed that if British overtures to the French 
to desist from annexing German territory proved ill-starred, then they would have to 
independently open another communication channel with the Germans. Sanders 
noted that Lloyd George thought that if the French were intransigent in the Ruhr, 
then ‘European opinion’ would have forced French Prime Minister Raymond 
Poincaré to change his policy.102  
 
Historians were aware that their country had to balance competing interests 
when it came to assuaging Franco-German disputes, and this reinforced views in 
favour of closer Anglo-German realignment. UK historians characterised French 
actions as a strategy to build its industrial capacity at Germany’s expense. They 
thought that French politicians and military officers drove efforts to bring the 
Lorraine and Ruhr industries under French control.103 In 1923, Sanders wrote that the 
French were ‘more difficult than ever’ to deal with.104 He commented that ‘[w]e shall 
have to take a line that the French will want’, rather than risk overt opposition.105 
  
D’Abernon noted the likelihood that the notion of the Balance of Power 
would predominate in Europe again.106 However, he feared that Germany’s 
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disarmament had created a security vacuum in Europe by 1922, because the 
Commission of Control had succeeded so dramatically to reduce the strength of 
Germany’s army and navy.107 In response, Germans hoped for a pliable ‘line of 
buffer states from the Baltic to the Black Sea’ to separate it from the Soviet Union.108 
While Germany was disarmed, other European powers did not.109 Germany had 
emerged from World War I as the most powerful of the beaten powers, but many 
worried that the costs of victory had made the UK ‘war shy’.110  
 
UK historians used past conflicts as a point of reference to rationalise 
Germany’s assertiveness about its interwar borders. D’Abernon recorded that the 
geography of the German border made French concerns about the Ruhr 
understandable. He informed Curzon that the geography of the Franco-German 
border meant that each neighbouring country was compelled to defend ‘two passages 
or defiles – one 70 miles broad – the Palatinate and the Cologne Neck’.111 He 
acknowledged that the French had made ‘determined efforts…to secure the 
Palatinate’, which was an historical route for invasions.112 However, his telegram to 
Lord Curzon stated that the German public was opposed to British troops evacuating 
Cologne. The telegram declared that the feeling was prominent in ‘military and 
socialistic circles’.113 France’s vulnerability over the Cologne Neck was dealt with 
by the French troops’ ‘persistent occupation of the Rhine ports, Duisburg, Ruhort 
and Düsseldorf’.114 Gooch viewed this from the German point of view, by arguing 
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that the country’s geography impressed upon its people that they had ‘open’ borders 
that were vulnerable to encirclement by potentially hostile powers.115  
 
Temperley underlined the centrality of sovereignty in contexts where 
potential population movements were considered. Temperley wrote to Keynes that 
the Germans had ‘played their cards very badly’ on matters that concerned 
reparations. He noted that this complicated their positions when they had argued 
against Germany being dismembered. Temperley affirmed that ‘upper Silesia…must 
remain with Germany’, because this would make reparations more manageable.116 
Other locations of substantial German populations were not resolved so easily, 
however. Germans had settled in Eastern Europe for centuries, but felt that their 
historical presence was disregarded following World War I.117  
 
Migration and its aftereffects contributed to a number of later works by UK 
historians, as they grappled with questions about Germany’s borders and 
sovereignty. Upwards of a ‘million former citizens’ of Germany felt marooned by the 
effects of the Treaty of Versailles.118 Dawson and Beazley were indignant at the 
effects of ‘secret treaties’ that they believed had created such conditions.119 
Afterwards, German communities in new states were coined as ‘unreal’ or 
‘minorities of fate’.120 Before World War I, Germans had formed transnational 
communities that ‘reached beyond Germany’s borders’.121 UK interwar historians 
explicitly connected migration with German power outside its borders.  
 
Significant circles within interwar Germany wanted the Peace Settlement and 
Germany’s reshaped borders revised.122 Furthermore, World War I and its aftermath 
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brought forth a period of migratory flows in Europe.123 Germany was a migratory 
country, and Germans had settled overseas in great numbers over several 
centuries.124 After the war, however, pan-Germans sought to spark Germany’s 
‘national awakening’ by repositioning millions of Germans who resided outside its 
borders.125 Labour migration had been the majority experience of German migration 
before World War I, but the early interwar era was a time of ‘forced population 
movements’.126 Again, UK historians maintained that the position of German 
migrants should have elicited their compatriots’ sympathy.  
 
UK historians included migration, colonies and German power beyond its 
frontiers as related subjects that they used to excite opinion in the public space. 
Dawson and Beazley noted that the requirements for the peace agreement in 
December 1918 had called for the dispassionate resolution of all issues regarding 
colonies. They recalled comments by the American Secretary of State, Robert 
Lansing, who had stated that such requirements had been ‘completely ignored’ and 
that President Wilson agreed to measures undertaken with reluctance.127 Dawson and 
Beazley continued to argue the connections between the colonial issue and 
migration, when they wrote 
 
[t]his is proved by the fact that, after expropriation had been 
determined on, he [President Wilson] yet pressed for such a 
restoration of colonial territory to Germany as would make her 
independent in the matter of tropical raw materials, and give her 
reasonable scope for emigration… Since the war no question has 
been discussed more generally and more actively in Germany than 
this of the colonies.128  
 
 
UK historians were cognisant of the ‘vital importance’ with which Germany 
regarded the Polish issue. Historians understood the reasoning behind the British 
goal to prevent Germany from becoming overly ambitious, and sought to direct 
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German power towards aims that did not threaten the UK. A large part of their 
activities included analysing the new states of Central and Eastern Europe, such as 
the contested legitimacy of Poland.129 Critically, the many Germans within the 
borders of newly-made states made the plight of their compatriots living beyond its 
borders a priority for the Weimar and Nazi governments.130  
 
Historians deliberated on the fact that Germans were at the heart of the post-
war migration flows. Some thought that a restrengthening of Germany’s geopolitical 
situation could see Germany ‘make up in the East for all that she has lost in the 
West’.131 Many Germans who were disillusioned with the Weimar Republic did want 
to migrate to the Baltics and areas of the Soviet Union.132 Polish assertiveness, and 
German hostility to them, complicated how the British dealt with migratory issues.133  
 
UK interwar historians participated in academic networks and exchanges that 
examined aspects of migration in interwar contexts. The Second Anglo-Polish 
Conference was conducted on 10 and 11 March 1935, and included the visit of Polish 
historians to Cambridge. On 11 March 1935, Temperley gave a speech on ‘British 
Policy towards Poland during the War’, as well how the Versailles Peace Settlement 
had affected the realities of German power beyond its frontiers.134 Changes to 
Germany’s borders presented clear challenges to the Weimar Republic. Countries 
warred over where borders were positioned and attempted to have migratory 
movements controlled.135 Winson Chu reveals the visceral nature of how borders 
were discussed in the public space. He wrote that: 
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[a] common tool of suggestive cartography was the geo-organic 
portrayal of the state as a living organism. The lost eastern 
territories were shown as being brutally ripped from the body of the 
German Reich, thus reinforcing political catchphrases such as 
‘bleeding borders’.136  
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CHAPTER 6: ETHICS, MORALITY AND THE NAZI 
PARTY 
UK interwar historians’ views of Nazi Germany emphasised their own difficult 
positioning in public space. As intellectuals, UK historians sought to shape views on 
the Nazi Party by contextualising current events through contemporary and historical 
analyses. This chapter shows how the historians’ work contributed to the UK 
public’s discussions of the Nazi Party, and sought to interpret the phenomenon of 
Nazism in the interwar period. The chapter argues that UK historians’ analyses can 
be characterised by two central approaches. The first explores sympathy for 
Germany, whose later manifestations became associated with the policy of 
appeasement. The second investigates UK historians’ hostility towards Nazi 
Germany, as disagreements developed between the two countries. The chapter argues 
that UK interwar historians’ interpretations of the Nazi Party reinforced their public 
role, notwithstanding their differing perspectives. 
 
UK historians’ analyses of ethics, morality and the Nazi Party consolidated 
their role as public intellectuals. This drew on their previous credibility through 
public and private networks. Their analyses of Germany within the interwar period’s 
parameters of Nazism (from 1933 to 1939) show how themes of ideology, security, 
sympathy and hostility were incorporated in their work to show the distinctiveness of 
the Nazi Party within the firmament of interwar Germany.  
 
Understanding the Nazi Ideology 
UK interwar historians believed that they could best promote their country’s interests 
by analysing the motives that underpinned the Nazi ideology. UK historians 
emphasised the importance of ideology in their investigations of the Nazi Party’s 
origins. Their commentary entwined Germany’s internal situation with broader 
concerns regarding Anglo-German diplomacy and interwar totalitarianism. In doing 
so, they acknowledged that their analyses of Nazism were strongly influenced by 
Germany prior to World War I.  
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Historians acknowledged that pragmatism was central to the British public’s 
perceptions of the Nazi Party’s morality. Philip Noel-Baker believed that Germany 
could have been made to re-enter the League of Nations after its withdrawal from 
that body in October 1933, but that the option was unlikely to succeed without 
‘getting rid of Hitler’.1 He wrote that ‘[t]he basic fact was that too many people in 
Britain’ desired the Nazi Party to remain in power.2 Noel-Baker continued that many 
Britons ‘wanted Hitler to fight the Communists. They believed the only way to do 
this was smash up Russia and the communist regime was to let the Nazis do it’ [sic].3 
The involvement of British diplomats, of whom a large number were historians, was 
seen as necessary for the maintenance of peace at a time of international tension.4 
According to Robert Sanders’ diary, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin ‘spoke of an 
agreement’ that set out key understandings between the UK and Germany should 
relations become hostile.5 Historians such as William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond 
Beazley, however, maintained that ‘national opinion’ in the UK was on their side, 
and supported their advocacy of ‘friendly cooperation’ between the UK and Nazi 
Germany.6  
 
The more sympathetic historians, such as Dawson and Beazley, sought to 
emphasise that cooperation was to both country’s benefit. They impressed upon 
Baldwin the view that Adolf Hitler was ‘earnest’ in his desire for ‘amicable 
cooperation’ with the UK.7 Some Germans noted that their plans for victory in a near 
future conflict would depend on the UK’s neutrality.8 Henry Wickham Steed agreed 
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with this view, and cautioned that the UK’s non-involvement in Europe would 
encourage Germans to take greater risks. Steed wrote ‘[a]nother great war, from 
which we could not hold aloof, would be the inevitable result of a British policy of 
now neutrality’.9 Henry Wickham Steed was born on 10 October 1871. Wickham 
Steed attended Sudbury Grammar School, Winchester College, and New College, 
University of Oxford. He was also educated at the universities of Berlin, Jena, and 
Paris. He was an historian newspaper editor and journalist. In 1896, Steed was 
employed by The Times and worked as a foreign correspondent. Part of his 
assignments based him in Berlin and Vienna. He became foreign editor of The Times 
in 1914, as well as editor for additional, varying periods. Between 1923 and 1930, 
Steed edited Review of Reviews. Steed died on 13 January 1956. 
 
UK historians sought to contextualise Germany’s apparent return to 
assertiveness. UK historians considered Germany’s rearmament to reflect the Nazi 
government’s aim to produce armed forces that could achieve the power they felt 
Germans were entitled to. Sanders recorded that Hitler had revealed his intentions to 
expand the German army and navy.10 Philips Price also maintained that Germany 
appeared to be on a course to re-establish its formidable army. He suggested that the 
initial task was to reimpose domestic stability. After that, he predicted its 
reorientation to project power.11  
 
Historians continued to use their earlier post-war prominence to analyse 
Nazism. In early 1933, Dawson observed that the growth of Nazism was 
understandable given the Treaty of Versailles, and felt that its aim to erase 
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‘monarchy and militarism’ had clearly failed.12 Dawson noted at the time that 
Germany’s President, Paul von Hindenburg, and the new Chancellor, Hitler, had 
been soldiers, and that they were ‘both at heart staunchly monarchist in sentiment’.13 
Dawson regarded the affection which Germany’s young had acquired militarism as a 
form of poison.14 He also believed that Nazi Germany could be restrained in its 
ambitions, if the UK extended sufficient overtures of goodwill. Public intellectuals 
such as these maintained that the Treaty of Versailles was the source of troubles for 
Anglo-German relations. In the event that the Treaty’s negative aspects were 
rescinded, then they imagined that Nazi Germany would adopt a ‘much more 
reasonable’ posture.15  
 
UK interwar historians hoped that Nazism might be moderated. On the Nazi 
Party’s assumption of power, some historians perceived it to be just another German 
government that would moderate over time and with diplomacy. Other historians, 
however, suspected that Nazism represented a more sinister iteration of German 
history. George P. Gooch openly opposed ‘the Nazi leaders’ in July 1933, when he 
addressed a public gathering of the National Peace Congress in Oxford.16 The UK 
historian and former foreign editor of The Times, Steed, similarly viewed Nazism 
with hostility.17 Steed’s series of lectures included talks to the League of Nations 
Union (LNU), as well as a joint Anglo-American group.18 The later interwar 
machinations of Nazi Germany confirmed the doubts of many historians. Yet many 
of their number drew a distinction between Germany as they liked to have perceived 
it, and the manifestations of Nazism. 
 
Germany’s potential power made analysis of Nazism all the more crucial. 
Historians observed that Britons’ support for Nazi Germany increased after the 
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Rhineland was remilitarised.19 The Nazi movement itself drew on the past to excite 
support. Nazism affirmed that aspects of its culture that related to Germany occupied 
the zenith of ‘Nordic and European civilisation’.20 Baldwin regained the prime 
ministership within two months. Historians underscored that Germans believed that it 
was their duty, indeed their destiny, to reinvigorate Europe.21 Harold Temperley 
supported the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, in his actions with 
Germany, and Chamberlain referred to Temperley’s books on nineteenth-century 
British diplomacy as a guide for his discussions with Nazi German leaders at 
Berchtesgaden, Godesberg and Munich.22 Herbert Butterfield respected how Nazism 
had restored many Germans’ self-confidence. In late 1938, he had lectured in 
Germany in late 1938, and was friends with many German historians.23 The 
historians continued to draw on their personal networks to access privileged 
information and to produce high impact analysis of the new Germany. 
 
Historians were able to suggest why Germans responded to Nazism as part of 
broader trends in German history. It was known that the former establishment and 
upper-class German elites still supported ideas that had been ascendant before World 
War I.24 More typically, however, the UK historian, elected representative and well-
known Labour commentator, Price, suggested that ‘Hitler’s crowds contain people 
who, if they leave him, as they may in the future, will go straight to the 
Communists’.25 Alfred Zimmern also highlighted the malleability of apparently rigid 
ideologies, and suggested that this was part of Germans’ evolution in response to so 
many traumatic events.26 H. A. L. Fisher concurred that the growth of ‘Hitlerism’ 
was attributable to the effects of Germany’s defeat in World War I, rather than solely 
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the Treaty of Versailles.27 Fisher felt that his fellow Britons had exaggerated the 
permanence of Germans’ sense of being defeated. He claimed that the interwar 
period was an incubator for militaristic movements in Germany in general, and any 
hope to resist it was ‘unfortunately, wrong’.28 Price had come to similar conclusions 
earlier when he wrote in 1932 that 
 
 
[i]t is all too clear that the spirit of militarism has shifted from Paris 
to Berlin… Poincaré’s mischiefs in the Ruhr and our ‘National’ 
Government’s obstruction at Geneva have sown dragon’s teeth 
which are sprouting in Potsdam. There is a danger that public 
opinion is not fully alive to the gravity of the situation in Germany. 
It is easy to regard the Papen regime as the lesser of two evils, 
when compared with a possible Hitler regime. Papen does at least 
stand for a Government which observes the decencies and 
formalities of our civilisation. Political murder gangs were the 
curse of Germany when I lived there after the war. The situation is 
worse now. But if the Papen regime is making some attempt to 
prevent Germany from sinking into the conditions of the Thirty 
Years War, it is almost more dangerous than Hitler in other ways, 
because it is led by able men with the mentality of last century.29  
 
 
UK historians’ sought to explain the development of Nazi ideology in the 
context of their broader understanding of German history. The elevated importance 
of ethnicity in Nazi philosophy was recognised to be connected closely to 
conceptions of soil.30 The notion of blood and soil [Blut und Boden], encapsulated 
the significance of ancestry and territory. Bucolic signifiers such as these were 
perceived to be embodied in the German peasantry and in notions of Germanness, 
such as Heimat.  
 
This program…revives the age-old characteristics of the German 
people and refers back to pagan myths and prehistory. It is bitterly 
opposed to Communism. National Socialism, then, is a creed of 
racial nationalism, in which a Nordic Volk triumphs over 
everything. Blood and soil produce supermen who together form a 
community in which the individual counts for nothing. Only as a 
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member of the community does the individual have any meaning.31 
 
 
Some UK historians considered Nazi Germany as existing beyond the rules 
normally governing states. Butterfield’s 1938 interview with the Czechoslovak 
leader, Edvard Beneš, informed his impression of the dynamism of Nazi 
totalitarianism. Beneš worried that ‘there is this danger in a totalitarian state – there 
is no press, no public questioning, no parliament, they can mobilise in an hour’.32 
The historian and diplomat, Harold Nicolson, wrote a letter to his colleague Fisher on 
29 September 1938, and derided what he perceived as Prime Minister Chamberlain’s 
timidity in the face of the Nazis. In the instance mentioned, Nicolson evidenced 
Anglo-Italian relations as an example.  
 
 
[t]he Prime Minister has not really got much understanding of 
dictatorial authority, although he seems to have a marked sympathy 
for it. It was only under very great pressure inside and outside the 
Cabinet that he was induced to mobilise the Fleet and I gather that 
even now he does not understand that it was this action which 
frightened Mussolini.33  
 
 
Historians’ public characterisation of totalitarian movements related closely 
to their analyses of British foreign policy. Anthony Eden’s diplomacy was lauded by 
Zimmern in an editorial, characterising Eden’s ‘masterly’ approach to the ‘Saar 
problem’ as an activism that was absent elsewhere in British foreign policy.34 Noel-
Baker later concurred, and thought that World War II would have been avoided if 
Eden’s more assertive approach to Germany had been adopted.35 Fisher monitored 
the development of ideological movements and how they affected the UK’s interests. 
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The then-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax, replied to Fisher’s 
concerns about having ‘belligerent rights’ bestowed upon the Spanish leader, 
Francisco Franco.36 He assured Fisher thus, ‘I fully understand your anxieties on the 
subject of the granting of belligerent rights to General Franco. The position has never 
changed and has been made clear twice in the House of Commons.’37  
UK historians’ international networks and solidarity were vital to their 
conceptualisation of the UK’s international role during the rise of Nazism in 
Germany. This frequently involved the nurture of connections with historians from 
countries under Nazi control. In 1941, historians at the University of Cambridge 
were approached to hold a conference with other historians, or ‘historical workers’ as 
they were termed, from European countries that were engaged in the common fight 
against Nazi Germany.38 They were asked to help the relevant authorities so that the 
conference could be explicitly organised between non-Nazi German historians.39  
 
The Nazi Seizure of Power 
UK historians responded to events around the Nazis’ seizure of power, and its 
subsequent consolidation, with a diversity of opinion. Historians’ reactions to the 
attainment of power of the Nazi Party was itself predicated on the domestic context 
of the interwar UK.40 In the UK, the National Government, formed in 1931, included 
leading Foreign Office personnel who argued that the Treaty of Versailles should be 
revised to forestall an inevitable German overthrow of the post-World War I 
settlement. Historians were aware that the withdrawal of Reparations at the July 1932 
Lausanne Conference was championed by many within the UK, as Germany was 
unable to resume instalments. However, British desires for reconciliation with 
Germany were shaken by the Nazis’ willingness to suppress their internal opponents 
in the initial years after they attained power.41 Historians had varying attitudes about 
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the causality and significance of these developments, and of their relevance for the 
UK.  
 
Hitler triumphed in the elections of November 1932 and assumed the office 
of Chancellor on 30 January 1933.42 The Reichstag Fire on 27 February led to 
Hitler’s portrayal of himself as Germany’s protector.43 The 23 March Enabling Act 
was legislated by the Reichstag and gave Hitler executive authority.44 Political 
violence that had featured at various levels throughout the previous Weimar Republic 
revealed itself in ‘the Night of the Long Knives’, an event which Lewis Namier 
described as a series of ‘massacres’.45 On 30 June 1934, the SS, who comprised the 
Nazis’ exclusive elite, destroyed the leaders of the SA, including its co-founder, 
Ernst Röhm.46 In this event, army General’s von Bredow and von Schleicher were 
also dispatched.47 Namier viewed the 30 June 1934 violence as the ‘Blood Purge’ 
and remarked how the event transformed the army into an instrument of Hitler’s 
will.48 Afterwards, the SS replaced the SA, and Heinrich Himmler became its 
Reichsführer, who was accountable to Hitler. The SS composed a more organised 
and loyal formation than the SA, and would seek to become a counterbalance to the 
army.49 Hitler maintained that he had fulfilled his duty to preserve Germany from 
treason.50  
 
Germany under the Weimar Republic set the context for the political 
upheaval in Germany in 1933 and 1934. William Harbutt Dawson had foreseen the 
fragility of events in Germany following World War I. He commented that ‘thirteen 
years after the enforcement of a Treaty’ which was designed to simultaneously 
dissolve both the monarchy and the martial culture, ‘Germany is today governed by a 
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soldier-president and a soldier-chancellor, both at heart staunchly monarchist in 
sentiment, though faithful to the Republic so long as it lasts’.51 He noted that the 
attempts of Germany’s World War I adversaries to hobble the country were rapidly 
failing and that the policies adopted at the Treaty of Versailles led to the re-
emergence of militarism and to the appearance of the Nazis, whom he called an 
‘intensely nationalist movement’.52 The forces at work in Germany to which Dawson 
referred existed in a spirit of revisionism. For instance, Friedrich Thimme was the 
chief editor of Die Grosse Politik.53 As well as a publisher, Thimme was an historian 
who published the first collection of Germany’s pre-war diplomatic documents, and 
formed the diplomatic record from which much of the history could be ascertained.54 
Thimme avowed that any ‘apologetic tendency, whether nationalist or of another 
kind’ was absent in the publication. In his personal moments, Thimme was inspired 
to work for ‘a substantial rehabilitation of the old regime and, morally at least, of the 
Kaiser’.55  
 
There were qualifications and complexities that defined each historians’ 
individual viewpoints about the Nazis in the early 1930s. Interwar Britons who 
followed Anglo-German relations in the years after the Nazis assumed power 
recognised that there was extensive ‘sympathy for some of the aims and aspirations 
of Nazism (or at least, those aims as they were understood)’, that were maintained 
‘among British intellectuals and politicians’.56 In July 1933, for instance, Dawson 
wrote that the political troubles that Germany experienced was due to the country 
being ‘encircled and disarmed’, and that this situation had spawned a ‘dictatorship’.57 
The Republican system was doomed, with centrist political forces without any 
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influence. Dawson, however, suggested that, far from being destroyed, ‘monarchism’ 
was rising alongside the recreation of ‘militarism’.58 Dawson called German 
nationalism ‘the nursery of militarism’.59 In his work, he mentioned how ‘influential 
men’ had made ‘disturbing threats of violent measures’ to reverse what they saw as 
the prostration of Germany, and that Germany’s politics were a reflection of that.60  
 
The anxiety about Germany’s influence on European stability was shared by 
G. P. Gooch. In September 1933, Gooch wrote of the Nazi assumption of power as a 
revolution that had put the countries bordering Germany in a state of ‘justifiable’ 
anxiety.61 He noted that ‘our nerves are quivering under the impact of these 
successive shocks’ and that his country’s government seemed unsure of maintaining 
a coherent policy towards Germany.62 Following the 30 June 1934 Night of the Long 
Knives, Gooch wrote an essay in the August edition of The Contemporary Review, in 
which he condemned the propensity for violence of the new government in Germany. 
He held that those in the UK should continue to regard Germany as ‘a great and 
friendly nation’ and that the purge in that country not be associated with the German 
people.63 He urged his compatriots to maintain basic liberties in the UK, through 
which ‘better captains’ of Germany could be inspired to emulate.64  
  
By the 1930s, most adherents in the UK of shared forms of Anglo-Saxonism 
were opposed to Nazi Germany’s employment of ‘science’ to discriminate.65 From 
the mid-1930s, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin supported a policy of ‘wait and see’ 
towards developments happening in Germany, a sentiment shared by many within 
the UK.66 In the months before 1934, Baldwin had considered mediators’ advice of 
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travelling to Germany to meet with Hitler, a journey he did not take.67 In 1934, 
however, Henry Wickham Steed was adamant that Nazi Germany ‘had declared war’ 
on whomever they perceived as their political opponents.68  
 
The events within early 1930s Germany drove how many within the UK saw 
the undefined nature of Anglo-German relations. A measure that involved the 
commentary of UK historians and public intellectuals was the steady rearmament of 
the UK onto a martial footing in the 1930s. This directed UK historians’ knowledge 
towards engagement with the press, and it was in the context of uncertainties over 
Germany’s increasing power that the UK started to rearm in 1935. The measures that 
the UK undertook included having the Committee of Imperial Defence enact plans 
for wartime propaganda, part of which included a Ministry of Information.69 
Baldwin, however, was optimistic about Germany when he wrote that the ‘future is 
open’. He sadly noted how Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations was 
the biggest ‘disappointment’ for all who had hoped for peace since the start of World 
War I.70  
 
Historians were among those who were open-minded about the direction of 
events in Germany, but they recognised that their analyses would be seen by 
Germans as that of foreign observers and outsiders. Herbert Butterfield was cautious 
in his outlook on the emergence of the Nazi Party as the government of Germany in 
1933. His interpretations of Nazism were mixed in the years after their takeover of 
power, and like many of his contemporaries, he refrained from examining Germany 
from a narrow focus. It was noted of Butterfield that  
 
 
[l]ike most people Butterfield did not ‘study’ the German situation 
but heard stories about it from those who had visited or who had 
German friends. It is all too easy to see the 1930s as a decade of 
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German obsessions when in fact the Nazi problem often remained 
at the edge of consciousness whilst people got on with their lives in 
a more familiar and palatable milieu.71 
 
Butterfield gave a paper entitled ‘Morality and the Historical Process’ at Columbia 
University in 1956, in which he stated that ‘some things we must leave to 
Providence’.72 Butterfield was asked the question ‘what should the West have done 
with Hitler in 1934 and after?’ to which he answered ‘we had to wait’.73 He was then 
asked to elaborate his answer with the question ‘should we have waited, even in 
1939’? He replied that ‘the West did have to wait until the dangers became overt’.74  
 
Before the period of the later 1930s most associated with appeasement, there 
was a range of views held by UK historians about Nazi Germany. Within Germany 
itself, public responses to the Night of the Long Knives were diverse. The causality 
of the event was met with curiosity by many Germans, though acceptance of the 
event’s justification gradually spread among the population.75 The disorganised 
thuggery of the SA unnerved apolitical Germans and the old guard of the army. 
Indeed, the SA appeared to have been an impediment to order, and a desire for order 
was what prompted enough Germans to vote for the Nazi Party.76 Historians, such as 
Gooch, did not hold Nazism and the German people as synonymous, and later 
backed appeasement because they felt that the policy would weaken the standing of 
the Nazi Party. Gooch opposed the anti-Semitic aspects of Nazism, and in 1934, he 
was supported by his German wife when he shunned cooperation with the German 
Embassy in London.77 Gooch publicly condemned the ‘Nazi leaders’ who he 
predicted would be remembered negatively.78  
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The distinction between historians and other intellectuals mentioned became 
less pronounced as the variety of their views about the Nazis showed. John Wheeler-
Bennett was born in 1902, and was employed by Chatham House and League of 
Nations Union.79 In 1929 he travelled to Germany to establish a horse stud, a venture 
that facilitated his access to the German upper classes. Wheeler-Bennett was 
unpopular with the Nazi Party, and he was targeted by Stormtroopers in the Night of 
the Long Knives. His life was spared on account of a visit to Switzerland, and he did 
not reappear. Afterwards, he wrote books, including a biography of Hindenburg, The 
Wooden Titan (1936).80 In World War II, Wheeler-Bennet was employed by the 
Foreign Office, following which he conducted research at Oxford University. 
Wheeler-Bennet died in 1975.81  
 
The real and perceived achievements of Nazism in its early years of rule 
complicated how its admirers in the UK should express their approval of the 
movement in Germany.82 In 1934, the Foreign Office ensured that Dawson insert 
changes in the second edition of a book about Germany. The changes were about 
portraying Germany in a more benign light. Dawson henceforth defended Germany 
in his second edition.83 Lord Lothian mentioned Hitler’s presumed desire for amity 
between Germany and its neighbours. He noted how he thought that the experience 
of the previous World War would minimise the reoccurrence of conflict. Lothian 
postulated that, ‘I think Herr Hitler wants twenty-five years’ peace. He has often 
said: “I will never fight a war again about a frontier. It would be madness. No 
frontier can be worth the price of a modern war”’.84  
 
Once Germany started to become assertive again, however, some historians 
began to doubt Germany’s innocence about the causality of World War I and the 
injustice of the subsequent Treaty. The notion of ‘shared war guilt’ began to lose 
some supporters because of Nazi Germany’s perceived aggression after it came to 
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power.85 Following the Nazi takeover of power in 1933, critiques of Hitler and the 
Nazi Party as embodying a teleological end-point in German history were promoted 
by ‘exiled historians’.86 This revelation was preceded by UK historians’ knowledge 
of Nazi Germany’s future direction. Sanders’ opinion of senior German leaders such 
as Hermann Göring and Joseph Göbbels was that they ‘were merely gangsters’ of 
Hitler’s entourage.87 Gooch held with pride his name’s appearance on the English 
Black List of Heinrich Himmler.88  
Historians’ sought to envelop the nuances of the contexts that they moved 
across, and used these experiences to provide what they hoped would be seen as 
trenchant analyses, although there was a diversity of opinion. The Nazi regime 
promoted Germnaness to be the antithesis of the cosmopolitanism that represented 
the Weimar Republic. Germanness, according to the National Socialists, was held to 
be grounded in features that were reminiscent of Nordic folklore.89 UK historians’ 
desire to inform audiences about Nazi ideology coincided with their activities in the 
public space. To this end, Dawson and Raymond Beazley gave advice on how 
Germany ought to be approached, and stated that ‘[w]e earnestly plead’ that the 
importance of Nazi Germany ideology was ‘a point [to]…which we ought not to be 
indifferent’.90 Sander’s recounted that Stanley Baldwin had mentioned that Hitler had 
exhibited a degree of ‘uniform ability’ in 1935.91 Some historians increasingly 
adopted a stronger anti-Nazi stance as the 1930s unfolded, however, their hostility 
grew in a context where many Britons viewed the betterment of Anglo-German 
relations to lead towards the general good. The diversity of opinion between 
historians showed that a monolithic view of Nazi Germany was absent. Historians’ 
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views shifted to accommodate new realities, and changed according to the 
circumstances.  
 
[a]nd Germany, under Nazi control, did begin to revive. 
Numerous British visitors in the early years of the Nazi regime 
returned with glowing reports of Germany’s gathering vitality. 
These and favourable press accounts generated a certain 
appreciation for the Germans’ ability to ‘get things done’…And 
they were reinforced by a belief, fostered alike by British historians 
and German propagandists, in basic Anglo-German responsibility 
for the First World War – the idea that different courses of action 
by those two nations could have averted that catastrophe – and the 
feeling that, in combination, it was quite within their power still to 
control the European situation to their mutual benefit.92  
 
 
Perceptions about the singularity of an Anglo-German relationship were complicated 
by the web of interwar, continental European statecraft. Carr perceived the 
emergence of the Nazis as indicative of a trying period that coexisted with a world 
economy that was collapsing.93 E. H. Carr and Namier recognised the fluidity of 
military power in Europe as they pondered the UK’s responses to Germany’s 
dynamism. Carr observed that Nazi Germany’s strength emanated from military 
power, and that Hitler was a ‘revolutionary’ whose focussed too narrowly on the 
German people.94 Namier observed with disapproval the UK’s objection in July 1934 
to uphold European nation’s borders, and to provide a guarantee.95 Carr wrote, ‘I 
remember clearly that I refused to be indignant about Hitler’s re-occupation of the 
Rhineland in 1936 (which coincided with my exit from the F. O.)’.96 Carr thought 
that ‘the Western powers had asked for what they got’ and that it was only 
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Germany’s 1938 occupation of Austria that he ‘began to think of Hitler as serious 
danger.97 No doubt I was very blind’.98  
 
Carr did not oppose Germany’s reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, and 
labelled it ‘a rectification’ for a wrong that had been imposed upon Germany.99 
However, he opposed Germany’s annexation of Austria in 1938.100 Carr had 
travelled to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1937, and later informed listeners 
at Chatham House that Nazi Germany was ‘almost a free country as compared with 
Russia’.101 Lothian regarded electoral democracy in the UK as militating against 
another Anglo-German war, as ‘no government’ could bring the country into a 
conflict against Germany without public opinion demanding it.102 Carr noted that 
Germany’s revived strength ensured that its approach to ‘morality’ would necessitate 
Germans to be ‘completely cynical’ about geopolitics.103 Germans advocated that the 
role of justice between states was important, but that Germany’s interests were better 
served by power. 
 
[B]y the time Germany regained her power, she had adopted a 
completely cynical attitude about the role of morality in 
international politics. Even though she continued to base her claims 
on grounds of justice, she expressed them more and more clearly in 
terms of naked force; and this reacted on the opinion of the status 
quo countries, which became more and more inclined to forget 
earlier admissions of the injustices of the Versailles Treaty and to 
consider the issue exclusively as one of power.104  
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Certainly, the ways in which Nazism was defined by observers in the UK was ‘hotly 
contested’.105 Before 1937, the opposition to appeasement with Germany was not 
substantial and closer relations with Germany were perceived to be harmless.106 
Moreover, before World War II, attitudes about Nazism within the UK were often 
contextualised into what implications it may have for the British Empire and for 
domestic politics, as well as for improving Anglo-German relations.107 Butterfield, 
for instance, was not against appeasement, as he perceived the UK at that time to not 
possess the will or the ability to confront Germany. He observed the UK to be 
‘relatively’ weak, and that this weakness must be remedied to augment any 
diplomatic effort it could muster.108 Namier described World War II as ‘the 
Unnecessary War’.109  
 
Historians’ backgrounds influenced how they perceived Nazism and the 
reasons for its emergence. Namier was driven by incentives that he perceived would 
gain him ‘high social acceptance’. He was closely involved with the Prime Minister’s 
Office, and was periodically approached by ‘Oxford inner-circle people’ who had 
previously ignored him.110 Likewise, R. W. Seton-Watson was among those writers 
whom Richard Evans described as intellectuals ‘of action’.111 These men’s 
enthusiasm for European and German history was interlinked with ‘the increasingly 
violent and chaotic present’.112 The character of Namier and his intensity which he 
regarded his employment represented the contradictions of the interwar era, as he 
simultaneously embodied being an ‘exile and misfit’.113 Namier was notable for the 
historical technique which he popularised. He analysed government by way of public 
figures daily characteristics, rather than ideas and pronouncements. He inspired a 
number of historians who followed his methdology, named the ‘Namierities’, who 
argued that historical methodology based on numerous biographies, known as 
prosopography, was scientific. The Oxford English dictionary included the verb ‘to 
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namierise’ in 1976.114  
 
Historians’ responses to the Nazi takeover of power allowed them to 
comment upon Anglo-German relations during the high point of appeasement in the 
later 1930s. The Night of the Long Knives provided historians with an event from 
which they could contrast publicly their views about Nazi Germany. Later, in World 
War II, historians transferred aspects of their expertise to matters of Allied grand 
strategy. A. J. P. Taylor argued that an opening of a Second Front in Europe would 
increase some difficulties for the Allied War effort.115 Communists opposed this 
reasoning in 1942. Taylor dealt with objections to his views on U.S. forces’ progress 
in Tunis in February 1943, when he mentioned that they were then unable to 
complete the tasks assigned to them. The senior members of the Ministry of 
Information removed him from their roll of orators.116 Taylor believed that 
politicians responded to Germany haphazardly rather than preparing an agenda in 
advance.117 In the 1930s, the extent of radio broadcasting increased, and later in 
World War II, A. J. P. Taylor delivered ‘propaganda broadcasts’, while other UK 
historians were employed in intelligence duties and codebreaking.118 The study of 
recent German history was incentivised by the relevance of events in that country, as 
Richard Evans commented. 
 
The war ripped a number of dons away from their normal academic 
pursuits and plunged them into an unfamiliar, exciting and in many 
ways extraordinary world that they naturally wanted to write about 
after the war was over.119 
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Media Climate 
The British media offered a number of perspectives on German politics from which 
UK historians could both consume and contribute. Historians were publicly involved 
with the British press in the 1930s. Pierre Bourdieu observed that, ‘without being 
necessarily conceived as such’, intellectuals’ work in the public space evolved from 
involvement in journalism and the media, including in the ‘production of newspaper 
articles, participation in petitions or demonstrations, etc).120 The Times had a wide 
readership for those interested in British foreign policy formation, and was regarded 
as ‘the most influential newspaper in Britain’.121 As the newspaper did not have a 
position for foreign editor, its editor, Geoffrey Dawson, directed the news associated 
with foreign, and particularly German, developments. Dawson was well connected, 
and collaborated on Anglo-German issues with Lord Lothian, Philip Kerr, a public 
intellectual and government functionary.122  
 
The Daily Mail was sympathetic to aspects of Nazism in the early thirties, 
however, its proprietor, Viscount Rothermere, severed support for Mosley’s BUF in 
1934.123 The Economist, The Yorkshire Observer, and the Liverpool Daily Post 
published views that were hostile to appeasement to Nazi Germany. The Manchester 
Guardian was an authoritative source about foreign developments from a Liberal 
framework. Its views on Nazi Germany were set in a context of defiance of 
appeasement and opposition to Germany. Furthermore, Liberal policy was expressed 
by widely circulated News Chronicle.124 The Times was a newspaper that a 
prominent German journalist regarded as ‘the greatest paper of England and possibly 
of the world’.125   
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William H. Dawson received a private education and had wrote eleven books 
on Germany before the outbreak of World War I.126 Dawson and his colleagues 
continued writing for the press in the interwar years, paradoxically seeking to 
influence opinions while maintaining a diversity of opinion amongst themselves. 
Hitler had convinced many among the upper and other classes who read newspapers 
that Germany under his rule was the only barrier between European civilisation and 
Communism. As soon as Hitler attained power, he set into motion policies that 
would regain Germany’s pre-World War I strength and its confiscated territories. 
This was paralleled by the use of information and propaganda to justify Germany’s 
regained assertiveness.127 Apart from the Soviet Union, Germany remained the only 
country in Europe that had the potential to dominate the continent with its population 
and ‘industrial war potential’.128 The Times was a newspaper whose editorial line 
over the twentieth century largely correlated with the aims of whatever government 
was incumbent. This position held that of articulating the view of the government in 
‘the field of foreign affairs’. The Foreign Office Press Department’s staff payroll 
included UK interwar historians.129  
 
Alfred Zimmern maintained that the ‘daily newspaper’ of the 1920s was the 
main conduit by which public opinion was shaped.130 According to Jonathon Rose, 
‘at any given point, the reading tastes of the British working classes consistently 
lagged a generation behind those of the educated middle classes, a cultural 
conservatism that often coexisted with political radicalism’.131 The war’s end and the 
resultant Peace Settlement’s treatment of Germany propelled Dawson to seek 
revisions to what he saw as excessively punitive measures against Germany. His 
prescriptions in the standards of the time were considered ‘revisionist’. One such 
book of Dawson’s, for instance, was Germany Under the Treaty (1933). It advocated 
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the revision of ten localities in order to restore the balance back to Germany’s sense 
of dignity and to prevent war.132 Bavaria lost more autonomy than the other Reich 
states under the Weimar Constitution, and there was a customary aversion of 
Bavarian Catholics for Protestant Prussians. Part of this rivalry influenced how the 
Berlin and the Bavarian government disagreed on how to cooperate, and which led to 
differences that climaxed in the ‘audacious revolt of Hitler and Ludendorf in 
1923’.133  
 
UK historians were public intellectuals who sought the growth of a well-
informed citizenry. While the English Historical Review was produced at Cambridge 
University, the Historical Association produced the journal History, a publication 
which held discussions on pedagogy at school. The Historical Association promoted 
the development of civil society in the UK by fostering closer collaboration between 
the public and public intellectuals. These types of intellectuals had previously 
included school teachers who had history Honours degrees in the public and 
grammar schools. Historians G. M. Trevelyan and A. S. Turberville educational 
credentials did not exceed master level. A. F. Pollard, of London University’s 
Institute of Historical Research, advocated for the normalisation of ‘the expert 
historian’ to educate the citizenry.134  
 
Charles Webster perceived Butterfield to have a ‘curious conception’ of 
Hitler.135 During the later 1930s, Butterfield objected to Nazi Germany being morally 
analysed, and hoped that ‘Fascists’ antagonists ‘could be more gentle’.136 Butterfield 
was criticised for his ‘lecture tour’ of Germany following the 1938 Munich 
Agreements. He apparently inferred that the UK had a degree of responsibility for 
how the geopolitical situation developed. He asked rhetorically, ‘what did we do 
wrong? What could we have done to prevent the Germans from feeling that they 
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must turn to Hitler?’137  
 
Historians were involved in developments that were reported as noteworthy 
because of their political association. The media climate of the 1930’s UK showed 
that UK historians’ interest in Germany was shared by their colleagues in the press, 
albeit from various viewpoints. In the later 1930s, advocates of appeasement were 
found outside government. The editor of The Times, Geoffrey Dawson, was notable 
for his support of the policy.  Dawson avoided stories which could ‘hurt’ Germans’ 
‘susceptibilities’, while he inserted articles that mollified German opinion.138 
Following the Czechoslovakia crisis in March 1938, Butterfield accepted a proposal 
from the German embassy in London to talk in Berlin.139 The initiative was 
suggested by Hans Galinsky, who was involved with the Department of English 
Studies in Berlin.140 Galinsky was the Nazi Party’s adjutant for the Hitler Youth 
movement and outreach, and he sought to build connections whilst he worked in 
London, and Manchester.141 Butterfield had earlier accepted Galinsky’s idea to give 
one address in Berlin. This plan changed when other German academics, who had 
affiliations with the Nazi Party, encouraged him to visit several other major German 
cities.142  
 
Most of the books about the Nazi movement that targeted a popular audience 
were hostile towards the Third Reich. In 1936, the Left Book Club (LBC) had works 
published by Victor Gollancz. From 1938 onwards, ‘sixpenny specials’ achieved 
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large print-runs. Germany Puts the Clock Back (1933) was written by Edgar Ansel 
Mowrer in the early thirties, and revised in 1939. 50,000 volumes were bought in its 
first week on sale. What Hitler Wants (1939), by Emily Lorimer, was distributed to 
politicians in the UK and its dominions, Ireland and the United States of America. It 
was also use in schools.143 These publications contributed a wide variety of 
perspectives about Nazi Germany for the British public to consume. It continued the 
development of a context where much Conservative opinion was unfavourable 
towards France while growing closer towards Germany.144  
Security and Nazism’s Rise 
Some historians argued that sentimental attachment to a vague sense of Anglo-Saxon 
heritage risked obscuring the potential danger that Nazi Germany posed the UK. 
Underpinning their analyses was an awareness that Britons could not rely on a 
relationship that was built solely on Anglo-Saxon virtues and proclaimed, good 
intentions of Germany. Instead, they must integrate a recognition of the problems 
caused by the Versailles Treaty with the particularities of the new German 
leadership.  
 
Hitler had declared in a speech on 30 January 1937 that Germans were 
seeking to revise the interwar order on Germany’s former non-self-governing 
territories. Dawson and Beazley maintained to Prime Minister Baldwin that it was 
‘unwise’ to misjudge the importance of ‘the Fuehrer’s statement’.145 Dawson and 
Beazley believed that Germany was entitled to an area of land that corresponded to 
the needs of its population. They noted that whereas France had only 40 million 
people, Germany’s 70 million citizens were ‘confined’ to a smaller land size.146 Not 
everyone agreed with this. Dickinson, for example, thought that a European polity 
was needed, but that it would risk becoming a world power that could harm British 
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interests.147  
 
Historians regarded Germans’ support for the Nazi Party to be directly related 
to Germans’ sense of restored honour. Dawson and Beazley, for example, interpreted 
Hitler’s motives as being shaped by inattentiveness for ‘strong national feeling, 
national pride, and national need’ following World War I.148 In the case of non-self-
governing territories, they postulated that Hitler was ‘indifferent’ to the issue of 
colonies when he produced his ‘famous book’, Mein Kampf.149 In the same year of 
1937, an organisation called ‘The Link’ was formed in the UK to foster closer ties 
with Nazi Germany, and Beazley took a leading role in it.150 Dawson and Beazley 
suggested that Hitler was driven by many of the same considerations that had driven 
the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck.151 Some in the UK even connected 
‘Nazi anti-Semitism’ to be a response to Germany’s debarment from colonies.152  
 
UK historians were increasingly concerned by Germany’s growing strength 
in the later interwar era. The former Prime Minister, Macdonald, warned of the 
dangers of the UK’s unilateral disarmament given continental powers’ rearmament. 
He continued that even a ‘pacifist’ nation and government would be compelled by 
public opinion to undertake preparatory defences to protect the UK.153 Yet, the two 
countries continued to cooperate in military matters. In 1935, the UK and Germany 
had signed the Anglo-German Naval agreement, which regulated the size of the 
Kriegsmarine [German navy] relative to the UK’s Royal Navy.154 It was in the spirit 
of conciliation that Fisher addressed the leaders of Nazi Germany in the late 1930s. 
He declared, ‘[w]e appeal above all to the leaders of the great German Reich at this 
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moment of power and influence in their history’, and called on them to use their 
influence to foster international stability.155 The capacities of historians such as 
Fisher were advanced by widespread interwar public support to avert war.  
 
Sympathy to Nazi Germany 
UK interwar historians argued in the public space that British policy should tolerate a 
more assertive Germany in Europe, and observed that the priorities of the UK and 
Germany could coincide as much as they differed. They sought to reach a common 
Anglo-German understanding so that that the solidarity and cohesion between the 
two peoples could be reawakened. Some UK historians adopted appeasement, and 
presented the policy as concessions that aligned with a long-standing strategy of 
restraint on the part of both the UK and Germany. While the details of the Treaty of 
Versailles were scantly remembered by many Britons, Germans remained 
preoccupied with its contents.156 In this manner, men such as A. L. Kennedy 
presented Nazism as a response to Germany’s having been given just three days to 
agree to their opponents’ terms or risk invasion by the French.157 The German 
delegation had not been welcomed to Paris in the opening months of the drafting of 
the Treaty of Versailles. They were given three weeks to submit written suggestions, 
but had not been allowed to engage in oral consultations.158 By the 1930, all 
Germans retained an intense desire to revise the Treaty of Versailles. The main 
distinction centred on the means, and not the end.159 ‘Hitlerism’, as regarded by The 
Times’ assistant foreign editor Kennedy, was ‘largely a revolt against Versailles’.160 
This view was held up as a ‘fundamental truth’ that had to be observed in order to 
preserve European peace.161  
 
UK interwar historians largely sympathised with the policy of appeasement, 
given their examination of Germans’ response to military defeat. The belief that 
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World War I was not won by any one power grew substantially among Britons in the 
interwar period, particularly among members of the elite.162 Noel-Baker emphasised 
the importance of the Disarmament Conference, and how its failure in 1932 made it 
foreseeable that Hitler and his Nazi Party would dominate Germany.163 After the 
Nazi Party’s assumption of power, some UK historians asked to what extent the 
Germans’ change of government would affect their role in the public space. Their 
responses, of course, differed depending on their perspectives. ‘[T]he question’, 
Noel-Baker suggested, ‘was at what point did you want to have trouble with 
Germany and how much’.164 Such debates directly informed the policy of 
appeasement, given the historians’ presence. A contributor to one of Gooch’s edited 
works at the end of the interwar period suggested that empathy played a role.  
 
 
[i]t is worth speculating for a moment on what would happen in 
England – if she ever lost a war. English people would certainly not 
take a defeat lying down! There would be plots and revolts and 
revolutions until England had once again won her place in the sun. 
This speculation should, therefore, help us to look a little more 
kindly and objectively on the spirit of defiance, the desire for 
another fight and for revenge, which went along with the 
pessimism in Germany immediately after the First World War.165  
 
Some historians argued that there were areas where Anglo-German priorities could 
coincide and that Germany could be incentivised to have modest ambitions. Arnold 
Toynbee argued that appeasement could be characterised by ‘high-minded men who 
had gone to unusual lengths in putting ethical principles into power politics’.166 Noel-
Baker felt that ‘half of them [the elite] were appeasers and half of them were bar 
politics men’.167 Detractors of Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of The Times, insinuated 
that he was unfamiliar with Germany’s history or the German language because but 
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he had studied non-Germanic subjects at Oxford. He was nonetheless reputed by 
many to favour revising the post-World War I settlement for Germany’s benefit.168 
Noel-Baker informed Mr Liddle that he viewed British civil servants, Tom Jones and 
Horace Wilson, as ‘ghastly’.169 Noel-Baker maintained that Jones, Wilson and their 
colleagues ‘honestly believed that Hitler was a nice, good man and if you treated 
nicely with him and were only fair to Germany and gave them some colonies, you 
could perfectly well get on with him without any quarrel’.170  
 
A. J. P. Taylor opposed appeasement in the interwar period, but understood 
that ‘an independent and powerful Germany had somehow to be fitted into 
Europe’.171 Taylor was born on 25 March 1906, at Birkdale in Lancashire. Taylor’s 
education included his time at Oriel College, Oxford University, and attained First 
Class Honours with his graduation in 1927. Taylor often viewed Germany from the 
perspective of what Viennese opinion was, but he had stayed in Berlin in 1928 and 
resented the experience. He disapproved of the Nazis. Taylor’s colleague, Namier, 
had a level of scorn for Germany that predated World War I.172 Throughout the 
1930s and 1940s, A. J. P. Taylor and Lewis Namier both maintained opinions that 
were negative about Germans.173 Taylor died on 7 September 1990.   
 
In contrast, Dawson and Beazley contended that they advocated simply for 
sympathetic interpretations of Germany’s actions in the interwar period. They 
affirmed that their actions in the public space were informed by ‘a love of good faith, 
moderation and justice; and most of all by a deep consciousness of the importance of 
the issues involved’.174 Gooch was similarly held to have a ‘sympathetic’ empathy 
for Germans’ historical and contemporary experiences.175 One of the colleagues of 
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historians of this thesis, Arthur Bryant, was even considered for internment on 
account of his alleged pro-German sympathies.176 A number of Britons sympathetic 
to Germany met near Birmingham in 1938, where they exchanged views, socialised 
and danced. Historians, such as Beazley, were prominent among them and they 
remind that sympathy for Germany was not isolated in society.177  
 
In 1937, Mr Myers, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin’s private secretary, 
described Dawson and Beazley in a short note that was attached to the memorial that 
they had forwarded to be viewed by the prime minister.  
 
  
[I] have not met R. Beazley but I know Mr Harbutt Dawson very 
well before the war. (He did special work for the [sic] B. S. T. and 
found it difficult to conceal his information with official methods!) 
He is a close student of German thought, probably taking a rosy 
view of current manifestations. His friends in Germany would not 
be among the close adherents of Hitler. But I have no reason to 
doubt that what he says in the memorial accurately reflects the 
views of the older and more thoughtful Germans.178  
 
Dawson and Beazley asserted in their memorial to Prime Minister Baldwin that their 
relative sympathy towards Germany was influenced by their ‘knowledge of German 
opinion’, and motivated by their ‘sense of responsibility’.179 They listed their 
credentials by addressing their proficiency on issues of hostility, morality and 
Nazism. Furthermore, they claimed their expertise derived from ‘special study and 
personal contacts’ in Germany that exceeded five decades.180  
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When Chamberlain received a copy of Fisher’s book, History of Europe, he 
wrote in a letter that he had been too occupied with other matters to have found the 
time to read the work. He noted that ‘[a]t the present moment I am too busy trying to 
make the history of Europe to read about it, but when holiday time comes I am 
promising myself a long-deferred pleasure in reading your book which has earned 
such universal and enthusiastic praise’.181 Baldwin had resigned his prime 
ministership in 1937, but kept up correspondences with UK historians. On 10 
September 1939, Baldwin wrote to Fisher that ‘the literary supplement the other day’ 
had numerous inclusions of Professor [Arnold] Toynbee’s works.182 He desired to 
know if his books were ‘suitable for a useless old prime minister in the long, dark 
winter days ahead? …If I can’t improve my walking there’s plenty of room for 
improvement of when I call my mind’.183 
  
Many historians were eager to represent themselves privately as public 
intellectuals who could mediate Anglo-German discussions in the Nazi era. A 
correspondent to Fisher had written that British ‘public opinion’ was opposed to any 
‘aggressive policy’ towards Germany.184 He noted that the public was pacifist on the 
issue, and that this sentiment had grown in scope and loudness.185 Historians were 
directly enlisted to bring the betterment of Anglo-German relations to the attention of 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax. Although the exact identity 
of the author of this letter is unknown, being signed only as ‘Dawson’, his close 
knowledge of key historians strongly suggests it was written by William Harbutt 
Dawson. In his letter, he had written, 
 
 
[i]n the opinion of the government the prospects of peace would be 
served if a letter were published [and] signed by certain 
representative people who had no present contact with politics...if 
you agree to sign it, which I hope you will, you might sign this 
copy and send it straight back to Halifax at the Foreign Office. The 
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men who were not at the meeting and who in addition to yourself 
are being communicated with are – Derby, G. M. Trevelyan, Major 
Temperley, Grant Robinson, Jeans, Edington, Lutyens, Vaughn 
Williams, John Masefield, Michael Sadler, Eustace Percy, Claude 
Elliot, P. H. B. Lyon and Burghley (representing athletics).186  
 
On 16 June 1939, Fisher penned a letter to Halifax in which he asked if other 
initiatives for improving the UK and German relationship had been explored. Fisher 
aimed to ensure that his familiarity and networks within the British government 
would lead to the improvement of Anglo-German ties. Fisher conveyed to Halifax 
his understanding that Nazi Germany’s grievances were not insurmountable. He 
continued that the UK might rely in similar personal contacts to his own as a point of 
departure for further discussions. He had written, 
 
 
[i]s there not anyone in England with a perfect knowledge of 
German and a powerful temperament who could talk to Hitler as 
man to man and explain to him in suitably energetic language what 
the actual position of the British government is, what vast risks he 
is running, and how easy it would be to avoid them...I thought 
perhaps you might like to have these impressions, but of course I 
do not expect an answer.187  
 
Halifax replied on 21 June 1939, ‘I have tried to think of such a man as you mention 
to talk to Hitler, but have not yet succeeded in hitting on anyone to fit the bill’.188 
Historians’ actions were not primarily motivated by sentimentality about Germany, 
and although many felt goodwill for Germans, they still sought to serve the UK’s 
vital interests. Moreover, UK interwar historians maintained lines of communication 
that crossed the public and private spaces. Halifax’s willingness to defer to his 
judgement reveals the extent of Fisher’s embedded presence, and the trust he 
commanded. Halifax continued ‘[i]f you can think of anybody, I would be very 
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grateful if you would let me know’.189  
 
Nazi Germany’s incremental occupation of Czechoslovakia reinforced UK 
interwar historians’ commitment to speak out in public forums. The British 
politician, senior member of the Independent Labour Party and pacifist, Reginald 
Clifford Allen, appealed to Fisher because of latter’s status in the public space. 
Fisher’s fellow academic and politician, Sir Arthur Salter, also played a role in 
seeking Fisher’s assistance in the public space. He noted, 
 
[D]ear Dr Fisher, Sir Arthur Salter has been spending the weekend 
with me, and we both feel it essential that some useful letter should 
be sent to The Times at this critical moment about Czechoslovakia. 
You will realise that the draft which we submit to you studiously 
avoids all the usual ferocious demands that the British government 
should commit itself in any form whatsoever. On the other hand it 
makes a practical proposal which we believe would be of enormous 
service both to our own government and to the governments of 
Germany and Czechoslovakia. I enclose the list of the people to 
whom we have submitted the letter, and we both feel it should be 
headed, for purposes of publication in The Times, by your own 
name as by far the most eminent among us. I should esteem it a 
very great favour if you could let me have your answer by return of 
post, Allen of Hurtwood.190  
 
Historians also maintained their professional contacts overseas. Men, such as 
Butterfield, criticised  the professionalization of Polish and Czech historians and 
attested that some of their functionaries were ‘on the fringes of historical work’.191 
Butterfield maintained that such historians should have instead become integrated in 
government, so that they could better handle ‘peace negotiations’ for when World 
War II ended.192 J. H. Clapham concurred, agreeing that many such historians were 
overly emotional with a penchant for ‘political pronouncements’.193 Clapham wanted 
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to have such ‘research’ analysed, and suggested cynically to Butterfield ‘[l]et us kill 
the bear before dividing his kill’.194 On 23 March 1942, Resolution II of the Informal 
Conference of Historians at Cambridge noted ‘that the resolutions carried out at this 
conference should not be published, but may be communicated privately by 
delegates to their own governments’.195  
 
Hostility to Nazi Germany 
As UK historians’ analyses oscillated between sympathy and hostility, their 
awareness of the strategic threat Nazi Germany posed gradually overrode 
considerations of Anglo-Saxon kinship. They were cognisant that assertions about 
the danger of Germany outweighed any sympathy for that country, and risked 
making their claims about Anglo-German cohesion seem exaggerated.  
 
Historians were aware that characterising Germany as a predator centred 
attention on the needs of British security. Pollard was opposed to the notion of Der 
Staat ist Macht, and worried about states’ focus on an arms race. Pollard blamed the 
German Kaiser for setting the conditions for interwar Anglo-German relations. He 
wrote ‘[m]y protest was against his Prussianisation of England’.196 Pollard used 
aspects of the Sonderweg approach to argue that a sequence of non-democratic 
elements ran through Germany’s history, facilitating the Nazi Party’s assumption of 
power.197 In this manner, they argued that notions of Heimat which had earlier 
attracted UK historians and given German regions their distinctive particularities, 
were now used by the Nazi Party to centralise power.198  
 
Dawson and Beazley used the social capital that they had acquired by writing 
and speaking in the public space to influence political decision makers; they did so in 
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such a manner as to emphasise their capacities as private men. The final paragraph of 
their petition called for greater efforts to be made to ensure that Nazi Germany’s 
interests were treated with sensitivity and equality. They wrote, 
  
 
[r]eading the shallow, sometimes puerile, and invariably egoistic 
reasons which are so flippantly advanced in the public press and on 
political platforms for refusal to consider the German colonial 
claims, we confess to feelings of amazement and anxiety. It is 
absolutely disastrous that so little regard should be paid to future 
Anglo-German relations or to the security of the peace of Europe. 
What could be worse than a renewal of antagonism? No one knows 
better than you, Sir, with your vast experience, balanced judgment 
and deep human sympathy, that a sound statesmanship like your 
own must look far ahead, and anticipate difficulties. We are 
profoundly convinced, as a result of intimate knowledge of German 
opinion, that willingness to meet Germany on this question would 
do more than anything else to deepen and strengthen the 
foundations of our friendship, and that it would win to our side a 
powerful coadjutor in the service of world peace, settlement, and 
stability. We beg to add the assurance that this memorial has not 
been prepared with any thought of publicity, and will not be so 
used. We are Sir, with great respect, Yours faithfully, Raymond 
Beazley, William Harbutt Dawson.199 
 
When the UK declared war on Germany in 1939, all things Germanic became 
interchangeable with Nazi Germany.200 The interwar Permanent Under-Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, Robert Vansittart, moved to ensure that the consistency of his 
opposition to Germany was reflected in any documents published. Vansittart wrote to 
Anthony Eden on 6 February 1943, worried that the documents he had received there 
was ‘[n]one of the memoranda and minutes of warning which I continually showered 
upon successive governments’.201 He lamented that his contribution was only shown 
in an ‘interview with Ribbentrop’, and in how Vansittart had encouraged Germany to 
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be associated with the Soviet Union.202 He had earlier sought to see Germany 
cooperate with the Soviets, and had ‘congratulated’ Ribbentrop on the agreed Anglo-
German Naval Pact.203 Vansittartism, according to the historian, Noel Annan, 
‘resembled the doctrine of original sin’.204 Thus, in respect of Nazi Germany, 
‘Germans were born bad and grew worse. Had they not started five wars in the space 
of a century’?205 Vansittart continued to disseminate his particular construct of 
Germanophobia in broadcasts from 1940.206  
 
Vansittart claimed retrospectively that he had ‘nothing to do’ with the Anglo-
German Naval Pact, and that he ‘did not really approve’ of it.207 With regards to the 
Soviets, he had tried ‘to make the best of a fait accompli in the Russian interest’.208 
Eden’s reply included his assurances that their colleague, the historian E. L. 
Woodward, would have ensured that Vansittart was portrayed benignly in matters 
that concerned his interactions with members of the Nazi Party. He wrote, 
 
 
[I] can assure you that in preparing this collection, regard will be 
paid to the point you have mentioned. E. L. Woodward, who is 
editing the documents, tells me that, as long as he is responsible for 
this work, he will undertake that nothing in them will lay you open 
to misrepresentation, and that, if he has the least doubt on the 
matter, he will seek permission to consult you.209  
 
UK historians understood that the shifts in sympathy and hostility to Nazi 
Germany drew on long-standing British attitudes. Historians were cognisant that 
many Britons’ animosity towards Germans was clearly the product of the very recent 
history of World War I.210 UK historians, such as Steed, believed that the Nazi 
                                                          
202 Ibid. 
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Party’s beliefs represented ‘the negation of Christ and the affirmation of Odin’.211 He 
continued that Germany under the Nazi Party revealed the intolerance of Germans. 
Steed used the Nazis’ hostility to Judaism as a basis for his attacks on the Nazi 
movement. At King’s College, London, Steed gave lessons that were later published 
in multiple editions in book format. This prefaced many other works on Hitler and 
the Nazi Party by Steed, which were later incorporated in books, journals, 
magazines, and broadsheet newspapers. Steed advocated that the ‘Nordic Legend’ 
was one of the keys for understanding the Nazi Party.212  
 
A little more than a month after Britain’s declaration of war against Nazi 
Germany, the Prime Minister of South Africa, Field Marshal Jan Smuts, wrote a 
letter to Fisher in which he sought to encourage his colleague about the upcoming 
conflict with Nazi Germany. He invoked their nation’s common friendship and 
camaraderie during World War I, as well as the gravity of the task that confronted 
historians such as Fisher and his colleague, Gilbert Murray.  
 
Once more we clasp hands in the darkness. When this war broke 
out I thought of your modest confession in your great history that 
you had failed to discover a clear clue to our human story. And 
today the mystery is all the greater, and more poignant than ever. 
Twenty five years after! Still this is a vale of soul making, and 
perhaps human souls and personality are being hammered out by 
the blows of fate. This war makes me think of the old Christian 
conception of Anti-Christ. It is Anti-Christ we are up against, and 
now that the anti-God forces of Nazism and Bolshevism seem to be 
joining hands we are up against a double Anti-Christ. We must 
assume victory for the Cross, and plan a better international order 
for the future. Our Versailles mistakes should not be repeated. 
Cannot you high thinkers begin now already to put on your 
thinking caps and plan the new world? My own mind is in a haze, 
and besides every bit of my time and energy is locked up in 
preparation for the struggle. You and Gilbert Murray and other men 
of good will may begin your planning.213  
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UK historians expressed concern and disappointment with the conduct of 
interwar Anglo-German relations from various angles, but sought not to damage the 
relationship permanently. Throughout their analyses, historians considered the need 
to avoid another war as paramount, and they acknowledged that this influenced their 
earlier interpretations about Nazi Germany. As a public intellectual, Grant reserved 
his harshest critiques for the privacy of his diary. Grant regarded the Nazi Party’s 
assent to power with sadness. However, much of his despondency was directed 
against the conditions that had created war. He wrote that everything in his life that 
he had worked for was now imperilled.214 Grant despaired of the likelihood of the 
impending conflict. In depression, he repeatedly wrote the saying: Si jeunesse savait; 
si vieillesse pouvait [If youth only knew, if age only could] in his diary.215 World 
War II’s progression past the first months into 1940 troubled him, and he lamented 
events in his diary in English, French and Latin. Grant’s anguish manifested itself in 
moments of self-doubt, such as when he wrote that ‘I have interpreted the world 
wrong. I have believed in the strength of humanity, love, truth and how can they 
make head against sheer brutality’?216 With pain he wrote that, ‘[a]ll that I wanted in 
public life is lost’.217  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has provided an account of UK historians’ important roles during the 
interwar period. It situated their analyses of Germany within the history of the 
interwar UK, and considered the extent of their influence on perceptions within the 
UK. The thesis itself is situated as an examination of historians’ roles in the public 
space. The thesis used the historical context of the interwar era to analyse what was 
foremost in UK historians’ minds on the issue of Germany. It suggested that the 
historians’ contributions to the public debate on Germany were recognised because 
of their unique attributes. This recognition ensured that historians were at the fluid 
interface of the public and private space in the interwar UK. 
 
The central research question asked ‘what were UK historians’ roles in 
analysing Germany, and how did they analyse that country in the interwar period?’ 
An analysis of UK interwar historians’ role shows that the flexibility of their 
occupations enabled the public nature of their work. The extent of their influence on 
public debate was also contingent on their role in the shifting public space. The thesis 
discovered that interwar UK historians’ interest in Anglo-German relations played a 
significant role in the evolution of the public space. Historians found that their 
portrayal of post-World War I Germany raised that country’s profile in a manner that 
remained sensitive to Britons’ perceptions. It was in this capacity as public 
intellectuals that they were able to be persuasive across the multiple contexts in 
which they worked.  
 
UK historians’ work in the interwar era was bounded by particular spaces, 
time and issues. Historians’ work in the nexus of public policy and politics provided 
the subtext for their movement across both literal and figurative spaces of public 
debate. A core aspect of the thesis was premised on how UK historians employed 
their intellectual skills to fulfil various roles, but also how they used social networks 
and norms to advance their views. Historians took up multiple responsibilities and 
roles by occupying liminal spaces, but their cultural and social capital remained 
bounded. In essence, the thesis was about men who had a unique combination of 
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social and cultural capital in the interwar era.  
 
The thesis has found that UK interwar historians’ engagement with Germany 
was derived from significant breadth and depth of knowledge. UK historians’ 
engagement with public life raises a question about what made these public 
intellectuals different from other university-trained scholars, such as philosophers. 
The different fields of knowledge that historians worked across made them cognisant 
of the extent to which disciplines, such as philosophy, informed policy. However, it 
was the fluidity of historians’ professional influence that enabled relationships 
between politicians and academics. UK historians’ work was itself a product of the 
context of the post-World War I years, when conditions optimised the need for their 
unique skills. Their sex also facilitated their influence, but there remained something 
unique about historians as a profession.  
 
Education underscored historians’ credibility, and assisted their pursuits 
across time and space. Public schools, Oxford, Cambridge, as well as other 
universities and colleges, continued to be centres imbued with social and cultural 
capital.1 Undoubtedly, the historians’ proximity with such ‘citadels of power and 
influence’ aided their introductions to ‘clubs and other all-male institutions’.2 These 
gatherings found expression in ‘old boy network[s]’ that were similar in outlook.3 As 
public intellectuals, they benefited from the flow of ideas within the interwar UK. 
Historians’ ideas resonated most when their views on Germany coincided with 
popular sentiment. Historians had come from varying circumstances, but their views 
excited support from a range of audiences.  
 
As public intellectuals, the historians sought to increase the profile of Anglo-
German relations in both public and private audiences. From the early interwar 
period, many public intellectuals sought to persuade people that there could be no 
peace in Europe unless the UK focused on Germany’s concerns. They believed that it 
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2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. 
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was in the UK’s interests that public intellectuals prioritised Germany for public 
debate, and that a renewal of European conflict was unlikely if the UK and Germany 
became partners.4 The thesis explored how historians’ pursuit of Anglo-German 
understanding aided in their accruement of social and cultural capital. Thus, UK 
historians’ work about Germany increased the value with which audiences viewed 
the salience of their opinions.  
 
Much of the interrelationship between the elite and public aspects of British 
culture was set within a context provided by the Commonwealth of Nations.5 It was 
as public intellectuals that UK historians analysed the significance of the British 
Empire’s early twentieth-century development.6 This environment provided the 
context for historians’ various activities in seeking to influence international 
relations. They participated in the formation of foreign policy, the press and civic 
associations. Historians’ participation in groups, such as the Union of Democratic 
Control and the League of Nations Union, affected the policies of the UK’s political 
parties.7 Historians conducted themselves as public intellectuals who were 
proponents of the League of Nations, and who sought to promote perspectives of 
pacifism and international comity.8 
 
UK historians ‘interpretations of Germanness structured historians’ analyses 
of Germany in the public space, as explored in Chapter 3. As noted, Germans had 
earlier been blamed for actions that their detractors represented as primitiveness.9 In 
contrast, the Weimar Republic sought to distance itself from legacies associated with 
Prussian militarism. The Republic promoted the culture represented by Goethe and 
Schiller as exemplars of how Germany sought to be portrayed.10 Perceptions of 
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Germans’ characteristics that conditioned many Britons understandings of Germany 
included Anglo-Saxon heritage, ethnicity, confessionalism, and militarism. 
Historians’ judgment provided a context through which events of the period were 
interpreted and perceived.  
 
UK interwar historians investigated the panoply of contested interpretations 
of Germannness, as outlined in Chapter 4. These included interpretations that 
revolved around ethnic identity, confessional perceptions, militarism, and a 
recognition of Germany’s particular political culture. UK historians raised the 
significance of Germans’ perceptions of injustice and failure following World War I, 
and articulated the risks of taking advantage of their temporary vulnerability to 
humiliation. Their views evolved in tandem with wider society, and attitudes that 
favoured conciliation with the former enemy. 
 
UK historians noted how the politics of reparations and revisionism informed 
Germans’ resentment both inside and outside Germany. In this sense, some UK 
historians became enthusiasts for international norms and institutions, morality and 
law. They analysed Germany’s transition to democracy by examining concepts of 
democratisation, history teaching, and the German revolution. They observed that the 
chances of Germany achieving a viable democratic system were complicated by the 
legacy of the 1919 Versailles Treaty and its associated War Guilt Clause. Historians’ 
views about German democracy were informed by their studies of the British and 
German parliamentary systems. As this thesis examined in Chapter 5, these studies 
facilitated their contributions to the public space.  
 
UK historians saw interwar Germany’s ability to project its power beyond its 
borders as a marker of Germans’ sense of renewed dynamism after World War I, as 
profiled in Chapter 6. Germany’s defeat and the occupation of parts of its territory in 
the aftermath of the conflict struck at Germans’ sense of military superiority. 
Historians’ concern for the past electrified their interests in the interplay of 
contemporary and future events. UK historians saw that the confiscation of 
Germany’s overseas empire weighed hard on Germans’ sense of injustice. Historians 
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analysed Germany by focusing particularly on the importance of renegotiating 
Germany’s borders by means of the League of Nations and return of Germany’s 
colonies. They described the forced reshaping of Germany’s borders and people 
movement as challenging Germans’ sense of their country’s territorial integrity.  
 
Historians similarly scrutinised the Nazi Party through prisms of security, 
sympathy and hostility, as charted by Chapter 7. The need to structure a better 
relationship with Germany provided historians with an opportunity to occupy an 
otherwise fluid public space in the UK. They worked consciously to take advantage 
of their capacity to move across contexts to maximise the impact of their 
commentary and analyses about Nazi Germany. These later activities built upon the 
advances that they had made during the experience of the Weimar Republic.  
 
The preceding chapters have explored the position and impact of UK interwar 
historians as public intellectuals. It was argued that their adaptability and flexibility 
in the public space enabled them to respond to contemporary Britons’ interest in 
Germany. Their work across different fields of knowledge allowed them to adopt 
multiple identities and roles. While this thesis analysed UK historians collectively, 
the historians themselves responded to the serious issues relating to Anglo-German 
relations with varying levels of enthusiasm and commitment. Nonetheless, their 
common background and emphasis on Germany makes them definable as a 
collection of individuals. As a particular group of public intellectuals, many of them 
formed collaborative relationships to influence the UK’s policy towards interwar 
Germany. As a result of this collaboration, these academic networks facilitated 
historians’ access to the public space. Ultimately, in some respects the scope of their 
input to the public space exceeded the brief which they would normally have been 
expected to occupy as historians. Yet, as historians they enjoyed a unique flexibility. 
This increased their ability to pass across political and social barriers.  
 
One of the theoretical assumptions that underpinned the thesis suggests that 
historians’ influence, and ability to deploy social capital, was connected to the 
relationships and conduits that their roles afforded them. In this sense, it offers an 
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insight into historians’ willingness to adopt flexible and adaptive roles across the 
duration of their careers. From this viewpoint, their work on Germany resonated 
within the public space, and accentuated the connectivity between the public space 
and foreign policy. Admittedly, UK historians’ contributions to the consolidation of 
the public space paralleled the development of the mass society of the interwar 
period. It was historians’ roles as credible analysts that bestowed social and cultural 
capital upon them, and which provided them with the authority to actively 
commentate on Germany in a variety of ways.  
 
The thesis shows that there were intellectuals whose affiliations with 
universities appeared remote, yet their occupations gave them access to the public 
space. Their reputation sometimes exceeded the work of their colleagues whose 
connections to universities appeared deeper.11 Nonetheless, up until the end of World 
War I, the ‘last entirely elite generations’ submitted honours theses in order to be 
employed in government.12 They envisioned that their efforts would be recognised 
by the body of their thinking compatriots. Perceptions of the value of their social 
position also drew on the education many of them received at the public schools and 
at Oxbridge.13  
 
The conclusions arrived within this thesis help to demonstrate the relationship 
between intellectuals and their publics. UK historians shared an intense curiosity 
about Germany. As this thesis has demonstrated, UK historians used interwar 
Germany as a means to influence the public space and to highlight the 
counterproductive treatment of Germany after World War I. This manifested itself 
into a cause and effect relationship, whereby historians sought to promote a positive 
image of Germany to prevent a repeat of World War I. An analysis of historians’ 
diaries, correspondence, and government minutes authored by them, make clear that 
they were very cognisant of Germany’s significance in the UK’s public spaces.  
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UK historians’ connection with Germany enabled them to bring foreign 
affairs to the attention of Britons in the public space. Germany was central to 
historians’ interests, and resonated with the public given the events of World War I. 
The thesis considered UK historians and their ability to apply themselves to tasks of 
analysis, prescription and advocacy. In this way, UK historians’ roles in guiding the 
UK’s public opinion and foreign policy about interwar Germany was decisive. 
Historians contributed to an emerging form of the public space as it reconfigured 
itself after World War I.  
 
The thesis is concerned with UK historians and public intellectuals of 
interwar Germany. This is to determine the degree to which their histories and public 
commentary informed British public opinion and foreign policy towards Germany. 
The thesis argued that there was a synergy between influencing public opinion and 
affecting foreign policy options. Furthermore, it suggested that UK historians’ 
scholarship of interwar Germany comprises a singular case study of public 
intellectuals who influenced private, public and political opinions.14  
 
The thesis analysed the ways in which interwar UK historians discussed the 
geopolitical significance of interwar Germany. Historians’ careers at the time 
emanated from a culture where historians’ roles at university level were particularly 
flexible. Historians had enough latitude to pursue careers in universities without 
being assessed and conducting research, despite often engaging in both. As public 
intellectuals, they published their research in a number of publications. A thread that 
links this thesis’ historians is that they were periodically employed within both 
academia and the government. The labours of public intellectuals were themselves a 
product of the UK’s social realities.15 British civil servants’ work was informed by 
the aim that their service should result in ‘a public good’.16 To this end, historians 
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challenged Germany’s responsibility for World War I, as well as the harshness of the 
Treaty of Versailles. Problems for future research around this theme would 
necessitate how aspects of in-group loyalty, such as nationality, be considered as a 
means of public intellectuals’ work. 
 
UK interwar historians were people from whose ranks came public intellectuals 
whose analyses of interwar Germany changed how that country was perceived. The 
nuances of argument, which they displayed in their portrayal of Germany, became 
emblematic of their combination of prescriptive, analytical and advocacy skills. 
Through it all, they were the embodiment of the high ideals set out in the interwar 
years. They were hopeful yet disappointed, idealistic and sincere, even when their 
hopes were dashed and their recommendations on Germany were overtaken by 
events. Among their number included UK historians who used interwar Germany as 
a means to engage with the UK’s changing public space, who strived to be 
acknowledged – and succeeded.  
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